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FORUM SHOPPING FOR ARBITRATION DECISIONS: FEDERAL
COURTS' USE OF ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS AGAINST
STATE COURTS
JEAN R. STERNLIGHTt
"The facts of this case demonstrate the quagmire into which federal courts
frequently have been thrust in arbitration disputes in which the parties have
involved both state and federal tribunals."'
"This case is about forum-shopping, by one and all."2
INTRODUCTION
Arbitration clauses, which are supposed to do away with litigation, have
ironically spawned many complicated and expensive court fights. Some of
the most complex cases involve both forum shopping by the parties and ju-
risdictional turf battles between federal and state courts. Federal courts
have, on quite a few occasions, actually gone so far as to enjoin a state court
from continuing to consider a pending case because the federal court con-
cluded that the matter ought to be arbitrated. 3 The Supreme Court, how-
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Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 1981) (refusing to
enjoin a state court's determination that a dispute was not arbitrable), overruled on other
grounds by Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466 (1 1th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 105 (1998).
2 Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Distajo Second Cir-
cuit 1") (enjoining state court decisions in which a franchisee had secured rulings that disputes
with a franchisor were not arbitrable), on remand, 944 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Conn. 1996), affid,
107 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Distajo Second Circuit lT'), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 365 (1997).
3 See, e.g., Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. HalRob, Inc., 129 F.3d 726, 727 (3d Cir. 1997) (af-
firming, as modified, the district court's injunction proscribing further actions by the state
court, which had refused to stay the action pending arbitration); Distajo Second Circuit 11, 107
F.3d at 136-38 (affirming a district court's grant of injunctions against state courts, despite
arguments that they were improper given the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or abstention princi-
ples); Distajo Second Circuit 1, 66 F.3d at 458 (affirming a district court's stay of several state
court actions in which the state courts had already entered judgment, but denying a stay of
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ever, has never ruled on whether or when such "arbitral antisuit injunctions"
are permissible. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Con-
struction Corp., 4 the Supreme Court expressly reserved ruling on the ques-
tion of whether, given abstention principles, federal courts "might stay a
state-court suit pending arbitration," 5 and the Court has not come back to
the question since then.
6
These arbitral antisuit injunction decisions, which often read like intel-
lectual versions of a playground sandbox battle, raise four important and, to
some degree, conflicting policy concerns. First, multiple federal courts
have held that such injunctions are necessary and appropriate to support the
1925 Federal Arbitration Act's ("FAA's")7 pro-arbitration policy.8 While
those state courts where state res judicata principles would treat state rulings as a final judg-
ment); In re Arbitration Between Nuclear Elec. Ins. Ltd. & Central Power & Light Co., 926 F.
Supp. 428, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting a motion to compel arbitration and staying Texas
state court litigation although the Texas court previously refused to grant a temporary re-
straining order precluding litigation of the suit); McGuire, Cornwell & Blakey v. Grider, 765
F. Supp. 1048, 1051-52 (D. Colo. 1991) (granting a motion to compel arbitration and to stay a
state court action although the state court previously denied a motion to dismiss or enforce
arbitration); A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc. v. McMahon, 697 F. Supp. 488, 494-95 (N.D. Ga.
1988) (enjoining a state court action where a federal court action was filed six weeks after the
state court suit); Pervel Indus., Inc. v. TM Wallcovering, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 867, 870
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (granting a motion to compel arbitration and staying an action previously
filed in a Tennessee state court), afb'd, 871 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1989); cf Roodveldt v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 770, 783-84 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (granting a
motion to compel arbitration but refusing to stay a state court action). But see Towers, Perrin,
Forster & Crosby, Inc. v. Brown, 732 F.2d 345, 350-51 (3d Cir. 1984) (reversing a district
court's stay of a state court action where the state court denied a motion to compel arbitration
and where that determination was affirmed on appeal); Ultracashmere, 664 F.2d at 1178 (af-
firming a district court's denial of an injunction that would have barred state court proceed-
ings where the state court previously ruled that arbitration was not required and had gone on
to determine liability); TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 975 F. Supp. 1305, 1316 (M.D. Ala.
1997) (abstaining from compelling arbitration and ruling that it would be improper under the
Anti-Injunction Act (the "AIA") to enjoin a previously filed state court action), affid in part,
vacated in part on other grounds, and remanded, 149 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998). Federal
courts may also issue arbitral antisuit injunctions against one another. See, e.g., Lummus Co.
v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 93 (2d Cir. 1961) (vacating a district court's stay
of an arbitration pending a court-ordered trial). This subject, however, exceeds the scope of
this Article.
4 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
5 Id. at 25 n.32. It did, however, rule on the related issue of whether a federal court could
abstain from ruling on a motion to compel arbitration pending the outcome in the associated
state case. The Court concluded that, given the facts of the particular case, the district court
had erred in abstaining from a decision on the motion to compel arbitration. See id. at 19.
6 Neither have any commentators focused on the propriety of such injunctions.
7 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994).
8 As one district court put it:
We are sensitive to notions of federalism and comity. Yet, the integrity of arbitra-
tion under the Federal Arbitration Act constitutes an important federal policy. We
do not believe that a contracting party or a state court may act in any way to under-
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recognizing that the FAA does not explicitly authorize antisuit injunctions,
9
such courts have explained that unless they are permitted to enjoin state
courts' actions, the parties will be unable to secure the speedy and inexpen-
sive arbitration envisioned by the FAA.10 This Article examines whether
such injunctions are, in fact, necessary and appropriate to support the FAA's
approval of arbitration.1 Second, in an era declaimed as resurgent for
states' rights and federalism, 12 should federal courts be permitted to enjoin
ongoing state court actions? Such injunctions, through which a federal en-
tity completely shuts down the actions of a state court, may be seen as a di-
rect threat to comity 13 and federalism. 14 Third, do such injunctions support
efficient and effective use of judicial resources? 5 And fourth, do such in-
junctions encourage or discourage inappropriate forum shopping or vexa-
tious litigation behavior?
6
Antisuit injunctions are extremely significant to the parties in arbitra-
tion cases because, in the words of two lawyers who have represented mul-
cut that policy, where as here a federal court order compelling arbitration has been
issued. A preliminary injunction restraining the [franchisee] from proceeding in
state court is necessary in aid of our jurisdiction so as to preserve the integrity of this
arbitration process. Otherwise, [the franchisee] can obtain full and complete injunc-
tive relief and money damages in the state court, as it requests in its complaint there.
Little or nothing would be left for the arbitrator.
Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. RobHal, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 822, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff'd as
modified and remanded sub noma. Specialty Bakeries v. HalRob, Inc., 129 F.3d 726 (3d Cir.
1997).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 102-08 (noting that neither the express language nor
the legislative history of the FAA demonstrates the congressional intent to allow federal
courts to enjoin state court proceedings in favor of arbitration).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 84-85 (noting federal courts' concern that allowing
state court proceedings to continue in the face of federal court-ordered arbitration would make
the arbitration process a "hollow formality").
I See infra text accompanying notes 78-113 (discussing whether the issuance by federal
courts of injunctions that compel arbitration furthers federal policy). After all, the Supreme
Court has observed that "[]ontracts to arbitrate are not to be avoided by allowing one party to
ignore the contract and resort to the courts. Such a course could lead to prolonged litigation,
one of the very risks the parties, by contracting for arbitration, sought to eliminate." South-
land Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984).
'2 See infra text accompanying notes 128-33 (outlining recent Supreme Court decisions
that demonstrate the Court's increased emphasis on federalism and states' rights).
13 The principle of comity requires that courts from one jurisdiction should forbear from
interfering with courts from anotherjurisdiction. See infra text accompanying note 114.
14 The doctrine of federalism focuses specifically on the relationship between the federal
government and the states and is premised on the notion that federal entities must respect the
independent sovereignty of state entities. See infra text accompanying notes 114-41.
See infra text accompanying notes 142-54 (exploring the judicial efficiency concerns
which are raised when one dispute is simultaneously handled by two courts).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 155-63 (discussing the role that a court's determi-
nation that a party's behavior is vexatious should play in the granting or withholding of an
antisuit injunction).
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tiple companies in arbitration actions in both federal and state court, "Fed-
eral courts have generally proved more receptive to arbitration than have
their state counterparts. 17 While parties may differ in their characteriza-
tions of this dichotomy, either calling the federal courts "overenthusiastic"
or calling the state courts "hostile" toward arbitration, it does seem that state
courts are more likely to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements than are
federal courts.18  Although no empirical studies have been done to verify
this anecdotal observation, 19 and while it is not easy to come up with a clear
explanation as to why the attitudes of federal and state court judges should
differ toward arbitration,20 the decided cases do seem to support such a gen-
eral differentiation. For example, when the Montana Supreme Court ini-
tially considered Casarotto v. Lombardi,z1 Justice Trieweiler railed against
"those federal judges who consider forced arbitration as the panacea for
their 'heavy case loads' and who consider the reluctance of state courts to
buy into the arbitration program as a sign of intellectual inadequacy." 22 By
17 Mark R. Kravitz & Edward Wood Dunham, Compelling Arbitration, LITIG., Fall 1996,
at 34, 35.
18 See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text (noting that some experts suggest that
larger franchisors interested in compelling arbitration are often best served by filing suit in
federal, rather than state, court). Some commentators have argued that state courts are, in
general, a dubious forum in which to resolve federal rights, see infra note 117, but the Su-
preme Court has explicitly rejected this position. See infra text accompanying notes 116-27
(noting that the Supreme Court has held that principles of federalism require federal courts to
be bound by state court decisions, even where these decisions are wrong as a matter of federal
law).
Such a study would be extremely interesting but is beyond the scope of this Article.
20 Perhaps state judges' heightened sympathy toward the unfairness claimed by consum-
ers or small businesses can be attributed to the fact that state judges may come from less
wealthy or elite backgrounds than do federal judges, or to the fact that their positions are typi-
cally more politically accountable than are those of federal judges. For a discussion of the
backgrounds of federal appellate judges, see Susan Haire et al., An Intercircuit Profile of
Jud es on the US. Courts ofAppeals, 78 JUDICATURE 101 (1994).
886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 515
U.S. 1129 (1995).
22 Lombardi, 886 P.2d at 939 (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring). Justice Trieweiler
further stated:
What I would like the people in the federal judiciary, especially at the appellate
level, to understand is that due to their misinterpretation of congressional intent
when it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, and due to their naive assumption that
arbitration provisions and choice of law provisions are knowingly bargained for, all
of these procedural safeguards and substantive laws [provided in courts] are easily
avoided by any party with enough leverage to stick a choice of law and an arbitration
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contrast, a number of federal courts have interpreted arbitration clauses ex-
tremely broadly, proving quite willing to reject asserted defenses of fraud,
waiver, unconscionability, and nonarbitrability. 23 Thus, permitting federal
courts to enjoin state court interpretations of arbitration clauses is likely to
result in more disputes being resolved through arbitration, rather than
through litigation.
24
Arbitral antisuit injunctions are also very significant, in that certain
kinds of parties are more likely to prefer to litigate in federal court, and oth-
ers are more likely to prefer state court. In analyzing the published deci-
sions involving arbitral antisuit injunctions, one learns that it is virtually al-
provision in its pre-printed contract and require the party with inferior bargaining-
power to sign it.
." [Such opinions] illustrat[e] an all too frequent preoccupation on the part of
federal judges with their own case load and a total lack of consideration for the rights
of individuals.
Id. at 940 (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring). Several state supreme courts have issued de-
cisions that might be characterized as hostile toward arbitration. See, e.g., Engalla v. Perma-
nente Med. Group, Inc. 938 P.2d 903, 916, 923-24 (Cal. 1997) (remanding the case to the
lower court in order to determine whether a medical group lost the right to arbitration because
of possible fraudulent behavior or waiver); Colorado Permanente Med. Group, P.C. v. Evans,
926 P.2d 1218, 1232-33 (Colo. 1996) (holding an arbitration clause unenforceable pursuant to
a Colorado statute); Heurtebise v. Reliable Bus. Computers, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 243, 258
(Mich. 1996) (holding that an employee handbook did not create a binding contract requiring
arbitration).
23 See, e.g., Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 72 F.3d 793, 797 (10th Cir. 1995)
("Questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy
favoring arbitration,' and thus, 'any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration."' (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985))); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d
1114, 1116 (1st Cir. 1989) ("Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act... to help legiti-
mate arbitration and make it more readily useful to disputants."); Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble,
Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1988) (positing that, since the FAA placed arbitration
agreements as equal in weight to any contract previously recognized at law, courts were re-
quired to vigorously enforce such agreements).
24 There are, of course, a number of federal court decisions that might be characterized as
hostile to arbitration and a number of state court decisions that are very hospitable to arbitra-
tion. See, e.g., Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 precludes employers from using pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreements to compel employees to arbitrate claims brought under Title VII), cert. de-
nied, 119 S. Ct. 445 (1998); Cole v. Burns Int'l. Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1481, 1486-87
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate employment discrimination claims only
because the agreement required the employer to pay the costs of arbitration and assuming that
judicial review of an arbitral award would be meaningful); Brown v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co.,
921 P.2d 146, 163-66 (Haw. 1996) (upholding an arbitration clause contained in an employ-
ment application although the application stated that it did not constitute an employment con-
tract); Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 364-68 (Utah 1996) (remanding a case to trial court to
determine whether or not a doctor-patient arbitration agreement, otherwise held to be proce-
durally unconscionable, was enforceable because the patient, with adequate notice, had failed
to exercise a 14-day revocation privilege).
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ways a "little guy," that is a consumer, employee, franchisee, or dealer, who
has filed in state court, whereas it is usually a "big guy," such as a manu-
facturer or franchisor, who has sought the protection of the federal courts.
2 5
These federal arbitral antisuit injunctions are worth studying, not only
because of their practical significance, but also because they raise intriguing
26jurisdictional questions. In particular, where a state court has previously
issued an order stating that a dispute need not be arbitrated, the federal court
27must decide whether the Federal Full Faith and Credit statute, principles of
claim and issue preclusion, or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine29 prevent the
federal court from reconsidering this question. Even where the state court
has not issued such a ruling, the federal court must determine whether it is
permitted to enjoin an ongoing state proceeding in light of the All Writs
Act,30 traditional equitable principles, 31 the Anti-Injunction Act (the
"AIA"),32 and various abstention doctrines.3 3 Each of the above doctrines is
extremely complex, and many. commentators have noted that the entire
doctrinal foundation of federal jurisdiction is rather convoluted and con-
25 See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (noting that legal experts have counseled
"big guy" franchisors to avoid state courts on the ground that state courts may be more favor-
able to franchisees).
26 By contrast, it is clear that a state court may not enjoin a party from proceeding in a
federal court. See, e.g., Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 665 n.9 (1998) ("This
Court has held it impermissible for a state court to enjoin a party from proceeding in a federal
court ... ."); Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1964) (noting that, although
Congress has authorized federal courts to restrain state court proceedings in certain circum-
stances, it has never "relaxed the... rule that state courts are completely without power to
restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions").
27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994); infra text accompanying notes 164-99 (discussing the
Full Faith and Credit statute as a doctrine that restricts federal courts from overriding state
court decisions).
28 The federal Full Faith and Credit statute requires federal courts to apply the same claim
and issue preclusion principles to a state court decision as would the state's own courts. See
infra notes 164-75 and accompanying text (describing the background of the federal Full Faith
and Credit statute).
29 This doctrine precludes lower federal courts from hearing "appeals" from state courts.
See inffra text accompanying notes 200-33 (describing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994). This legislation gives federal courts the power, absent a
prohibition, to issue antisuit injunctions. See infra text accompanying notes 234-38 (describ-
ing the All Writs Act as granting federal courts authority to issue injunctions).
31 See infra text accompanying notes 239-43 (noting that "[t]raditional equitable con-
straints prohibit federal courts from issuing injunctions ... absent a showing of prospective
'irreparable injury and lack of an adequate remedy at law').
32 The Act is currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994). With a few exceptions, this
statute generally prohibits federal courts from enjoining state suits. See infra text accompa-
nyinA notes 248-369 (explaining the scope of the AIA).
See infra text accompanying notes 370-436 (discussing abstention based on concerns
involving both federalism and judicial efficiency).
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fused, and perhaps in need of an overhaul.34 Thus, the convergence of all of
these doctrines around the issue of federal antisuit injunctions creates a real
intellectual and policy morass.
35
Unfortunately, most courts that have considered the propriety of issuing
an arbitral antisuit injunction have granted the injunction without consider-
ing many of the statutes and doctrines that are directly on point.3 6 Further,
34 See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, Part II,
36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 322 (1968) (stating that the AIA is shrouded in "dense clouds of am-
biguity"); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State
and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV.
1769, 1769 (1992) [hereinafter Redish, Reassessing] ("[A] surprisingly large portion ofjuris-
dictional doctrine makes little sense from any perspective, whether logical, conceptual, or
practical.'); Diane P. Wood, Fine-Tuning Judicial Federalism: A Proposal For Reform of the
Anti-Injunction Act, 1990 BYU L. REV. 289, 290 (endorsing the conclusion of Telford Taylor
and Everett I. Willis in The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts,
42 YALE L.J. 1169, 1172 (1933), that the AIA is an unsatisfactory "thing of threads and
patches"). This Article will, indirectly, support such an argument through its detailed exege-
sis of the many doctrines that must be considered in deciding whether a federal court may en-
join a state court proceeding to support an order to compel arbitration. Rather than propose a
total reform of existing statutory and case law, however, this Article will, instead, address the
question of how courts should proceed under existing statutes and Supreme Court precedent..
35 This Article will not address the extent to which another extremely complex and con-
fusing doctrine, Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, may also be relevant to
whether a federal court ought to enjoin a state court's consideration of an arbitration matter.
See Ranger Fuel Corp. v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co., 677 F.2d 378, 380-81 (4th Cir.
1982) (refusing to enjoin a state court's consideration of an arbitration and dismissing a fed-
eral suit pursuant to Rule 19 because indispensable parties could not be added); Green Tree
Fin. Corp. v. Holt, 171 F.RID. 313, 319 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (same); see also TranSouth Fin.
Corp. v. Bell, 975 F. Supp. 1305, 1315-16 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (observing that a refusal to enjoin
a state court's consideration of an arbitration question is consistent with a Rule 19 approach to
the problem in that a grant of a federal court injunction might well be prejudicial to parties to
a state court action who could not, due to jurisdictional barriers, join in the federal suit), affid
in part, vacated in part on other grounds, and remanded, 149 F.3d 1292 (1 th Cir. 1998).
36 See, e.g., Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. HalRob, Inc., 129 F.3d 726 (3d Cir. 1997) (af-
firming the district court's grant of a franchisor's request for a preliminary injunction against a
franchisee's state court claims pending arbitration); In re Arbitration Between Nuclear Elec.
Ins. Ltd. & Central Power & Light Co., 926 F. Supp. 428, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting an
insurer's request for a temporary restraining order to stay the insured's state court breach of
contract action pending final disposition of arbitration); McGuire, Cornwell & Blakey v.
Grider, 765 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (D. Colo. 1991) (granting a law firm's request to compel ar-
bitration of a legal fees dispute and staying the state court legal malpractice claims pending
arbitration); A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc. v. McMahon, 697 F. Supp. 488, 495 (N.D. Ga.
1988) (granting the motions of an insurer, general agent, mutual fund company, and others to
compel arbitration of a state court claim by a former agent); Pervel Indus., Inc., v. TM Wall-
covering, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 867, 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (granting a manufacturer's motion to
compel arbitration of a dispute with the distributor and staying the distributor's state court
action pending arbitration), affd, 871 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1989); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 557 F.
Supp. 368, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (granting the motion of oil companies and independent oil
producers for an order enjoining plaintiffs from prosecuting antitrust, conspiracy, and breach
of contract claims during arbitration), affd, 742 F.2d 1438 (2d Cir. 1983); Novik & Co. v.
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almost none of the decisions look in depth at the important policy questions
raised by these cases.37 Rather, many are cursory examinations consisting
primarily of cites to earlier decided cases, which are themselves lacking in
analysis.38 In a typical ruling, the federal court simply: (1) determines it
has jurisdiction; (2) finds that arbitration is required by the parties' agree-
ment and thus grants the motion to compel arbitration; and (3) concludes
that having compelled arbitration, it is justified in enjoining the state court
proceeding either to protect the federal court judgment or to protect federal
court jurisdiction.39  While perhaps appearing reasonable at first glance,
these decisions often fail to take note of important factual distinctions be-
tween the cases, and therefore fail properly to analyze the relevant doctrines
and policies.40 The decisions also fail to take into account the fact that re-
Jerry Mann, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 447, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (granting a fabric seller's action to
stay state court proceedings and to enforce an arbitration provision); Burger Chef Sys., Inc. v.
Baldwin Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (compelling arbitration between an
Indiana corporation and Michigan residents and staying a lawsuit brought in Michigan state
court); Network Cinema Corp. v. Glassbum, 357 F. Supp. 169, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (granting
a movie theater franchisor's motion to compel arbitration of franchising agreement disputes,
and staying the franchisee's attempt to litigate same and other disputes in state court); In re
Arbitration of Controversies Between Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp. & Carl, 260 F. Supp.
665, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (granting the sewing machine suppliers' motion to proceed to arbi-
tration, and staying the distributor from proceeding further in its state action). By contrast, in
Distajo Second Circuit I, 66 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 1995), and in Distajo Second Circuit II, 107
F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 1997), the Second Circuit did, at least, consider the propriety of the re-
quested injunction in light of the federal Full Faith and Credit statute, the AIA, and the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Nonetheless, as discussed infra in text accompanying notes 471-
89, this Article contends that the Second Circuit failed to adequately consider how the specific
factual context of that case ought to impact the application of those doctrines.
37 See, e.g., Novik, 497 F. Supp. 447; Burger Chef, 365 F. Supp. 1229; Network Cinema,
357 F. Supp. 169; Necchi Sewing, 260 F. Supp. 665.
38 See, e.g., Pervel Indus., 675 F. Supp. at 870 (justifying a stay with a cite to Hunt);
Hunt, 557 F. Supp. at 372 n.13 (justifying a stay with cites to various cases including Novik,
Network Cinema, and Necchi); Novik, 497 F. Supp. at 448 (justifying a stay with a cite to
Burger CheJ); Burger Chef, 365 F. Supp. at 1233-34 (justifying a stay with cites to prior deci-
sions in Necchi and Network Cinema).
39 See, e.g., Specialty Bakeries v. RobHal, 961 F. Supp. 822, 829-31 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(enjoining a state court proceeding which had found arbitration inappropriate, and justifying
an antisuit injunction as necessary in aid of federal jurisdiction), aff'd as modified and re-
manded sub nom. Specialty Bakeries v. HalRob, 129 F.3d 726 (3d Cir. 1997); Nuclear Elec.,
926 F. Supp. at 432-36 (concluding that a federal court need not abstain from compelling ar-
bitration, that arbitration was required, and that an antisuit injunction was warranted to aid the
federal court's jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its judgments); Pervel Indus., 675 F.
Supp. at 868-70 (concluding that a dispute was arbitrable based on strong federal policy and
that an antisuit injunction was warranted to aid federal jurisdiction); see also TranSouth, 149
F.3d at 1293 (suggesting, but not holding, that an antisuit injunction might be appropriate after
a federal court has compelled arbitration to ensure that the federal court has the opportunity to
rule on the validity of a future arbitration award).
40 See, e.g., Specialty Bakeries, 961 F. Supp. 822 (failing to consider the Full Faith and
Credit or Rooker-Feldman implications of a prior state court order concluding that a dispute
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cent Supreme Court decisions have undercut the reasoning of some of the
early cases granting injunctions against state courts.41 Those few courts that
have denied the requested injunctions typically engage in a somewhat more
detailed analysis, but even their discussions fail fully to consider the com-
plexly interwoven policy and doctrinal issues.
42
This Article thus attempts to determine when, if ever, federal courts
should be permitted to enjoin state court determinations in order to allow
arbitration to proceed.43 Part I considers the phenomenon of federal
was nonarbitrable); Pervel Indus., 675 F. Supp. 867 (failing to specify when a state suit had
been filed or what progress had been made in it, or to consider the possible implications of
that suit in terms of abstention); Novik, 497 F. Supp. 447 (enjoining state suits but failing to
specify when such suits were filed or how far they had progressed; failing to consider the pos-
sible Full Faith and Credit, Rooker-Feldman, or abstention implications of state action; and
failing to discuss the AIA); Network Cinema, 357 F. Supp. 169 (enjoining a state court action
in which the court had concluded arbitration was not required while failing to consider the
possible Full Faith and Credit, Rooker-Feldman, or abstention implications of the state court
rulini).
But cf. First Franildin Fin. Corp. v. McClollum, 144 F.3d 1362, 1364-65 (1lth Cir.
1998) (recognizing that recent decisions allow state courts to compel arbitration under the
FAA); TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 975 F. Supp. 1305, 1310 n.6 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (distin-
guishing several previously decided cases on the ground that they are inconsistent with subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions), affid in part, vacated in part on other grounds, and re-
manded, 149 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998). See infra text accompanying notes 91-96, 372-90
for a further discussion of recent Supreme Court and lower court decisions that have undercut
many early cases granting arbitral antisuit injunctions.
2 See, e.g., Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc. v. Brown, 732 F.2d 345, 347-51 (3d
Cir. 1984) (reversing a district court stay of a state court action after considering the Full Faith
and Credit statute and whether res judicata would apply under California law, but failing to
consider equitable principles, the AIA, or abstention principles); Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v.
Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1180-84 (lth Cir. 1981) (affirming the district court's denial of an
injunction after analyzing the concepts of federalism and equity as relating to an injunction of
a state court proceeding and concluding that the state ruling was subject to the doctrne of res
judicata, but failing to analyze the AIA or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine), overruled on other
grounds by Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466 (1 1th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 105 (1998); TranSouth, 975 F. Supp. at 1306-16 (ruling that both the injunction and the
order compelling arbitration would be inappropriate in light of federal abstention doctrines,
the AIA, and Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but failing to consider purely
equitable principles), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, and remanded, 149 F.3d
1292 (11th Cir. 1998).
43 This Article will not consider, except in passing, whether federal courts should be
permitted to enjoin state court decisions issued in furtherance of arbitration. Cf Southeast
Resource Recovery Facility Auth. v. Montenay Int'l Corp., 973 F.2d 711, 715 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a state court's grant of a motion compelling arbitration was, given state law, en-
titled to preclusionary effect as a final order, thereby voiding the district court's contrary or-
der); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541 F.2d 1263, 1271, 1273-74 (7th Cir.
1976) (granting a motion to compel arbitration but refusing to stay a state court's action where
the state court had previously ordered arbitration, where that judgment was affirmed by an
intermediate appellate court, and where that judgment was on appeal to the Illinois Supreme
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courts' issuance of antisuit injunctions in the arbitration context, analyzing
the cases in which such injunctions have been sought, and pointing out
some important distinctions among them. Part I focuses, in particular, on
four key differences among the cases: 1) whether the federal action was
filed prior or subsequent to the state suit, 2) the stage of the state suit at the
time the injunction was sought, 3) the stage of the federal suit at the time the
federal injunction was sought, and 4) the extent to which either party may.
be said to have engaged in vexatious litigation.
44
Part II examines the primary policy concerns that courts should con-
sider in determining whether to grant such injunctions. It takes a close look
at each policy and shows that the relative strength of the competing policies
45at issue will vary according to the factual context of each case.
Parts III and IV examine the various statutes and doctrines that deter-
mine whether or not federal courts may enjoin state court actions to ensure
that a dispute goes to arbitration. Part III first examines the two doctrines
governing whether a federal court may effectively overrule a state determi-
nation that a dispute is nonarbitrable: the Full Faith and Credit Statute46 and
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.47 Part IV then discusses those doctrines that
govern whether a federal court may enjoin an ongoing state action, regard-
less of whether the state court has already determined that the dispute is
nonarbitrable. After first examining federal courts' power to issue injunc-
tions under the All Writs Act,48 Part IV examines the limits imposed by the
Court); Integrated Pet Foods, Inc. v. Commonwealth, No. CIV. A. 95-7847, 1996 WL
153216, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 1996) (dismissing a motion to stay a state court action and
granting Rule 11 sanctions against a party who requested an injunction where the state court
had previously rejected certain of the defendant's defenses, and where the action was going to
proceed to arbitration in the state court); see also Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v.
Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248-51, 254 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a state court's determi-
nation confirming an arbitration award, despite a jurisdictional challenge, was entitled to be
treated as res judicata under state law and thus must be afforded full faith and credit by the
federal court).
44 See infra text accompanying notes 56-76 (using a hypothetical franchising scenario to
illustrate these key differences).
45 See infra text accompanying notes 77-163 (discussing the following four policies: the
FAA's supposed preference for arbitration over litigation; federalism and comity; efficiency;
and the discouragement of vexatious litigation).
46 See infra text accompanying notes 164-99 (discussing the statute requiring federal
courts to honor state judicial proceedings).
47 See infra text accompanying notes 200-33 (discussing lower federal courts' lack of
reviewing jurisdiction over state court decisions).
48 See infra text accompanying notes 234-38 (discussing federal courts' general statutory
authority to issue various writs, particularly antisuit injunctions).
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traditional equitable constraints on the issuance of injunctions, 49 the AIA,50
and the relevant abstention doctrines.51 With respect to each doctrine, Parts
III and IV first provide background context, then examine whether and how
courts have applied the doctrine to arbitral antisuit injunctions, and finally
discuss how the doctrine should be applied to such injunctions. These Parts
show that although courts have often failed to apply these doctrines properly
in the context of arbitral antisuit injunctions, courts' applications of the
doctrines in other contexts often draw on precisely the policies discussed in
Part I1.52  These Parts also show the importance of drawing distinctions
based on the factual differences noted in Part I: the priority of the state and
federal actions, the stage of each suit, and the vexatiousness of the litigants'
behavior. In short, Parts III and IV demonstrate that, while courts could
easily employ the policy analysis set out in Part II within the constraints of
existing doctrine, courts generally fail to do so.
Part V concludes by arguing that the federal courts' typical failure to
apply many of the doctrines that might preclude arbitral injunctions or to
draw the factual distinctions set out above is symptomatic of courts' fre-
quent over-enthusiasm for contractual arbitration. This failure may also al-
low big businesses to gain an unfair advantage over "little guys."53 As I
have argued elsewhere, it is by no means clear that courts' extreme prefer-
ence for arbitration over litigation is supported either by the legislative his-
tory of the FAA or by policy considerations. 54 Instead, where federal courts
issue arbitral antisuit injunctions in defiance of dominant principles of fed-
eralism and comity, federal courts disparage state courts' capacity for fair-
ness more seriously than can be justified by the federal supremacy interest.
In effect, the federal courts are making an invidious comparison between the
state forum and an arbitral forum in the guise of resolving a jurisdictional
conflict between the federal and state forums. Moreover, this preference for
49 See infra text accompanying notes 239-47 (concluding that traditional equitable princi-
ples will likely prevent a federal court from issuing an arbitral antisuit injunction except under
unusual circumstances).
50 See infra text accompanying notes 248-369 (discussing the powerful scope of the AIA
as well as its limitations and exceptions).
51 See infra text accompanying notes 370-436 (analyzing the issue of whether a federal
court that has the authority to enjoin a state court may, or ought to, exercise that prerogative).
52 Of course, certain doctrines may emphasize one set of policies more than another.
53 See infra text accompanying notes 437-99 (contending, inter alia, insufficient attention
to federalism and comity concerns as possible explanations for over-enthusiasm).
54 See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 641 (1996) ("When Congress
passed the FAA in 1925, it intended only to require federal courts to accept arbitration agree-
ments that had been voluntarily entered into by two parties of relatively equal bargaining
power in arms' length transactions.").
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arbitration over litigation raises constitutional concerns.55 Thus, it is crucial
that federal courts carefully consider the permissibility of antisuit injunc-
tions in light of the relevant jurisdictional doctrines and the particular facts
of each case.
I. THE PHENOMENON OF FORUM SHOPPING FOR ARBITRATION DECISIONS
A. A Hypothetical
Francesca (franchisee) and Big Guys (franchisor) enter into a contrac-
tual agreement which, inter alia and in small print, provides for arbitration
of certain disputes. When a disagreement ultimately arises between the two,
Francesca sues Big Guys in state court, alleging various tort and contract
causes of action. Francesca also argues that she should not be required to
arbitrate the disputes, reasoning perhaps that the disputes do not arise out of
the arbitration agreement, that the arbitration agreement itself was fraudu-
lent or secured under duress, or that Big Guys has, through its behavior or
delay, already waived its right to arbitration. Rather than fight this battle in
state court or remove the state action to federal court,56 Big Guys files a
55 See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Prefer-
ence for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and
Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1997) ("By expressing and applying a prefer-
ence for binding arbitration over litigation, the Court is directly countering the Constitution's
guarantees of due process of law in all courts, and to a life-tenured judge and jury trial in ap-
propriate matters brought in federal court.").
56 There are multiple reasons why a party might choose to file a separate action in federal
court rather than to remove the state court action to federal court. First, pursuant to the re-
moval statute, certain actions that give rise to federal jurisdiction are nonetheless not remov-
able. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446 (1994). Where the defendant is a citizen of the state in
which the action was filed and the only ground for removal is diversity jurisdiction, no re-
moval is permitted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). In such a situation, the defendant could, how-
ever, file a separate federal court action. See First Franklin Fin. Corp. v. McCollum, 144 F.3d
1362, 1363-64 (1lth Cir. 1998) (stating that the non-removability of a.state court action does
not affect jurisdiction over an independent federal suit). Second, a party may, at times, miss
the deadline for removal, which is just 30 days. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Third, when an
action is removed, it is removed to the federal district in which the state court is located. See
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). By filing a separate federal action, a party may secure an alternative and
preferable federal court venue. Fourth, sometimes the presence of non-diverse parties, see 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b), or of parties who do not consent to removal, see Chicago, Rock Island &
Pac. Ry. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245 (1900), will prevent the removal of an entire state action to
federal court. In such a situation, a subset of the state court defendants may file a separate
federal court action. This occurred in TranSouth Financial Corp. v. Bell, 975 F. Supp. 1305,
1306-08 (M.D. Ala. 1997), affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, and remanded, 149
F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998).
Because the filing of a separate federal court action may be seen as an "end run" around
the removal statute, it may be inappropriate for federal courts in which such separate suits are
brought to enjoin ongoing state court actions. But see TranSouth, 975 F. Supp. at 1306-09
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separate action in federal court, in the district that is the corporate home to
Big Guys.57 In this federal action, Big Guys requests the federal court not
only to compel arbitration pursuant to section 4 of the FAA, but also to en-
ter an injunction staying any further proceedings in, or the enforcement of,
the state action. The federal court enters the injunction, and the state court
ceases its activity in the case.
B. The Hypothetical is Based on Oversimplified Reality
This scenario is not purely hypothetical, but rather is based on many
actual cases. In the vast majority of the reported cases involving requests
for federal arbitral antisuit injunctions, a "little guy," such as a franchisee,
employee, consumer, or local distributor, filed suit in state court based on a
theory of either contract or tort law. The "little guy" argued that the dispute
was not covered by the arbitration clause or, in the alternative, that the arbi-
tration clause was void. The state court often agreed. Rather than rely on
(finding that a federal court has jurisdiction to hear part of a non-removable state court action,
although ultimately concluding that it should abstain from granting a motion to compel arbi-
tration). In one noteworthy case, the franchisor filed a separate federal action against only
those state counter-plaintiffs as to whom diversity existed, but then convinced the district
court to use the "active concert or participation" language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65(d) to also enjoin the non-diverse state court plaintiffs. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v.
Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp. 77, 85-86 (D. Conn. 1996) ("The reach of an injunction may ex-
tend to non-parties.... To enjoin all the class plaintiffs except for the [state court plaintiff],
who could then proceed with the ... lawsuit, would render the issuance of an injunction in
this case a nullity."). See generally Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class
Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE W. 141, 141-42 (1997) (explaining the use of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65(d) to enjoin non-parties).
57 Because section 4 of the FAA provides that arbitration proceedings ordered by the
court "shall be within the district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is
filed," 9 U.S.C. § 4, several courts have held that a federal court action to compel arbitration
must be filed in the district where, according to the arbitration agreement, the arbitration
would be held. See, e.g., Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc. v. Bloor, 129 F.3d 851, 854-55
(6th Cir. 1997) (holding that, where an arbitration agreement specified Ohio as its forum, only
the district court in that forum had the jurisdiction to compel arbitration); National Iranian Oil
Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the plain language of
a forum selection clause required parties to arbitrate in Iran); Farr & Co. v. Compafita Inter-
continental de Navegaci6n de Cuba, S.A., 243 F.2d 342, 347 (2d Cir. 1957) (explaining that
"by agreeing to arbitrate in New York a party makes himself as amenable to suit as if he were
physically present in New York"); Doctor's Assocs. v. Stuart, No. 3:95CV01065 (PCD), 1995
1WL 869590, at *1 (D. Conn. July 27, 1995) (holding that the parties were bound by a ruling
of a Connecticut court, and not by an Illinois court, because a forum selection clause specified
that disputes would be arbitrated in Connecticut), afr'd, 85 F.3d 975 (2d Cir. 1996); In re
Home Ins. Co., 908 F. Supp. 180, 182-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that a petition to compel
arbitration could only be brought in New York where an arbitration clause expressly provided
that arbitration would take place in New York). In the text's hypothetical, as Big Guys
drafted the arbitration agreement, it had the power to locate the arbitration in a desirable loca-
tion, such as Big Guys's corporate home state.
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the state court to resolve the dispute, the "big guy," such as a franchisor,
employer, or manufacturer, instead filed a motion to compel arbitration in
federal court, often far from where the "little guy" filed. The "big guy" also
asked the federal court to enjoin the state court proceeding. 8
58 See, e.g., TranSouth, 149 F.3d at 1294 (borrower filed state action in Alabama, lenders
filed federal suit in Alabama); Distajo Second Circuit 1, 66 F.3d at 447-50 (franchisees filed
state actions in Alabama, Illinois, and North Carolina, while franchisor filed federal action in
New York), on remand, 944 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Conn. 1996), affd, 107 F.3d 126 (2d Cir.
1997) ("Distajo Second Circuit I'), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 365 (1997); Towers, Perrin, For-
ster & Crosby, Inc. v. Brown, 732 F.2d 345, 347 (3d Cir. 1984) (employees filed a state suit in
California, and employer filed a federal action in Pennsylvania); Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v.
Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1178-79 (lth Cir. 1981) (local clothing retailer filed a state suit in
Alabama, while manufacturer filed a federal action in New York), overruled on other grounds
by Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
105 (1998); Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. RobHal, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 822, 825 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(franchisee filed a state suit in New Jersey, and franchisor filed a federal suit in Pennsylvania),
af[d as modified and remanded sub nom. Specialty Bakeries v. HalRob, 129 F.3d 726 (3d
Cir. 1997); Ferrari N. Am., Inc. v. Crown Auto Dealerships, No. 94 Civ. 8541 (KMW), 1995
WL 614558, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995) (dealer filed an administrative action in Florida,
and manufacturer filed a federal court action in New York), affd, 101 F.3d 686 (2d Cir.
1996); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Vetter, 838 F. Supp. 468, 470 (D. Mont. 1993) (dealer filed a
state action in Montana, and manufacturer filed a federal action in Montana); McGuire,
Cornwell & Blakey v. Grider, 765 F. Supp. 1048, 1049-50 (D. Colo. 1991) (client filed a mal-
practice action in Oklahoma state court, and law firm filed a federal suit in Colorado); A.L.
Williams & Assocs., Inc. v. McMahon, 697 F. Supp. 488, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (employee
filed defamation and fraud actions in California, while employer filed in federal court in
Georgia); Pervel Indus., Inc. v. TM Wallcovering, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 867, 868 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (local distributor filed in Tennessee state court, and manufacturer filed in federal court
in New York), afd, 871 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1989); Burger Chef Sys., Inc. v. Baldwin Inc., 365 F.
Supp. 1229, 1230 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (franchisee filed a state action in Michigan, while franchi-
sor filed a federal suit in New York); Network Cinema Corp. v. Glassburn, 357 F. Supp. 169,
170 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (franchisee filed a state action in Kansas, and franchisor filed a federal
suit in New York); In re Arbitration of Controversies Between Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales
Corp. & Carl, 260 F. Supp. 665, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (local distributor filed a state action in
Oklahoma, and manufacturer filed a federal action in New York).
Strikingly, in two cases with facts opposite to those in the hypothetical, the federal courts
were much more deferential to the state court decisions. See Swofford v. Shearson Leh-
man/Am. Express, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1128, 1129 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (refusing to enjoin a state
court's refusal to order arbitration where the employer filed a state action in Arkansas, and the
employee filed a federal action in Arkansas); Roodveldt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 770, 783-84 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (granting a motion to compel arbitra-
tion but refusing to stay a state court action where the employer filed an action in state court in
Pennsylvania, and the employee filed a federal action seeking to compel arbitration in Penn-
sylvania).
A few other cases involved disputes between two large powerful companies. See, e.g., In
re Arbitration Between Nuclear Elec. Ins. Ltd. & Central Power & Light Co., 926 F. Supp.
428, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (issuing a stay for a pending state court action while awaiting the
final disposition of an arbitration); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 557 F. Supp. 368, 371-72
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (enjoining a plaintiffs' state court action following the district court's ruling
that the plaintiffs breach of contract claims were subject to arbitration), affd, 742 F.2d 1438
(2d Cir. 1983); Novik & Co. v. Jerry Mann, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 447, 448-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
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The hypothetical scenario above is also based on a "how-to" article,
written by two franchisor attorneys, in which the authors provide detailed
suggestions regarding how to avoid a state court environment that may be
more favorable to the franchisee than the franchisor.59 Their article begins
with its own hypothetical:
The general counsel of AJAX Corporation is on the phone. AJAX has just
been sued for breach of contract and associated torts in a distant state court re-
nowned for its hostility to outsiders, fondness for hometown plaintiffs, and
enthusiasm for heart-stopping punitive damage verdicts. Not surprisingly, the
plaintiff wants ajury trial and a modest seven-or-eight figure punitive damage
award. In reviewing the file, the general counsel has discovered that the con-
tract between the plaintiff and AJAX contains a standard American Arbitration
Association (AAA) arbitration clause requiring, on demand by either party, ar-
bitration of any dispute in AJAX's home state .... Emphasizing how critical
it is to avoid a jury in this inhospitable locale, the general counsel asks you
what AJAX can do to enforce its arbitration rights if, as anticipated, the plain-
tiff refuses to arbitrate and insists on pressing its lawsuit.
The authors conclude that although one's first instinct might be to file a
motion in the state court to stay the litigation and compel arbitration, it
would be far wiser to file a separate action in the federal court with jurisdic-
tion over the contractually designated arbitration site6 1 and to move to en-
join the state court action.62 Observing, somewhat wistfully, that federal ju-
risdiction will not always exist,63 the authors recommend opting for federal
court whenever possible, to take advantage of the fact that federal precedent
is almost certainly more pro-arbitration than is state law precedent.64
(staying state court proceedings and enforcing an arbitration provision agreed to by the par-
ties).
59 See Kravitz & Dunham, supra note 17. Kravitz and Dunham note that they have each
represented Doctor's Associates, Inc., the franchisor for Subway sandwich shops, in multiple
cases. See id. at 34. These authors have also written several other articles geared toward
teaching franchisors and others how to use arbitration to avoid liability. See, e.g., Dunham,
supra note 56, at 141 (explaining that franchisors can use arbitration clauses to prevent class
actions, thereby deterring suits and dramatically reducing exposure); Edward Wood Dunham
et al., Franchisor Attempts to Control the Dispute Resolution Forum: Why the Federal Arbi-
tration Act Trumps the New Jersey Supreme Court's Decision in Kubis, 29 RUTGERs L.J. 237,
239 (1998) (suggesting that forum selection provisions contained within an arbitration clause
"should be immune to attempted state interference").
60 Kravitz & Dunham, supra note 17, at 34.
61 See id. at 37.
62 See id. at 40.
63 See id. at 36. As will be discussed, see infra text accompanying note 111, the FAA is
an anomalous federal statute which does not give rise to federal court jurisdiction.
64 See id. at 36; supra text accompanying notes 17-24, 58 (explaining that the state courts
tend to favor the franchisee, while the federal courts tend to grant franchisor motions to com-
pel arbitration).
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It is very important, however, to focus on certain significant facts that
are ignored in these two hypotheticals and in the actual cases in which
federal courts have been requested to enjoin state court actions. First, it
is important to focus on whether the federal action was filed before or
after the state court action was filed.65  Second, one must focus on what
stage the state court proceeding was at when the federal court was
requested to enjoin the state court proceeding, and if the parties had yet
exchanged discovery.66  Had the state court been requested to stay
litigation or compel arbitration? 67  Had it denied such a motion?68  Had
the state court entered a judgment on the merits?69 Was that judgment fi-
65 In Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 557 F. Supp. 368, 370-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aft'd, 742 F.2d
1438 (2d Cir. 1983), the court granted the requested injunction of state court proceedings, ob-
serving that the federal court action had been filed seven years prior to the state court action,
and that the federal court had issued a judgment ordering arbitration four years prior to the
state proceeding. Much more frequently, however, federal courts enjoin state court proceed-
ings even though such proceedings are filed prior to the federal court action. With the excep-
tion of Hunt, this is true of all of the cases granting antisuit injunctions cited supra in notes 3,
36.
66 In Ultracashmere House Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 1981), over-
ruled on other grounds by Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466 (11th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 105 (1998), the appellate court affirmed the district court's refusal to
enjoin a state proceeding where the federal court plaintiff did not file suit until "four days be-
fore the state court trial and almost nine months after initiation of the state court proceedings."
67 In TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 975 F. Supp. 1305, 1307-09 (M.D. Ala. 1997), affd in
part, vacated in part on other grounds, and remanded, 149 F.3d 1292 (1 1th Cir. 1998), the
district court abstained from ruling on a motion to compel arbitration and to enjoin the state
court proceeding where the state court had been asked to grant a motion to compel arbitration
but had not yet ruled on that motion. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the abstention on the mo-
tion to compel and remanded the case so that the district court could reconsider whether to
grant the motion to compel and whether to stay the state action if arbitration was compelled.
See TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 149 F.3d 1292, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 1998).
68 Compare Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. HalRob, Inc., 129 F.3d 726, 727 (3d Cir. 1997)
(affirming a district court's injunction of a state court proceeding, even though the state court
had refused to stay an action pending arbitration), In re Arbitration Between Nuclear Elec.
Ins. Ltd. & Central Power & Light Co., 926 F. Supp. 428, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting a
motion to compel arbitration and to stay a state court proceeding where the state court had
previously denied a motion for a temporary restraining order to stay the state action),
McGuire, Cornwell & Blakey v. Grider, 765 F. Supp. 1048, 1050-52 (D. Colo. 1991) (grant-
ing a motion to compel arbitration and to stay a state court action although the state court had
previously denied a motion to dismiss or enforce arbitration), and Network Cinema Corp. v.
Glassbum, 357 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (granting a motion to compel arbitration and
staying a state action although the state court had already ruled that arbitration was not re-
quired), with Ultracashmere, 664 F.2d at 1183 (affinming a district court's denial of an in-
junction which barred state proceedings where the state court had already determined that ar-
bitration was not required and that liability was appropriate).
69 Compare Distajo Second Circuit II, 107 F.3d 126, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming the
district court's stay of state court actions in which the state court had already entered judg-
ment), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 365 (1997), with In re Arbitration Between Towers, Perrin,
Forster & Crosby, Inc. v. Brown, 732 F.2d 345, 351 (3d Cir. 1984) (reversing the district
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nal?70 Third, the actual cases may vary as to the stage of the federal action
at the time the injunction was sought. Was the federal action just filed?7'
Had substantial discovery already taken place? Had the federal court al-
ready made a ruling on whether or not arbitration should be compelled?
72
And, had the federal court actually issued a final judgment in the case?
73
Fourth, it is important to determine whether either party engaged in any
kind of vexatious, strategic conduct or inappropriate forum shopping.74 In
considering whether particular litigation strategies were vexatious, it may be
appropriate to look at issues such as which party was the first to file in state
court 75 and how long a period of time passed before the action was filed in
court's stay of a state court action where the state court had denied a motion to compel arbi-
tration and where that determination had been affirmed on appeal).
70 In Distajo Second Circuit 1, the Second Circuit concluded that a district court's right to
enjoin a state court proceeding should depend, at least in part, on whether any judgment al-
ready issued by the state court was deemed to be "final" under that state's own jurisprudence.
See Distajo Second Circuit 1, 66 F.3d 438, 446-51 (2d Cir. 1995), on remand, 944 F. Supp.
1007 (D. Conn. 1996), affid, 107 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Distajo Second Circuit IF'), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 365 (1997). Reviewing judgments arising out of various state courts, the
Second Circuit concluded that although one state's judgments should be deemed to be final,
other states' judgments should not. See id. at 446-51.
71 Compare Ultracashmere, 664 F.2d at 1179 (affirming a district court's refusal to en-
join a state court proceeding where the federal court suit had just been filed, and where the
state suit had been in progress for nine months), with In re Arbitration of Controversies Be-
tween Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp. & Carl, 260 F. Supp. 665, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(enjoining a state suit although a federal suit was filed just a few months prior to the decision
and although the state suit had been pending for five years).
72 See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 557 F. Supp. 368, 370-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (enjoin-
ing a state proceeding where a federal action had been ongoing for eight years, and where five
years prior to the filing of the state action, the federal district court had dismissed the state
court plaintiff's claims on the merits, sending certain claims to arbitration), af'd, 742 F.2d
1438 (2d Cir. 1983).
73 The Hunt court characterized its determination as a judgment and made a determina-
tion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) that "there was no just reason for delay."
557 F. Supp. at 370. Nonetheless, when the court held that it still retained jurisdiction over
the parties and the claim it had sent to arbitration, see id at 372, the determination was appar-
ently not final.
74 Compare Hunt, 557 F. Supp. at 372 (granting an antisuit injunction where the party
that the federal court had sent to arbitration five years earlier then filed an action in state court
seeking to vacate the alleged arbitral final award), and Ultracashmere, 664 F.2d at 1179 (af-
firming a denial of an antisuit injunction where the party did not file a federal court motion to
compel arbitration until four days before state court trial), with Distajo Second Circuit H1, 107
F.3d at 135-36 (enjoining a state court action even though it was the franchisor who originally
brought the action in state court, and even though the contract required the franchisee to arbi-
trate all claims but allowed the franchisor to use court eviction proceedings against the fran-
chisee in the event of an alleged breach of contract).
75 In Distajo Second Circuit 1, 66 F.3d at 456, the court reversed and remanded the case
for further consideration of the district court's determination that the franchisor, Doctors As-
sociates, did not waive its right to arbitration by filing an action in state court. See also id. at
441 ("When problems did arise... neither side invoked the arbitration clause. First, DAI
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federal court.76 This Article contends that these distinctions, too often
blurred by the courts, are essential to a proper determination of whether a
federal court may legitimately enjoin state court action in a particular case.
IL. A PROPOSED ANALYSIS
Federal courts should consider four sets of policies in deciding whether
or not to enjoin an ongoing state court action in connection with an injunc-
tion compelling arbitration: (1) any federal policy favoring the issuance of
such injunction, (2) federalism and comity principles that might weigh
against the injunction, (3) efficiency concerns that might either support or
oppose an injunction, and (4) the goal of deterring vexatious or harassing
litigation that might also either support or oppose an injunction."
directed its wholly owned real-estate leasing companies to bring summary eviction proceed-
ings against the franchisees in local state courts."); see also Distajo Second Circuit 11, 107
F.3d at 132-33 (finding no waiver of arbitration although the franchisor initiated an action in
state court).
76 .Compare A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc. v. McMahon, 697 F. Supp. 488, 494-95 (N.D.
Ga. 1988) (enjoining a state court action where a company filed in federal court just six weeks
after its opponent filed a state court action), with Necchi Sewing, 260 F. Supp. at 668-70 (en-
joining a state court action even though the party seeking to compel arbitration waited five
years after the commencement of the state court action to file in federal court).
77 Other commentators have come up with their own lists of factors that courts or poli-
cymakers should consider in determining the propriety of antisuit injunctions, or, more gener-
ally, in allocating business between state and federal courts. See, e.g., COMPLEX LITIGATION:
STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS § 5.04(b) cmt. d (1994) (proposing that
federal courts be given discretionary power to enjoin ongoing state actions after considering
how far state actions have progressed, the degree of duplication between federal and state ac-
tions, the extent to which actions involve issues of federal law, and the interests of non-
parties); Redish, Reassessing, supra note 34, at 1770-85 (urging that allocation of cases be-
tween federal and state courts should turn on factors of desirability of "intersystemic cross-
pollination, systemic representativeness, litigant choice, litigation efficiency, fundamental
fairness, institutionalism, and logical consistency"); Edward F. Sherman, Antisuit Injunction
and Notice of Intervention and Preclusion: Complementary Devices to Prevent Duplicative
Litigation, 1995 BYU L. REV. 925, 927-46 (1995) (describing and advocating the aforemen-
tioned 1994 ALl Complex Litigation Proposal's antisuit injunction provision, which sets out
procedures and standards to be followed when enjoining a state action); Paul W. Werner, An-
tisuit Injunctions Under the Complex Litigation Proposal: Harmonizing the Sirens' Song of
Efficiency and Fairness with the Hymn of Judicial Federalism and Comity, 1995 BYU L.
REv. 1041, 1065-78 (1995) (criticizing those who advocate the American Law Institute's
1994 Complex Litigation Proposal for failing to give sufficient weight to principles of comity
and federalism, and urging that the federal transferee court should instead evaluate the fol-
lowing factors: the extent of progress in both courts, the extent of commonality of issues be-
tween the two suits, the effect on the party excused from the action, forum inconvenience,
party gamesmanship, and principles of comity and federalism); Diane P. Wood, supra note
34, at 319-20 (urging that the AIA be rewritten to allow a federal court to enjoin pending state
court proceedings "only when necessary to prevent irreparable harm to the parties or to federal
interests, giving due regard to the interests of the state and the adequacy of the remedies in the
state courts"). My own analysis is distinct from each of these in that I have attempted to focus
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A. Does Federal Policy Support Arbitral Antisuit Injunctions?
Courts and commentators have sometimes concluded that a federal
court is, or should be, justified in issuing an antisuit injunction where failure
to issue such an injunction would frustrate federal policy. 78 For example, in
Mitchum v. Foster,79 the Supreme Court held that because a purpose of the
Civil Rights Act of 187180 was to prevent state courts from depriving per-
sons of their federally protected civil rights, the AIA did not preclude a fed-
eral court from enjoining a pending state court proceeding seen as a threat to
free speech.81  Also, in Dombrowski v. Pfister,82 the Court cited federal
policies in order to reverse a federal district court's abstention from enjoin-
ing a criminal prosecution in state court where such prosecutions were al-
leged to be part of an attempt to prevent the state court defendants from "as-
serting and attempting to vindicate the constitutional rights of Negro
citizens of Louisiana."
83
on those particular policy considerations that tend to be the most relevant in the arbitration
context. My analysis is also distinct from the others in that I have separated out the over-
arching policy considerations from the specific factual circumstances that may dictate how
such a policy should be applied.
78 Nonetheless, as discussed infra, at text accompanying notes 114-63, other policies may
preclude a federal court from enjoining a state court action, even though the injunction might
further federal policy. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) ("It is gener-
ally to be assumed that state courts and prosecutors will observe constitutional limitations as
expounded by this Court, and that the mere possibility of erroneous initial application of con-
stitutional standards will usually not amount to the irreparable injury necessary to justify a
disruption of orderly state proceedings."). Some believe that federal courts should be allowed
to be more protective of federal interests. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 862
F.2d 491, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1988) (Rubin, J., concurring) (calling on Congress to revise the
AIA contending: "It is time ... for Congress to reconsider the statute that we are obliged to
follow, for it is no longer adequate to assure the protection of federal rights"). The Fifth Cir-
cuit was frustrated that, while "there can be little doubt that the [federal Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act] preempts state jurisdiction over suits involving failure to
pay compensation under the Act," id. at 510, the federal court lacked authority to enjoin an
erroneous state court interpretation and instead was forced to rely on state courts to enforce
the federal right, with the remote possibility of review by the U.S. Supreme court. See also
Wood, supra note 34, at 319-20 (arguing that the AIA should be amended to make clear "that
a sufficiently strong federal interest must and will permit an anti-suit injunction").
79 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
80 Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1994).
81 See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 240. The federal court plaintiffs were attempting to enjoin a
state court from closing down a bookstore as a supposed public nuisance, arguing that there
had been a violation of their First Amendment right to free speech.
82 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
83 Id. at 482. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the district court's conclusions that
the federal court plaintiffs had failed to show irreparable injury, and that the district court was
required to abstain. See id. at 489.
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Applying this approach in the arbitration context, federal courts have
cited the supposed federal policy favoring arbitration in order to enjoin state
court actions that might undermine federal rulings which compel arbitra-
tion?8 As one court put it, allowing the state court suit to proceed "would
eviscerate the arbitration process and make it a 'hollow formality,' with
needless expense to all concemed." 85
A superficial reading of the Supreme Court's decision in Moses H.
86
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. seems to lend
support to the idea that the FAA justifies using federal antisuit injunctions to
support arbitration. That decision reversed a federal district court's stay of
its consideration of a motion to compel arbitration based on the existence of
a previously filed state suit. 8 The Supreme Court held that the district court
abused its discretion in abstaining from hearing the case. The Court rea-
soned, in part, that the abstention was inconsistent with Congress's "clear
intent, in the Arbitration Act, to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out
of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible., 88 Noting that
"the presence of federal-law issues must always be a major consideration
weighing against surrender" of federal jurisdiction,8 9 the Court also ex-
plained that abstention would be inappropriate because the state courts were
94 See, e.g., Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. RobHal, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 822, 830 (E.D. Pa.
1997) (holding that an injunction which restrains a party from proceeding in state court is nec-
essary to preserve the integrity of arbitration under the FAA), afd as modified and remanded
sub nom. Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. HalRob, 129 F.3d 726 (3d Cir. 1997); Pervel Indus., Inc.
v. TM Wallcovering, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 867, 869-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that the parties
must submit their dispute to arbitration, and stating that an exception to the AIA provides fed-
eral courts with the authority to stay state court proceedings where it is necessary for the pur-
poses of jurisdiction), affd, 871 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1989); Network Cinema Corp. v. Glassbum,
357 F. Supp. 169, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding that although the federal arbitration statutes
do not grant federal courts the power to stay state court proceedings, a stay is authorized under
the AIA when the dispute in question is subject to the provisions of the FAA).
85 Specialty Bakeries, 961 F. Supp. at 830 (citing United States v. District of Columbia,
654 F.2d 802, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
86 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
87 Moses H. Cone involved a dispute between a hospital and a contractor. When the
contractor asserted a right to additional payment, the hospital filed an action in state court
seeking declaratory relief to the effect that the contractor was not entitled to arbitrate the claim
and also alleging that the claim was invalid on the merits. The contractor subsequently filed
an action in federal court seeking an order to compel arbitration under section 4 of the Arbi-
tration Act. Upon the hospital's motion, the district court stayed consideration of the suit
pending resolution of the state claim, citing the abstention principles set out in Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The Fourth Circuit reversed,
concluding that the stay was inappropriate. See Mercury Constr. Corp. v. Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp., 656 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1981), affd, 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
88 Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 22.
89 Id. at 26.
[Vol. 147:91
ARBITRAL ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS
not necessarily obliged to grant an order to compel arbitration under the
FAA.
90
Nonetheless, for two important reasons Moses H. Cone does not show
that the FAA justifies federal courts' issuance of injunctions against state
courts. First, the Supreme Court's decision explicitly reserved the question
of "whether a federal court might stay a state-court suit pending arbitration
under [the AlA,] 28 U.S.C. § 2283, '91 recognizing that such an injunction
would raise issues not addressed in the abstention opinion. Specifically,
such an injunction would implicate concerns of federalism and comity that
are not raised by a mere federal court issuance of an order to compel arbi-
tration. Second, part of the premise of Moses H. Cone no longer appears to
be good law.92  Whereas the Supreme Court explained that state courts
might not be obligated to grant a motion to compel arbitration requested un-
der the FAA,93 today the contrary appears true. Since 1983 the Supreme
Court has, on multiple occasions, made it clear that the FAA requires state
courts, as well as federal courts, to enforce parties' arbitration agreements.
94
Technically, those holdings only explicitly address section 2 of the Act,
95
but it nonetheless seems clear that state courts have the same obligation as
federal courts to enforce the statute by granting a motion to compel.96
90 See id. at 26.
91 Id. at 25 n.32.
92 See id. at 26-27 n.36 (discussing the "probable inadequacy" of state court proceedings
to protect rights to arbitration).
93 See id. at 26 (stating that although state courts, as well as federal courts, are required to
grant stays of litigation requested under section 3 of the FAA, it is not clear from the language
of the statute that they must grant motions to compel arbitration requested under section 4).
94 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 269-70 (1995) (re-
versing an Alabama court's finding that the FAA was inapplicable to a local contract and the
court's subsequent refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984) (reversing a California court's refusal to compel arbitration and
holding that California law was preempted by the FAA); see also Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683, 1133-34 (1996) (holding that the FAA preempted a state law
that required notice to be provided in contracts calling for arbitration).
9 Section 2 is the central provision of the FAA, providing that covered arbitration
agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The Court has, in
fact, reserved ruling on the question of whether sections 3 and 4 of the Act, calling for courts
to stay litigation and compel arbitration, also apply in state court. See, e.g., Volt Info. Sci-
ences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (holding that even if sections 3 and
4 of the FAA are applicable in state court proceedings, they do not prevent application of a
state law staying arbitration); Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 n.10 (holding that although the FAA
preempts a state law that removes the power to compel arbitration, sections 3 and 4 of the
FAA do not categorically apply to state court proceedings).
96 As the authors of the leading arbitration treatise explain, even if sections 3 and 4 are
not held to apply in state court, it is now clear that section 2, and its emanations, impose on
state courts duties that are indistinguishable from those imposed by sections 3 and 4 of the
19981
112 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
These rulings sharply undercut any argument that federal courts are some-
how better suited to enforce the statute than their state counterparts. In sum,
one cannot simply justify federal arbitral antisuit injunctions with a cite to
Moses H. Cone, but must instead look closely at the relevant issues to de-
termine whether and when federal policy might support such an injunction.
Once one takes a fresh look at the FAA, it is by no means clear that a
federal court's injunction of ongoing state proceedings in the arbitration
context will further federal policy. Even if it were true (as this Article dis-
putes below) that federal policy generally favors arbitration over litigation,
no federal policy justifies taking arbitration decisions out of the hands of
state courts in a typical situation.
Some might argue that federal antisuit injunctions are necessary to pro-
cure speedy, inexpensive arbitration because they believe that federal policy
favors arbitration over litigation, regardless of the intent of the parties.
Dicta in certain Supreme Court decisions admittedly seem to support this
interpretation, 97 and it has certainly been adopted by some courts. 98 How-
ever, a number of recent Supreme Court decisions undercut such an argu-
FAA. See IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTs, AWARDs
AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATON ACT § 10.8.1.3 (1994). Because section
2 requires state courts to enforce parties' agreements to arbitrate, state courts must grant mo-
tions to compel arbitration and also stay proceedings that regard issues referable to arbitration.
See id. § 10.8.3.2. A contrary result would create the bizarre situation of binding a state court
to enforce an arbitration agreement without giving it the tools to do so. See id. § 10.8.1.3; see
also TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 149 F.3d 1292, 1295 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing a state
court's ability to grant complete relief by issuing a motion to compel arbitration under the
FAA); First Franklin Fin. Corp. v. McCollum, 144 F.3d 1362, 1365 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (distin-
guishing Moses H. Cone on the ground that the state court had recognized its ability to compel
arbitration under the FAA); GAF Corp. v. Werner, 495 N.Y.S.2d 312, 317-18 (1985) (con-
cluding that the FAA effectively requires state courts to enforce the statute in the same way as
would federal courts, at least where the state has a statutory procedure for compelling arbitra-
tion).
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing federal
policy favoring arbitration to hold that claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act are arbitrable); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-81
(1989) (taking note of the federal policy favoring arbitration to hold that securities fraud
claims can be arbitrated); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 626 (1985) (noting that although "the parties' intentions [as to arbitrability] control ....
those intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability"); Moses H. Cone, 460
U.S. at 24-25 (recognizing that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy
regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration").
98 See, e.g., Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that,
because the FAA not only reversed judicial hostility to enforcement of arbitration contracts
but also created a rule of contract construction favoring arbitration, a securities industry em-
ployee was required to arbitrate a claim that did not become arbitrable pursuant to industry
rules until after the employee's termination); Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 793, 798
(10th Cir. 1995) (concluding that the federal policy favoring arbitration over litigation re-
quires that an arbitration clause be given the broader of two possible interpretations).
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ment because they rely on the original interpretation of the Act, which
stated that arbitration clauses should be treated with favor only to the extent
the parties actually opted for arbitration. 99 This distinction is crucial be-
cause if federal policy only favors parties' allowance to arbitrate disputes
once they have opted for that dispute resolution mechanism, then a state
court's ruling that a dispute is nonarbitrable is not necessarily inconsistent
with federal policy and should not therefore be enjoined. Rather, such a
state court decision would be entirely consistent with federal policy if the
parties did not, in fact, choose to arbitrate the particular dispute.
Moreover, even assuming federal policy does favor arbitration over liti-
gation, this does not mean that federal policy favors allowing federal courts
to enjoin state proceedings to ensure that disputes are arbitrated. As the Su-
preme Court and commentators have repeatedly enunciated, our jurispru-
dence typically assumes that state courts can be relied upon to enforce fed-
eral policies, 100 and that federal and state actions can proceed concurrently
until either court reaches a judgment that can then be used to preclude fur-
ther proceedings in the other forum.
101
99 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1995) (re-
specting the parties' determination not to exclude punitive damages in the contract at issue);
Volt, 489 U.S. at 479 ("Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and par-
ties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.").
Inhere is no strong arbitration-related policy favoring First Options .... After all,
the basic objective in this area is not to resolve disputes in the quickest manner pos-
sible, no matter what the parties' wishes . . ., but to ensure that commercial arbitra-
tion agreements, like other contracts, are enforced according to their terms ... and
according to the intentions of the parties.
First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
I have argued elsewhere that neither the language, the legislative history, nor valid policy ar-
guments support such an interpretation. See Sternlight, supra note 54, at 674-701 (arguing
that the Supreme Court's strong preference for arbitration over litigation is inappropriate); see
also Stemlight, supra note 55, at 40-47 (arguing that the Supreme Court's imposition of such
a preference constitutes state action). One appellate court has recently attempted to draw an
important distinction between labor arbitration and commercial arbitration. See United Bhd.
of Carpenters & Joiners, Local No. 1780 v. Desert Palace, Inc., 94 F.3d 1308, 1310-11 (9th
Cir. 1996) (attempting to draw a distinction between labor arbitration, which the Supreme
Court has repeatedly deemed a favored means of ensuring industrial peace, and commercial
arbitration, where such a policy is irrelevant).
100 See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 518
(1955) ("The prohibition of [28 U.S.C.] § 2283 is but continuing evidence of confidence in
the state courts, reinforced by a desire to avoid direct conflicts between state and federal
courts. We cannot assume that this confidence has been misplaced."); see also infra notes
114-27, 161-72 and accompanying text (discussing principles of federalism and comity).
101 See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S.
281, 295 (1970) ("In short, the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this case,
and neither court was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both
courts."); infra notes 116-25, 244-61, 280-92 and accompanying text (discussing the concur-
rent jurisdiction issue).
1998]
114 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA L.4 W REVIEW
Nothing in either the language or the legislative history of the FAA
shows that Congress intended to allow federal courts to enjoin state actions
to support the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Turning first to the
express language of the FAA, it is immediately evident that the statute does
not specifically authorize federal courts to enjoin ongoing state proceedings.
Rather, as many courts have noted, sections 3 and 4 of the statute merely
allow courts to stay litigation brought before them and to compel arbitra-
tion.1 2 Nor does the legislative history or policy underlying the FAA show
that Congress believed the statute would be ineffective if the federal courts
were not empowered to enjoin state court proceedings.10 3 Instead, this his-
tory shows that the FAA was passed to supplement, and not supplant, an
ongoing effort to modernize state arbitration laws.'0 4 The federal law was
said to be needed because federal courts might well hold that state laws did
not apply in federal court.105 At no point did the drafters indicate that the
102 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (1994); see, e.g., Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d
1176, 1180 (11 th Cir. 1981) (noting that while 9 U.S.C. § 3 "compels courts to stay their own
proceedings where the issues to be litigated have... been committed to resolution by arbitra-
tion .. ., it does not specifically authorize federal courts to stay proceedings in state courts."),
overruled on other grounds by Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466 (1 lth Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 105 (1998); TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 975 F. Supp. 1305,
1309 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (noting that § 3 of the FAA applies only to allow federal courts to stay
cases pending in federal, not state, courts), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, and
remanded, 149 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998); McGuire, Comwell & Blakey v. Grider, 765 F.
Supp. 1048, 1052 (D. Colo. 1991) (granting an injunction against the state court based on 28
U.S.C. § 2283); Network Cinema Corp. v. Glassbum, 357 F. Supp. 169, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(noting that a stay of state proceedings is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2283 once a matter has
been found to be subject to the FAA arbitration provisions); In re Arbitration of Controversies
Between Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp. & Carl, 260 F. Supp. 665, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(noting that "[p]lainly authority to stay the Oklahoma action is not to be found in § 3 of the
Federal Arbitration Act," but finding such authority in 28 U.S.C. § 2283).
103 Cf. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 237-39 (1972), discussed infra at text accompa-
nying notes 264-70 (concluding that the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 did
reveal an intent to control or correct state actions, and therefore finding that notwithstanding
the normal strictures of the AIA federal courts might enjoin state civil rights actions in support
of that statute).
104 See Joint Hearings on S. 1005 & HR. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on
the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 10 (1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of W.H.H. Piatt,
Chairman of the ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law) (noting a con-
tinuous effort to promote the adoption of uniform state arbitration statutes); Sales and Con-
tracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration:
Hearing on S. 4213, 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th
Cong. 2-3 (1923) [hereinafter Senate Subcomm. Hearing] (statement of Charles L. Bern-
heimer) (urging passage of a federal law in conjunction with uniform state laws); S. REP. No.
68-536, at 3 (1924) (noting that federal legislation follows lines of New York arbitration law
enacted in 1920).
105 See Joint Hearings, supra note 104, at 16 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen, general
counsel New York Chamber of Commerce) (referring to a federal court's refusal to hold that a
New York statute was binding in an admiralty action brought in federal court, and also ob-
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federal law might be used to countermand actions taken in state court.10 6 To
the contrary, one of the drafters of the legislation wrote:
There is no disposition therefore by means of the Federal bludgeon to force an
individual State into an unwilling submission to arbitration enforcement. The
statute can not have that effect. It is desired only that the Federal Government
shall declare the validity of arbitration agreements in the field where necessar-
ily it is supreme and where without this action no remedial action by the States
can ever be effected.
107
If the federal law was viewed to allow federal courts to force arbitration
on reluctant state courts, one might certainly expect that the bill would have
encountered at least some opposition in committee, which it did not.10 8 In
fact, for many years the FAA was not even applied in state courts, but rather
only in federal courts.10 9  Despite a vigorous argument from Justice
O'Connor and others, the Court ultimately held that the FAA did govern
actions brought in state as well as federal court.110 However, no court has
ever held that the purpose of the FAA was to allow federal courts to control
state courts.
Finally, the FAA is premised on an assumption of adequate state en-
forcement. This conclusion is compelled by the fact that the FAA is an
serving that the statute was part of a tripartite effort to amend arbitration law on the state, fed-
eral, and international levels).
106 No mention of antisuit injunctions is contained in either the House Report or the Sen-
ate Report. See H.R. REP. No. 68-96 (1924); S. REP. No. 68-536 (1924). Neither were they
mentioned in the Joint Hearings or the Senate Subcommittee Hearings. See Joint Hearings,
supra note 104; Senate Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 104.
107 Joint Hearings, supra note 104, at 40 (brief by Julius Henry Cohen, genes! counsel,
New York Chamber of Commerce); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 34-35
(1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The drafters' plan for maintaining reasonable harmony
between state and federal practices was not to bludgeon States into compliance, but rather to
adopt a uniform federal law, patterned after New York's path-breaking state statute, and si-
multaneously to press for passage of coordinated state legislation.").
108 Not one person spoke against the bill at the final hearing nor indicated opposition in
writing. See Joint Hearings, supra note 104, at 24.
IN See Stemlight, supra note 54, at 649-52 (discussing the historical application of the
FAA in state courts).
110 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 7-16 (concluding that state as well as federal courts were
obliged to apply at least section 2 of the statute); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dob-
son, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) ("What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair
enough to enforce all its basic terms ... but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.").
Many commentators have criticized the Court's interpretation of legislative history in reach-
ing this conclusion. See, e.g., MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 96, § 10.5.3 (criticizing the major-
ity's legislative history as a "pillar of sand"). Even assuming, however, that Southland and
Terminix were incorrectly decided, and that the FAA was only intended to apply in federal
court, such a limited application would not justify federal courts' refusals to follow pertinent
state court decisions; it would only demonstrate, even more clearly, that the state and federal
forums were intended to act concurrently.
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anomalous federal statute that does not give rise to federal court jurisdiction.
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained, a claim may be brought in
federal court pursuant to the FAA only if the suit involves a dispute under
another federal statute or falls under the court's diversity jurisdiction.II
Had the FAA been designed to allow for the correction of improper state
rulings, one would certainly have expected that the statute would have been
written and interpreted to give rise to federal jurisdiction."
12
In sum, it is by no means clear that federal arbitration policy favors fed-
eral courts' issuance of arbitral antisuit injunctions. However, the argument
that federal courts should be allowed to enjoin state courts in order to sup-
port arbitration is strongest where it is clear that action taken, or perhaps
about to be taken, by the state court will flout the FAA. Although federal
courts normally assume that state courts will adequately enforce federal law,
in these situations a state court might prove this assumption to be wrong.
Where, for example, a state court either blatantly refused to apply the FAA,
III In Moses H. Cone Mem ' Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,25 n.32 (1983),
the Court stated: "Section 4 [of the FAA] provides for an order compelling arbitration only
when the federal district court would have jurisdiction over a suit on the underlying dispute;
hence, there must be diversity of citizenship or some other independent basis for federal juris-
diction before the order can issue." See also Southland, 465 U.S. at 15 n.9 (stating that the
fact that the FAA does not create independent federal question jurisdiction is "implicit in the
provisions in § 3 for a stay by a 'court in which such suit is pending' and in § 4 that enforce-
ment may be ordered by 'any United States district court which, save for such agreement,
would have jurisdiction' (quoting FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4)). Interpretation of this seemingly
straightforward, albeit unusual, provision has proved tricky at times. Many arbitration dis-
putes will involve neither a federal question nor a dispute between entirely diverse parties that
involves more than $75,000. Specifically, where a federal court did not have jurisdiction over
the entire state court action, but did possess jurisdiction over an action filed by certain parties
to the state case, one federal court held that it had jurisdiction to enjoin the state court action.
See TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 975 F. Supp. 1305, 1306 (M.D. Ala. 1997), affd in part,
vacated in part on other grounds, and remanded, 149 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998); see also
Kaplan v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1219, 1219-20 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (holding
that a federal court lacked jurisdiction to compel arbitration where, although the underlying
dispute may have involved a federal question, the petitioner failed to allege it in its "well-
pleaded complaint").
112 Nor can federal arbitral antisuit injunctions easily be justified on the ground that arbi-
tration is likely to lead to different substantive results than is litigation. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly stated that the choice between arbitration and litigation is a choice merely of
procedural forum, and not of substantive results. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrys-
ler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court explained:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather
than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-
28 (1991) (finding no substantive difference between arbitral and litigation forums in terms of
resolving age discrimination disputes).
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or woefully misinterpreted that statute in a way that undermined the goals of
the statute, enforcement of federal policy might provide a reason for allow-
ing the antisuit injunction to issue.
113
B. Do Federalism and Comity Principles Oppose Arbitral Antisuit
Injunctions?
Federal courts should and sometimes do hesitate in issuing antisuit in-
junctions directed toward state courts due to concerns with both federalism
and comity. Comity requires that courts in one system offer some degree of
deference and respect to courts in a parallel system.114 The federalism doc-
trine is more specifically targeted at the special relationship between federal
and state sovereigns, and provides, inter alia, that federal courts should not
trample on their state counterparts. This Article will follow the Supreme
Court's lead115 and discuss the two concepts together.
In 1971, the Supreme Court spelled out the concept of "Our Federal-
ism" in some detail in Younger v. Harris,116 focusing particularly on the
need to restrain federal courts from enjoining ongoing state court actions.
Writing for the Court, in a decision which sparked a great deal of scholarly
113 Several district courts that have refused to enjoin ongoing state court proceedings
have stated that their decisions might have changed if it had been clear that the state court was
failing to properly apply federal law. See, e.g., TranSouth, 975 F. Supp. at 1316 (asserting
that if state courts "fail to honor adequately the federal policy favoring arbitration ... then...
federal relief could be justified"); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Vetter, 838 F. Supp. 468, 474 (D.
Mont. 1993) (refusing to issue an antisuit injunction based on the assumption that the state
court would proceed no further); Roodveldt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
585 F. Supp. 770, 783 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (basing a denial of injunctive relief, in part, on the con-
clusion that there was little danger that the state court's action would undermine the federal
pro-arbitration order).
114 See James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention
Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1067 (1994) (noting that "appeals to comity in Anglo-
American law originated in the notoriously fuzzy business of recognizing foreign judg-
ments"); see also Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922) (stating that comity
requires courts from one jurisdiction to exercise forbearance in "inter[fering] with the process
of each other" (quoting Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 182 (1884))). The term has rarely, if
ever, been defined in a precise fashion. One frustrated commentator has called comity "a
toothless abstraction, not a rule, invoked in an infinite variety of contexts to justify one gov-
ernmental body's deference to another." Rehnquist, supra, at 1066-67. Professor Shapiro,
however, has discussed the history of the comity principle at some length, showing that,
whereas in the 1600s, English courts found that they lacked the power to enjoin a foreign suit,
this hesitancy was later refined to permit such injunctions under constraints of great delicacy.
See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 549-50 (1985).
Professor Shapiro has also traced the development of the comity principle in this country's
jurisprudence. See id. at 581-85.
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971).
116 Id.
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commentary, 17 Justice Black explained that federal courts' issuance of such
injunctions are limited not only by equitable restraints but also by
an even more vital consideration, the notion of "comity," that is, a proper re-
spect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the
belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their insti-
tutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to
by many as "Our Federalism," and one familiar with the profound debates that
ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect those who
remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federalism." The concept does
not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more than it means centrali-
zation of control over every important issue in our National Government and
its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does
represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government,
anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal
interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with
the legitimate activities of the States.... This brief discussion should be
enough to suggest some of the reasons why it has been perfectly natural for our
cases to repeat time and time again that the normal thing to do when federal
117 1 cannot come close to capturing the entire scholarly discussion in a footnote. There
are many articles that criticize the Court's emphasis on states' rights. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss,
Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1164 (1977) (discussing the Burger Court's move away
from an expansive view of the role of federal courts in enforcing federal rights against the
states); John J. Gibbons, Our Federalism, 12 SuFFOLK U. L. REV. 1087, 1113 (1978) (criti-
cizing "the Burger Court's primary theme: purposeful insulation of state and local govern-
mental activities from federal supervision"); Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with
State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective Relief, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 193, 194 (arguing
that state remedies are often inadequate safeguards for federal rights); Burt Neubome, The
Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1977) (criticizing the view that state and fed-
eral courts provide equally effective fora for the enforcement of federal rights); Martin H. Re-
dish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J.
71, 71 (1984) ("The federal courts have assumed [abstention] authority, even in the absence of
legislative history or statutory language authorizing such a refusal to act."); Aviam Soifer &
H.C. Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1141,
1141 (1977) (criticizing the Burger Court's move towards the limitation of federal judicial
power and a greater state role). Other commentators have defended the Court's emphasis on
maintaining a separate state sphere, while at times offering clarifying suggestions to the Court.
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, Parity as a Constitutional Question, 71 B.U. L. REV.
645, 646 (1991) (arguing that while federal courts must have the last word on federal consti-
tutional questions, state courts may be adequate as "triers in the first instance"); Paul M. Ba-
tor, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605,
637 (1981) (arguing that "the state courts will and should continue to play a substantial role in
the elaboration of federal constitutional principles"); Rehnquist, supra note 114, at 1052 (ar-
guing that "only the friction caused by duplicative litigation warrants federal court absten-
tion"); Shapiro, supra note 114, at 588 (urging that "the responsibility of the federal courts to
adjudicate disputes does and should carry with it significant leeway for the exercise of rea-
soned discretion in matters relating to federal jurisdiction").
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courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue
such injunctions.1
18
Applying these principles more recently, in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco
Inc.,' 19 the Court required a federal court to abstain from using its injunctive
powers to bar enforcement of a civil judgment obtained in state court.
120
In other decisions, the Court has emphasized principles of federalism
and comity to explain that the federal and state court systems form a "dual
court system," with each system being essentially separate from, and inde-
pendent of, the other.121 The Court has discussed how the AIA and other
statutory and doctrinal provisions are designed to "prevent needless friction
between state and federal courts"'122 and to "work out lines of demarcation
between the two systems."'123 Thus, the Court has explained:
Due in no small part to the fundamental constitutional independence of the
States, Congress adopted a general policy under which state proceedings
"should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the
lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state appellate
courts and ultimately this Court."
' 124
A federal court may not enjoin an ongoing state court proceeding
merely because it believes that the state court has made, or will make, an
error in interpreting federal law. 125 Nor does a federal court "have inherent
power.., to enjoin state court proceedings merely because those proceed-
118 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45.
119 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
120 See id. at 10-14 ("[P]roper respect for the ability of state courts to resolve federal
questions presented in state-court litigation mandates that the federal court stay its hand.'); see
also infra text accompanying notes 408-22 (discussing Younger and Penzoil).
Atlantic Coast Line R.R v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286
(1970); see also Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 145-46 (1988) (noting the
United States's dual court system); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 482 (1983) (stating that lower federal courts may not hear appeals from state
courts). For a discussion of the Full Faith and Credit statute, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
and the ALA, see infra Parts III & IV.C.
122 Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 286 (quoting Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma
Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940)).
123 Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 286.
124 Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 146 (quoting Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 287).
125 See Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 295 (stating that because "the state and federal
courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this case... neither court was free" to enjoin the other);
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 518-19 (1955) (main-
taining that the appellate process adequately protects federal rights if state courts go wrong,
and thus, federal court intervention into state court proceedings is not necessary); see also
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 380-86 (1996) (requiring a federal court
to give preclusive effect to a state court's settlement of claims that were within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal court).
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ings interfere with a protected federal right or invade an area preempted by
federal law, even when the interference is unmistakably clear."126  Addi-
tionally, once a state court has issued a final judgment, federalism principles
have been applied to bind federal courts to the state decision, even where
that decision is wrong as a matter of federal law.
127
The Court seems to be increasing its emphasis on federalism and states'
rights. In the last several Terms, for example, the Court has struck down
federal legislation outlawing guns in schools as exceeding Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause, 128 struck down the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act 129 as exceeding federal regulatory powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment,130 and voided the federal Brady Bill131 because
it required local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on
handgun purchasers. 132 In fact, the Court recently showed such willingness
126 Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 149 (quoting Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 294).
127 See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 478 (1982). In Kremer, the
Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that granting preclusive effect to the state court judg-
ment would actually harm federalism interests by discouraging future litigants from pursuing
appellate remedies within the state system. The Court stated:
On the contrary, stripping state court judgments of finality would be far more de-
structive to the quality of adjudication by lessening the incentive for full participa-
tion by the parties and for searching review by state officials. Depriving state judg-
ments of finality not only would violate basic tenets of comity and federalism...
but also would reduce the incentive for States to work towards effective and mean-
ingful antidiscrimination systems.
Id. (citations omitted).
128 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (finding that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 did not regulate commercial or economic activity, and therefore
exceeded Congress's power to regulate commerce).
129 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l (1994).
130 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) ("Broad as the power of
Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts
vital1yinciples necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.").
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
132 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997) (concluding that federal im-
position on local law enforcement would violate the Constitution's system of "dual sover-
eignty" between federal and state government); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 47, 55-76 (1996) (striking down the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act as inconsistent with
the sovereign immunity requirements of the Eleventh Amendment); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515
U.S. 70, 83-102 (1995) (explaining that federal judges should strive to return power over edu-
cation to state and local authorities when fashioning desegregation decrees); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (finding that the Tenth Amendment precludes Con-
gress from requiring states to take title to radioactive waste because such a requirement would
force states to act as agents of the federal government); cf U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
514 U.S. 779, 845-50 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing the view that the Tenth
Amendment precludes the federal government from depriving the people of each state of the
power to prescribe eligibility requirements for congressional candidates for their state).
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to strike down federal legislation that commentators have begun to draw
comparisons to the Lochner era.
133
No matter where one stands on the relative importance of federalism
concerns, 134 it seems clear that federal courts ought to be just as concerned
with federalism and comity when they consider enjoining state courts' con-
sideration of arbitration matters, as the federal court are in other contexts.1
35
Yet, the federal courts that have been asked to issue arbitral antisuit injunc-
tions have typically failed to adequately consider how federalism and com-
ity ought to influence their decisions. Many of the federal courts which
have granted such injunctions have paid scant attention to the disruptive ef-
fect of such a remedy. 136 Even those federal courts that have cited federal-
133 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial
Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe
Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213, 2214 (1996) (contending that the Court's recent empha-
sis on states' rights reflects the same kind of hostility toward regulation that underlie the pre-
1937 economic due process cases, and critiquing the Court's recent federalism decisions as an
unjustifiable interference with the political market). See generally Stephen Gardbaum, Re-
thinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEx. L. REV. 795 (1996) (discussing ways to protect
new post-Lopez federalism); Marcia Coyle, Was this Term Historic?, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 11,
1997, at B5 (discussing the federalism theme that runs through many of the Court's decisions
during the 1996-97 term); Richard C. Reuben, Justices Take the 11th: Obscure Amendment
Becomes Federalism Fodder for Supreme Court, 83 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1997, at 44, 44 (discuss-
ing "new federalism"); David G. Savage, Supreme Spree: Court Decides on Everything from
Federalism to the Internet, 83 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1997, at 40, 40 (concluding that "[tihe states
were consistent winners at the expense of Congress and the president"). For an article that
questions whether the Court is really transforming the relationship between the states and the
federal government in a significant way, see Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 643, 646-61 (1996).
134 1 could not, within the scope of this Article, completely spell out my own views, even
assuming such views were filly developed. I do note, however, that I am not convinced that
federal courts are inherently more protective of individual rights than are state courts.
135 In fact, an argument can be made that federalism concerns more strongly favor federal
courts' non-interference with state courts than they favor striking down intrusive federal leg-
islation. As Professor Hovenkamp has argued, our political system is, at least arguably, capa-
ble of protecting states' interests in the legislative context. See Hovenkamp, supra note 133,
at 2221-22. States and their citizens are not clearly oppressed minorities that lack the political
clout to protect their own interests. While the correction might not be immediate, citizens
who find federal legislation too intrusive can, as Hovenkamp says, "elect less imperial mem-
bers of Congress." Id. at 2247. By contrast, where a federal court oversteps its bounds and
interferes with a state court, the political process cannot step in to make a correction. Relief
can be obtained only through appeal within the federal system, and the odds of getting to the
Supreme Court are always extremely low.
136 See, e.g., Pervel Indus. Inc. v. TM Wallcovering, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 867, 869-70
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (failing to mention federalism concerns), affd, 871 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1989);
Novik & Co. v. Jerry Mann, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 447, 448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (enjoining a state
action without considering the implications for federalism); In re Arbitration of Controversies
Between Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp. & Carl, 260 F. Supp. 665, 668-70 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (enjoining a state suit filed five years previously without taking note of federalism con-
cerns).
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ism and comity concerns in denying such injunctions have generally paid
insufficient attention to how the specific factual context of the case may af-
fect such concerns, and instead, have simply announced that the injunction
would interfere with state processes.1
37
A proper explication of federalism and comity concerns should recog-
nize that the significance of the federal court intrusion will vary substan-
tially, depending on facts regarding the status of the federal and state ac-
tions. One relevant fact is the relative priority of the two actions.
Federalism concerns are stronger where the state action was filed first and
weaker where the federal court action was filed first.138 Second, the federal
court should consider the extent of progress that has been made in the state
court action. Although any federal court antisuit injunction will interfere to
some degree with state court autonomy, federalism and comity concerns are
heightened in those cases in which state courts have already expended sub-
stantial resources on the case.139 At the extreme, a federal court acts most
disrespectfully toward a state court when it enjoins an action in which the
state court has already reached a final judgment, and in which this judgment
has been affirmed by the highest state court. 140 A third consideration is the
status of the federal action. Where a federal court enjoins a state action in
support of a federal court action in which substantial progress has been
made, it demonstrates far more respect for the state forum than where it
137 See Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1180 (1lth Cir. 1981) (ac-
knowledging that "[w]here a federal court is asked to interfere with pending state court pro-
ceedings it must proceed with caution, taking into account general considerations of federal-
ism"), overruled on other grounds by Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466 (11th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 105 (1998); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
541 F.2d 1263, 1274 (7th Cir. 1976) (upholding the district court's refusal to enjoin state court
proceedings because the power to do so is discretionary, and no abuse of discretion was
found); Swofford v. ShearsonLehman/Am. Express, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1128, 1129 (E.D. Ark.
1985) (stating that none of the exceptions to the AIA were applicable, and thus, the state court
action would not be enjoined); Roodveldt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 585
F. Supp. 770, 781-84 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (concluding that "principles of comity and federalism
require that [the court] refrain from interfering in the pending state court case at this time").
138 Applying a related analysis, one commentator proposed that the abstention doctrine be
modified to focus substantially on a "first filed rule," such that "a federal district court should
abstain from exercising jurisdiction if, and only if, the federal plaintiff has an adequate op-
portunity to litigate her claims in a duplicative suit already pending in state court." Rehnquist,
supra note 114, at 1110.
139 That is, a federal court exhibits greater disrespect for a state court by disregarding the
state court's substantial efforts in a case than by merely preventing a state from continuing to
act in a suit which has barely commenced.
140 There is some tension between this concern and the idea, discussed in Subpart ll.A,
that a federal court should not enjoin a state court action in order to support federal policy
based on the mere speculation that the state court may not adequately enforce the policy. See
also supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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stays a state court action in favor of a federal suit that has barely com-
menced.
141
At the easy extremes, these factors will all weigh on the same side. On
the one hand, federalism interests are strongest where the case was first filed
in state court, where the state action has already progressed to final judg-
ment, and where it has been affirmed on appeal. On the other hand, feder-
alism interests are weakest where the suit was first filed in federal court, the
federal court has already progressed to final judgment, and the state action
has only just been filed. In between, of course, is an entire spectrum of pos-
sible scenarios: state court actions in which substantial discovery has been
exchanged but no orders have been issued; state actions in which a non-final
order has been issued; federal actions which were filed first, but in which no
discovery has been exchanged and no motions filed. Faced with such "in-
between" cases, courts should not simply assume that federalism interests
are either weak or strong, but rather should analyze the strength of the inter-
est in light of the particular facts, including the dates of filing of the actions,
the extent of discovery completed in both suits, and the nature of any rulings
made by the two courts.
C. Do Judicial Efficiency Concerns Support or Oppose Arbitral Antisuit
Injunctions?
Antisuit injunctions are generally said to be justified, at least in part, by
efficiency concerns. As one commentator put it, "It is not difficult to rec-
ognize... that one court can resolve a particular controversy more effi-
ciently than two courts belonging to separate systems." '142 That is, it is
wasteful of both litigant and court resources for two courts to simultane-
ously conduct proceedings directed toward resolution of the same dispute.
While this concern with efficiency does not, by itself, permit federal courts
141 Many of these same facts are also relevant in assessing efficiency concerns, as will be
discussed infra in Subpart II.C.
142 Redish, Reassessing, supra note 34, at 1778-79; see also Martin H. Redish, The Anti-
Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. Cmii. L. REV. 717, 753-60 (1977) [hereinafter Redish,
The Anti-Injunction Statute] (advocating the broadening of exceptions to the AIA in order to
allow federal courts to enjoin state actions under the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception); Ed-
ward F. Sherman, supra note 77, at 931-34 (urging that the issuance of federal court injunc-
tions should take into account how far individual actions have progressed and the degree of
duplication between suits in order to secure more efficient results); Paul W. Werner, Com-
ment, Antisuit Injunctions Under the Complex Litigation Proposal: Harmonizing the Sirens'
Song of Efficiency and Fairness with the Hymn ofJudicial Federalism and Comity, 1995 BYU
L. REV. 1041, 1047 (recognizing that "repeated litigation of identical issues of law requires
the potentially unnecessary, and therefore wasted, expenditure of limited judicial, individual,
and societal resources," while arguing that the recent ALI Complex Litigation Proposal ne-
glects comity and federalism concerns by overemphasizing efficiency).
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to enjoin ongoing state actions, 143 courts have noted the relevancy of effi-
ciency in connection with various doctrines that do govern the grant of such
injunctions.
144
A few courts have properly taken efficiency concerns into account in
determining whether or not to issue an arbitral antisuit injunction.145 Such
courts have recognized that the strength of the efficiency concern will vary
depending on the status of both the federal and state actions. The efficiency
143 See Wood, supra note 34, at 314-15 (observing that efficiency concerns, alone, do not
form an exception to the strictures of the AIA, and asking whether the old rule tolerating du-
plicative federal and state in personam actions should be discarded); see also Atlantic Coast
Line R.R v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970) (concluding that
federal and state courts had concurrent jurisdiction and that "neither court was free to prevent
either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts"). Note, also, that efficiency
concerns never justify state courts' actions to enjoin in personam proceedings in federal
courts. See Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964) (stating that "state courts are
completely without power to restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions");
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 296 (5th ed. 1994) ("Since the states
cannot limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts, they cannot enjoin proceedings in federal
courts, except to protect the jurisdiction of the state court over property in its custody or under
its control.").
144 For example, the "relitigation exception" to the AIA allows federal courts to enjoin
parties from spending time and money to attempt to litigate in state court an issue that the fed-
eral court had already resolved. See, e.g., Allan D. Vestal, Protecting a Federal Court Judg-
ment, 42 TENN. L. REV. 635, 660 (1975) (discussing how "a federal court has the right to pre-
vent its judgment from being circumvented or undercut through relitigation of the claim").
See infra text accompanying notes 334-69 for a further discussion of this exception. Also, the
Full Faith and Credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994), prohibits federal courts from relitigat-
ing state courts' final decisions, in part to conserve judicial resources. See Kremer v. Chemi-
cal Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467 (1982) (stating that since the plaintiff already received a
final judgment in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 would "appear to preclude [him] from reliti-
gating the same question in federal court"); see also infra text accompanying notes 164-99
(discussing the Full Faith and Credit statute).
145 Compare TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 975 F. Supp. 1305, 1308-09 (M.D. Ala. 1997)
(denying an antisuit injunction where the allowance of a federal suit would be inefficient, be-
cause not all parties could be joined in federal suit), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other
grounds and remanded, 149 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998), and Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v.
Meyer, 88 F.R.D. 359, 360 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (denying an antisuit injunction where a federal
action was filed one working day prior to the state trial, and observing that federal arbitration
laws were not intended to be an instrument to protract litigation or make it more expensive),
aff d, 664 F.2d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 1981) (noting that federal interference with state pro-
ceedings at a late date would waste the resources already expended by the state), overruled on
other grounds by Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied, 119 S. Ct. 105 (1998), with A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc. v. McMahon, 697 F. Supp.
488, 494-95 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (granting an antisuit injunction against a state suit that had pro-
ceeded only to the initial stages of discovery, in part due to concerns of judicial economy),
rev'd in part, 149 F.3d 1292 (11 th Cir. 1998), and Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 557 F. Supp. 368,
373 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (enjoining a state action filed more than five years after federal court had
ordered the dispute to arbitration, and citing the federal court's "considerable familiar-
ity.. with the complex issues involved in the case throughout its history"), aftd, 742 F.2d
1438 (2d Cir. 1983).
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concern is greatest where the federal action has progressed quite far and the
state court action has only recently been filed or has otherwise progressed
very little. In such a situation, it does make sense from the efficiency stand-
point, for the federal court to prevent commencement of additional litigation
that will waste the resources of the parties and the state court.146 By con-
trast, where the state court action has progressed quite far and the federal
action has not, the efficiency rationale may dictate against the federal anti-
suit injunction. 47 Efficiency concerns may also exist where, due to a lack
of complete diversity among the disputants, a federal court's order compel-
ling arbitration and enjoining state court litigation could not apply to all the
state court disputants and thus would result in piecemeal litigation.
148
Nonetheless, advocates of federal antisuit injunctions might argue that
these injunctions save resources, in the arbitration context, even in those
cases where the state court action has progressed much farther than the fed-
eral action; because the federal court is more likely than the state court to
send the dispute to arbitration, and because arbitration is substantially
quicker and cheaper than litigation, federal courts generally ought to be
permitted to prevent state courts from making decisions on arbitrability
1 49
146 For a general discussion on this point, see A.L. Williams, 697 F. Supp. at 488, and
Hunt, 557 F. Supp. at 368, which are discussed supra at notes 72 and 76. Of course, those
who are particularly concerned with protecting state court autonomy might still question if it
ought to be the state court's decision as to whether to stay its own proceeding in the interest of
efficiency, rather than the federal court's decision to impose such an economizing measure.
147 For a general discussion on this point, see TranSouth, 975 F. Supp. at 1308-09, and
Ultracashmere, 88 F.R.D. at 360, which are discussed supra notes 66 and 145. Where, in the
extreme, a state court has already ruled on the merits of the case before the federal court or-
ders the dispute to arbitration, arbitrators cannot be reversed for failing to apply preclusion
principles and follow the state court ruling. Although the arbitrators might choose to apply
issue or claim preclusion, their failure to do so can only be reversed to the extent that the ar-
bitrators express "manifest disregard" for the law. Some circuits will not reverse even for
such manifest disregard. See, e.g., R.M. Perez & Assocs., Inc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 539
(5th Cir. 1992) (pointing out that "this circuit never has employed a 'manifest disregard of the
law' standard in reviewing arbitration awards"). The Seventh Circuit has essentially stated
that failure to properly apply preclusion principles cannot rise to the level of manifest disre-
gard. But see C.P. Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 193-94 (7th Cir. 1996) (observing that
courts may consider the existence of claim or issue preclusion to determine whether a dispute
is arbitrable). See generally MACNEIL ET AL, supra note 96, at § 39.5 (addressing preclusion
issues in arbitration proceedings).
149 Compare TranSouth, 975 F. Supp. at 1308-09 (abstaining on the ground that an order
compelling arbitration would lead to piecemeal litigation), with TranSouth, 149 F.3d at 1294-
95 (reversing the district court's abstention, in part, because no piecemeal litigation would
ensue with regard to the arbitrability of the dispute and because "any piecemeal litigation that
might result from a decision on arbitrability would be the result of the parties' voluntary ac-
tions and the strong federal policy favoring arbitration").
149 See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir.
1976) (summarizing one party's argument that denying an injunction would frustrate the con-
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There are, however, several flaws in this argument. First, although it is
often posited that binding arbitration is quicker and cheaper than litigation,
this has yet to be established by empirical evidence.150 Anecdotal evidence
reveals that binding arbitration can, at times, be more fraught with delay
than litigation, and also can be more costly, at least for one of the parties.
1 51
Second, given the limited nature of federal court jurisdiction, it may often
be the case that some of the parties in a state court dispute are not partici-
pants in the federal court action. In such cases, the federal court would not
have the power to order all parties to arbitration, and the dispute might
therefore have to be resolved in a piecemeal and inefficient fashion.
152
Third, except where a state court has already found a dispute nonarbi-
trable, a federal court engages in speculation by presuming that the state
court would reach such a conclusion. Yet, it is not clear that Congress or
the Supreme Court would, or should, sanction such speculation. As dis-
cussed earlier, our dual court system depends in large degree on the as-
sumption that state courts can be trusted to apply federal law. 153 Fourth,
even if state courts are less likely to find a dispute to be arbitrable, federal
enforcement of arbitration may not accurately reflect the parties' choice.
Does such an "efficiency" policy, which denies parties access to litigation
for which they had contracted, really support an efficiency rationale? 154 In
short, it is far from clear that both parties will benefit, in terms of time or
cost, where a federal court enjoins a state court from allowing litigation of a
gressional purpose of resolving disputes speedily through arbitration in order to avoid the ex-
pense and delay of litigation).
150 Few empirical studies have been done. Those studies that have been done regarding
non-binding arbitration, admittedly a very different technique, have shown that non-binding
arbitration does not necessarily save either time or money. See Sternlight, supra note 54, at
678-79; see also James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Ju-
dicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REv. 17, 18 (1997)
(reporting the results of a study that showed that surveyed programs implemented by the Civil
Justice Reform Act, including various nonbinding alternative dispute resolution measures, had
little impact on the speed or cost of resolution).
151 In Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 912-13 (Cal. 1997), the
California Supreme Court affrmed the trial court's finding that the HMO had typically used
its power to veto selection of arbitrators to delay arbitration, such that, on average, it took 863
days to reach a hearing. See also Sternlight, supra note 54, at 682-83 (arguing, inter alia, that
binding arbitration can often be very costly for the "little guy" by requiring him to arbitrate in
a distant location, as well as pay certain arbitral fees that would not have been required had
the case remained in litigation).
152 See TranSouth, 975 F. Supp. at 1308 (refusing to enjoin state action where pursuit of
federal court action would have led to piecemeal dispute resolution due to lack of diversity
jurisdiction).
153 See supra text accompanying notes 121-25; infra notes 248-63 (discussing the rela-
tionship between the state and federal court systems as effected by the AIA).
154 See generally Sternlight, supra note 54, at 677-97 (arguing that arbitration is not nec-
essarily better for society than is litigation).
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dispute that the federal court believes to be arbitrable. Thus, the efficiency
rationale strongly supports issuance of a federal antisuit injunction in the
arbitration context only where the federal action has progressed much fur-
ther than the state suit.
D. Does Deterrence of Vexatious Litigation Support or Oppose Issuance of
ArbitralAntisuit Injunctions?
In deciding whether to issue an arbitral antisuit injunction, federal
courts should consider whether either party has engaged in bad faith or har-
assing litigation. Courts have at least implicitly employed such an analysis
in various contexts. For example, the Supreme Court has held that a federal
court is not barred from enjoining a state court criminal prosecution where
that prosecution was brought in bad faith in order to deter the defendants
from exercising their rights, rather than in a genuine attempt to secure a
conviction. 155 Similarly, in determining the scope of the Colorado River
abstention, 156 several federal appellate courts have found that vexatious be-
havior, engaged in by either party, is relevant to a federal court's determi-
nation regarding the propriety of abstention.157 In addition, the "relitigation
exception" to the AIA 158 seems geared toward preventing parties from using
repeated, harassing relitigation to secure an advantage over an opponent.
59
155 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (finding that a substantial loss
of freedoms and expression shows the type of irreparable injury necessary "to justify a dis-
ruption of state court proceedings"); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 48-49 (1971)
(denying an injunction after finding no sufficient showing of bad faith and harassment); Cam-
eron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 619-20 (1968) (declining to interfere with the state court's de-
termination of a constitutional issue because the court found no bad faith on the part of the
state officials). See infra text accompanying notes 419-22 for discussion of this exception to
the AIA.
156 See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)
(focusing on whether exceptional considerations of wise judicial administration and efficiency
dictate abstention by the federal court); infra text accompanying notes 407, 424-27 (discuss-
ing the applicability of the Colorado River abstention to arbitral antisuit injunctions).
157 See infra notes 392-93 and accompanying text (discussing appellate decisions that
consider the possibly vexatious nature of federal or state litigation to determine whether ab-
stention is appropriate).
158 See infra text accompanying notes 334-56 (exploring the nature of the "relitigation"
exce tion to the AIA).
In fact, but for the possibility of such vexatious tactics, it would seem that claim and
issue preclusion would render unnecessary the antisuit injunction designed to prevent relitiga-
tion. See Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute, supra note 142, at 725 n.39 (suggesting that
one possible rationale for the relitigation exception might be to save the party who had already
prevailed in federal court the burden of using preclusion doctrines to defeat subsequent state
actions). Interpreting another exception to the AIA, Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, con-
curring in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977) (plurality opinion), opined
that a federal court considering a claim brought under the Clayton Act would be justified in
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Several courts that have been requested to issue arbitral antisuit injunc-
tions have concerned themselves with whether either party has engaged in
bad faith or harassing tactics. For example, in Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v.
Meyer,1 60 the district court refused to enjoin a previously filed state court
action where it concluded that the federal court plaintiff had engaged in de-
laying tactics by failing to seek the injunction until the state action was all
but resolved. 161 By contrast, although they did not make a finding of har-
assment or bad faith, two federal courts were apparently influenced by an
inference of bad faith in concluding that a stay was warranted where a party
that had lost in federal court sought to relitigate the same issues in state
court.
162
Some may contend that courts should not decide whether to grant an
antisuit injunction based on the presence of vexatious behavior. Professor
enjoining a state court proceeding if it could be shown that the state proceedings "are them-
selves part of a 'pattern of baseless, repetitive claims' that are being used as an anticompeti-
tive device .... I Id. at 644 (citations omitted).
At least one circuit has also considered the vexatious character of the litigation to decide
whether to issue an antisuit injunction directed to the court of another country. In Laker Air-
ways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the D.C. Circuit granted the injunction
requested by the federal court plaintiff on the ground that the action brought by the federal
court defendant, in the British courts, was "solely designed to rob the [federal] court of its ju-
risdiction." Id. at 931.
160 88 F.R.D. 359 (M.D. Ala. 1980), aff'd, 664 F.2d 1176 (11th Cir. 1981).
161 The district court stated:
Plaintiff seeks a stay of the state court action one working day prior to the com-
mencement of the final stage of those proceedings. The state court has already re-
solved all issues in that proceeding except the amount of damages allowable to
plaintiff, the issues of liability having been litigated and decided adversely to [plain-
tiff]. The state court has determined that the arbitration clause contained in the con-
tract between the parties is unenforceable.
Ultracashmere, 88 F.R.D. at 359-60. Thus, emphasizing that the plaintiff had waited over
nine months to assert the federal court claim, and that the plaintiff had failed to seek removal
of the state claim, the court stated that "[a]rbitration laws are passed to expedite and facilitate
the settlement of disputes and avoid the delay caused by litigation. It was never intended that
these laws should be used as a means of furthering and extending delays." Id. at 360 (internal
quotationmarks omitted).
162 See Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. RobHal, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 822 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (en-
joining a state court proceeding where, after the federal court ordered the dispute to proceed to
arbitration, the state court plaintiff still sought substantive relief through a temporary re-
straining order and failed to proceed to arbitration), ajfd as modified and remanded sub. nom.
Specialty Bakeries v. HalRob, 129 F.3d 726 (3d Cir. 1997); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 557 F.
Supp. 368, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (enjoining a state court action where "[t]he parties to this
action have been engaged in litigation for eight years," where a "final judgment after a trial
was entered as to some claims in November 1978," and where "the end of the controversy is
nowhere in sight"), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1438 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Distajo Second Circuit 1, 66
F.3d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1995), on remand, 944 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Conn. 1996), aftd, 107 F.3d
126 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Distajo Second Circuit Ir'), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 365 (1997) (enjoin-
ing various state proceedings after expressing a concern that "[t]his case is about forum-
shopping, by one and all").
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Linda Mullenix has stated her opposition quite clearly: "Ultimately any
vexatious litigation standard is inherently meaningless. In the broadest
sense, all litigation is vexatious. Why should a federal plaintiffs suit be
deemed vexatious because it was filed after a state plaintiffs lawsuit? In
litigation terms, one party's good lawyering is the opposing party's vexa-
tion.
163
I am quite sympathetic to Professor Mullenix's position. I agree that it
is not necessarily vexatious for a state court defendant to file a subsequent
federal suit. More generally, I concur that mere forum shopping is not
vexatious. Nonetheless, I do believe that in certain extreme situations a
party's actions may be found to be inconsistent with the legitimate policies
supporting a certain degree of forum shopping, and that such actions may
appropriately be labeled vexatious or harassing.
To distinguish between those actions that are harassing or taken in bad
faith, and those that merely reflect legitimate forum selection or other
strategies, courts should look for signs of illegitimate delay, false forum
shopping, or repetitive litigation. For example, a party sued in state court
may legitimately seek a federal forum, either by removal to federal court or
by filing a separate action in federal court. Such actions reflect the party's
acceptable preference for a federal court forum. However, if the state court
defendant's true goal is to secure the federal forum, then it should take steps
to move the action to federal court as quickly as possible. Where instead,
the state court defendant waits until the state court action has proceeded
quite far before seeking the federal forum, it begins to appear that the state
court defendant was actually seeking either "two bites at the apple" or de-
lay, rather than a mere forum change. Similarly, where a party itself
chooses the state forum and then later, perhaps in response to a counter-
claim, files a federal court action seeking to stay the state action, it appears
that the party acted vexatiously. After all, if the party truly preferred to
have the federal forum make the arbitration determination, why did it file in
state court in the first place? Finally, where a party essentially keeps refil-
ing the same case, even after having received an adverse ruling, it may be
attempting to use the litigation system to bother or harass its opponent,
rather than to secure a victory on the merits.
163 Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEo.
L.J. 99, 148 (1986). Some might also prefer to use a standard that does not explicitly require
identification of vexatious conduct to accomplish essentially the same end. Doctrines of
waiver, estoppel, or laches might possibly be used in this way. See infra note 436 (citing
cases where courts have applied the waiver doctrine to parties seeking arbitration in a federal
court).
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There may be, however, legitimate explanations for any of the actions
described above. At times, parties may engage in activities that at first ap-
pear vexatious or harassing, but are not. Moreover, given the difficulty in
distinguishing legitimate from vexatious litigation, I believe that litigation
should be labeled as vexatious only under rare circumstances. Thus, al-
though courts should be alert to the possibility of harassing tactics, and
should take them into account when deciding whether or not to grant an ar-
bitral antisuit injunction, courts will have to consider all of the facts and ar-
guments of the parties in making such determinations.
III. DOCTRINES RESTRICTING A FEDERAL COURT FROM OVERRIDING A
PRIOR STATE COURT RULING
A. The Federal Full Faith and Credit Statute
1. Background on the Full Faith and Credit Statute
Federal courts are statutorily required to give state judi-
cial proceedings full faith and credit. 164 Now set out in 28 U.S.C.
§1738,"' the gist of this provision was enacted in 1790.166 The Su-
preme Court has interpreted this statute to require federal courts to apply
to state court judgments the same claim preclusion167 and issue pre-
164 This statutory requirement should not be confused with the Constitution's Full Faith
and Credit provision, Article IV, which requires states to honor other states' public acts, rec-
ords, and judicial proceedings. See U.S. CONST. art. IV.
165 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). This section provides in relevant part:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and
seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the
court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
Id.
166 The Act of May 26, 1790, ch. XI, I Stat. 122, 122 required that federal courts afford a
state judgment "such faith and credit" that it would have "by law or usage in the courts of the
state" in which it was issued. Professor Wright speculates that the concept was adopted by
statute, rather than as part of the Constitution, because "it was not clear when the Constitution
was drawn that there would be lower federal courts." WRIGHT, supra note 143, at 731. He
suggests that once the lower federal courts were created by the Judiciary Act of 1789, Con-
gress realized the necessity of requiring such-deference to state court judgments. See id.
167 The Court actually uses the term "res judicata," rather than the more modem "claim
preclusion," now set out in the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
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clusion t68 treatment those judgments would be afforded by the courts within
the state. 16 9 In Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 17 the Court fur-
ther held that where a state court has already determined the res judicata ef-
fect of a particular federal decision, a federal court must defer to the state
court's res judicata interpretation to the extent that another state court within
the jurisdiction would defer to that ruling.171 Even where the state court
judgment consists of a settlement of claims that are within the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the federal court, the federal court is precluded from rehearing
the claims.172 The Court has explained that the deference required by the
statute is particularly important to "promote the comity between state and
federal courts that has been recognized as a bulwark of the federal sys-
tem,"' 73 as well as to serve the typical preclusion goals by "reliev[ing] par-
§§ 17-19 (1982). The Court explains that "[u]nder res judicata, a final judgment on the mer-
its of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could
have been raised in that action." Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467 n.6
(1982); cf Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984) (dis-
cussing the use of plain English terms, claim and issue preclusion, in lieu of res judicata and
collateral estoppel).
168 The Court uses the term "collateral estoppel" in place of "issue preclusion" and ex-
plains that "[u]nder collateral estoppel, once a court decides an issue of fact or law necessary
to its judgment, that decision precludes relitigation of the same issue on a different cause of
action between the same parties." Kremer, 456 U.S. at 467 n.6.
169 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996) ("Absent a par-
tial repeal of the Full Faith and Credit Act ... a federal court must give the judgment the same
effect that it would have in the courts of the State in which it was rendered."); Parsons Steel,
Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 519 (1986) (same); Marrese v. American Acad. of Or-
thopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985) (same); Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466-67 & n.6
(same); see also Migra, 465 U.S. at 84 (holding that the Full Faith and Credit statute even
barred a plaintiff from raising in federal court claims she could have raised but did not raise in
the earlier state court action, to the extent such claims would be barred by the state's own res
judicata doctrines).
170 474 U.S. 518 (1986).
171 See id. at 524. In Parsons Steel, similar claims were filed in both federal and state
court. The federal action went to trial first and a j.n.o.v. was granted in favor of the bank.
When the state court refused to treat the matter as res judicata, however, the federal court is-
sued an injunction to protect the validity of its own prior judgment, and the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed. See id. at 520-22. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of injunctive relief, hold-
ing that the federal district court should have relied on state law to determine the preclusive
effect of the state court's decision concerning resjudicata. See id. at 525. The Supreme Court
allowed the seemingly inefficient simultaneous litigation in state and federal court as "one of
the costs of our dual court system." Id.
172 See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 379-87 (finding that the policies underlying the grant of
exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts to hear securities claims are not undermined by re-
quiring federal courts to defer to a state court's settlement of said claims).
17 Kremer, 456 U.S. at 467 n.6 (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980)); see
also Marrese, 470 U.S. at 385 ("mhe concerns of comity reflected in § 1738 generally allow
States to determine the preclusive scope of their own courts' judgments."). See generally
Barbara Ann Atwood, State Court Judgments in Federal Litigation: Mapping the Contours of
Full Faith and Credit, 58 IND. L.J. 59, 85 (1982) (finding that the decisions in Kremer and
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ties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserv[ing] judicial re-
sources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourag[ing] reliance
on adjudication." 174 Thus, where the full faith and credit statute applies, and
where the state rules require preclusion, federal courts must defer unless the
state court action failed to "satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
175
2. Application of the Full Faith and Credit Statute to Federal Courts'
Issuance of Pro-Arbitration Antisuit Injunctions
Although the Supreme Court has never issued a holding on the question
of whether federal courts owe full faith and credit to state courts' arbitration
decisions, the Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Con-
struction Corp.176 seemed to assume that a state court's decision on arbitra-
bility would be treated as res judicata by the federal court. The Court
stated: "[A] stay of the federal suit pending resolution of the state suit
meant that there would be no further litigation in the federal forum; the state
court's judgment on the issue would be res judicata."'177 In support of this
Allen illustrate that enforcing preclusion doctrines supports "the principle of comity as well as
traditional res judicata goals of judicial economy, finality, and repose"); David P. Currie, Res
Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CIi. L. REv. 317, 327 (1978) (explaining that state
policies may seek to limit the preclusive effect of a state's own judgments).
174 Kremer, 456 U.S. at 467 n.6 (quoting Allen, 449 U.S. at 94); see also Marrese, 470
U.S. at 385 (stating that the Full Faith and Credit statute "may promote the goals of repose
and conservation ofjudicial resources by preventing the relitigation of certain issues in a sub-
sequent federal proceeding"). See generally, Daan Braveman & Richard Goldsmith, Rules of
Preclusion and Challenges to Official Action: An Essay on Finality, Fairness, and Federal-
ism, All Gone Awry, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 599, 599-600 (1988) (noting that preclusion sup-
ports policies of efficiency but concerns for efficiency should not be permitted to overwhelm
concerns for fairness); Allan D. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Ap-
plied in Federal Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1723 (1968) (observing that preclusion saves
time and costs, avoids inconsistent judgments, and protects litigants from harassment).
175 Kremer, 456 U.S. at 480-81 (holding that a party must be afforded a 'full and fair
opportunity' to litigate" (quoting Allen, 459 U.S. at 95)). Kremer found that state court pro-
cedures were constitutionally sufficient where, although they were primarily administrative,
the claimant had a chance to informally present his claim to the administrative agency, the
agency was charged with investigating his complaint, the claimant had an opportunity to rebut
respondent's case, a public hearing was required in certain circumstances, and judicial review
was ultimately available to assure that the agency's decision was not arbitrary or capricious.
Id. at 483-84. See generally William V. Luneburg, The Opportunity to be Heard and the
Doctrines of Preclusion: Federal Limits on State Law, 31 VILL. L. REV. 81, 122 (1986) (dis-
cussing due process principles that should be applied in preclusion cases, and applying princi-
ples set out in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) and Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univer-
sity of1ll. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971)).
460 U.S. 1 (1983).
177 Id. at 10. The dissent similarly stated:
If the state court had found that there was no agreement to arbitrate within the
meaning of the United States Arbitration Act, the District Court would have been
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proposition the Court cited two circuit court decisions holding that district
courts were bound by prior state court rulings denying arbitration of a par-
ticular dispute.
1 78
Notwithstanding the above dicta, some might attempt to argue that
claims brought under the FAA are somehow exempt from the statutory full
faith and credit requirement. However, any such argument seems doomed
given two Supreme Court decisions holding that even state decisions in civil
rights cases are entitled to preclusive effect in federal court. 179 Given these
decisions, and in light of the language and legislative history of the FAA, it
seems clear that the Court would not find FAA cases exempt from the re-
quirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Like the federal civil rights statutes, the
FAA contains no explicit language exempting FAA decisions from the re-
quirements of the Full Faith and Credit statute.180  Further, the FAA con-
tains no implicit exemption from the statute. Whereas the Court found that
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was passed in part because state courts were
bound by that finding. But res judicata or collateral estoppel would apply if the state
court reached a decision before the District Court in the absence of a stay.
Id. at 30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
178 See id. at 10 (citing Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1183-84
(11th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d
1466 (1 1th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 105 (1998)) (relying on res judicata to affirm
the district court's refusal to enjoin a state court that had already rejected the manufacturer's
claim that the dispute was subject to arbitration and resolved the dispute in favor of the re-
tailer); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391, 397-98 (5th Cir.
Unit B Feb. 1981) (reversing and remanding the district court's grant of a motion to compel
arbitration to allow the district court to consider the preclusive effect of a prior state court
ruling denying arbitration and ordering commencement of a trial).
179 In Allen, the Court held that the plaintiff's federal court damages action, pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, was precluded by a prior state court ruling denying plaintiff's motion to
suppress. See 449 U.S. at 100-05. While recognizing that "one strong motive" behind Con-
gress's passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was "grave congressional concern that the
state courts had been deficient in protecting federal rights," id. at 98-99, the Court nonetheless
concluded that neither the language nor the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 demon-
strated an intent to limit the coverage of the preclusive scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Rejecting
a principle of "general distrust of the capacity of the state courts to render correct decisions
on constitutional issues," id. at 105, and also refusing to conclude that "every person asserting
a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal
district court," id. at 103, the Court instead concluded:
There is, in short, no reason to believe that Congress intended to provide a person
claiming a federal right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already de-
cided in state court simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding in which he
would rather not have been engaged at all.
1d. at 104; see also Kremer, 456 U.S. at 478 (holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 created no exception to the statutory full faith and credit requirement in that "[s]tate
authorities are charged with enforcing laws, and state courts are presumed competent to inter-
pret those laws").
ISO See Allen, 449 U.S. at 98 (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 says nothing, explicitly, about
the preclusive effect of state judgments).
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seen as insufficiently protective of civil rights, ls1 the FAA's legislative his-
tory provides no reason to doubt the legitimacy of arbitration decisions
made by state courts. Rather, as discussed earlier, the jurisdictional struc-
ture of the FAA illustrates that Congress had confidence in the capacity of
state courts to interpret arbitration agreements. 12 This confidence justifies
federal courts' grant of full faith and credit to state arbitration decisions.1
8 3
In this situation, the FAA should not be entirely exempted from the full faith
and credit requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
Assuming then that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 applies to actions brought under
the FAA, a state court determination of nonarbitrability is entitled to preclu-
sive effect in federal court so long as it would be entitled to preclusive effect
in the state itself, and so long as the state proceeding did not violate the due
process clause. 184 In particular, a federal court may not deny preclusive ef-
fect to a state court's judgment as to arbitration merely because the state
court's decision was legally erroneous or failed to follow federal arbitration
policies.1
8 5
Several federal courts have applied such an analysis to rule upon re-
quested arbitral antisuit injunctions after examining whether a state court
ruling was sufficiently final and "on the merits" to foreclose subsequent
federal court action. The results have been mixed. The Second Circuit, in
181 See supra note 179 (discussing the Court's interpretation of the legislative history of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 inAllen).
182 See supra text accompanying notes 102-08 (explaining that the legislative history of
the FAA shows that Congress did not intend to preclude state court decisions).
183 Commentator Barbara Atwood has argued that statutes which grant concurrent juris-
diction to federal and state courts cannot, by definition, create exceptions to the Full Faith and
Credit statute. See Atwood, supra note 173, at 63. Further, the Supreme Court, in Marrese v.
American Acad of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 385 (1985), and Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 380-86 (1996), has even stated that the mere fact that a
statute provides federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction does not mean that such courts are
excused from deferring to state court rulings. Surely if deference is not necessarily excused in
the case of exclusive jurisdiction, and perhaps never excused in the case of concurrent juris-
diction, then it is not excused where the federal statute at issue does not create federal juris-
diction at all.
184 See supra text accompanying notes 164-75 (explaining federal deference to state court
judgments under the Full Faith and Credit statute).
185 As the Court stated with respect to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there is "no strength to any ar-
gument that Congress intended to allow relitigation of federal issues decided after a full and
fair hearing in a state court simply because the state court's decision may have been errone-
ous." Allen, 449 U.S. at 101; see also In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank
Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 142-43 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a state court's approval
of a class action certification and settlement was entitled to full faith and credit even though a
federal court had refused to certify a virtually identical class or to approve settlement).
[Vol. 147:91
ARBITRAL ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS
Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Distajo, 1 6 a case involving the Subway sand-
wich shop and various franchisees, considered antisuit injunctions issued by
the federal district court against suits pending at various stages in state
courts in Alabama, Illinois, and North Carolina.18 7 In each of these cases,
the state court had either ruled that arbitration was not appropriate or re-
fused to order the case to arbitration prior to the district court's issuance of
its antisuit injunction. 188  The Second Circuit concluded that the district
court erred in failing to afford preclusive effect to the Alabama Circuit
Court's entry of judgment against the franchisor.1i 9 However, the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to afford full faith and credit to
the Illinois and North Carolina decisions, even though the Illinois state court
had concluded the arbitration clause was void and unenforceable on several
grounds and designated its decision a "final and appealable order."'190 Quite
a few other federal courts have, with little or no analysis, found that the
statutory full faith and credit provision did not block them from overriding
or even enjoining a prior state court denial of a motion to compel arbitra-
tion.191
186 Distajo Second Circuit , 66 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 1995), on remand, 944 F. Supp. 1007
(D. Conn. 1996), affd, 107 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Distajo Second Circuit IX'), cert. de-
nied, 118 S. Ct. 365 (1997).
187 66 F.3d at 441. Subway sandwich shop franchisor Doctor's Associates, Inc. ("DAI")
initially instituted litigation against several of its franchisees in various state courts by direct-
ing its wholly owned real estate subsidiary to bring eviction proceedings against them. When
the franchisees responded by filing suit against DAI in state court, DAI sought the protection
of the arbitration clauses in the franchise agreement by filing actions in federal court. See id.
i88Prior to the federal court's issuance of its injunction, the Alabama state court had al-
ready ruled that the arbitration clause was void and unenforceable, and denoted its ruling a
"final judgment" See 66 F.3d at 447. The Illinois court had issued partial summary judgment
in favor of the franchisee, declaring the arbitration clause void and unenforceable. See id. at
449. The North Carolina court had denied DAI's motions to stay or dismiss the complaint
pending arbitration. See id. at 450.
189 The Alabama trial court ruled that the arbitration clause was "void and unenforce-
able," basing its ruling on "'any of the following independent reasons': (1) lack of mutuality;
(2) fraudulent inducement; (3) waiver by DAI of the right to invoke the arbitration clause; and
(4) invalidity of the clause under Alabama law." Id. at 447. Rejecting DAI's counterclaim,
the Alabama court then found "no just reason for delay" and ordered immediate entry of
judgment. Id. The Second Circuit, having found that the Alabama judgment was "final," re-
jected arguments that it nonetheless could be ignored by the federal court. See id. at 447-49.
The court found no change in the law totally undercutting the state court rationale, found no
denial of a full and fair opportunity to litigate, and rejected an assertion that the Alabama rul-
ing was merely advisory. See id.
190 Id. at 449-50.
191 In Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Woolsey & Co., 81 F.3d 1540 (10th Cir. 1996), the state
court denied a brokerage firm's interlocutory motion to compel arbitration based on the bro-
kerage's insufficient factual showing that the dispute was covered by the arbitration clause.
See id. at 1542-43. This determination was also affirmed by the state court of appeals, and the
federal district court therefore found that the Full Faith and Credit Clause precluded it from
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Two other federal circuits have, however, applied the Full Faith and
Credit statute and relevant state law to preclude federal courts from issuing
arbitral antisuit injunctions in cases where the state court had already ruled
arbitration to be inappropriate. The Third Circuit, in Towers, Perrin, For-
ster & Crosby, Inc. v. Brown,192 found that the district court erred in grant-
ing a petition to compel arbitration and in staying a California state court
action where, prior to the district court's ruling, the state court had denied
the company's petition to arbitrate, and where this denial had already been
refused review by the state supreme court.193 Similarly, in Ultracashmere
House, Ltd. v. Meyer,194 the Eleventh Circuit found that where Ultracash-
mere's violation of various discovery orders led the state court not only to
compelling arbitration or from staying the state court proceedings. See id. The Tenth Circuit,
however, reversed this decision, holding that because the state court decisions were based on
an absence of evidence in the record rather than a decision "on the merits," they should not be
given preclusive effect under the relevant state law. See id. at 1543-44; see also Ferrari N.
Am., Inc. v. Crown Auto Dealerships, No. 94 Civ. 8541 (KMW) 1995 WL 614558, at *2-3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995) (holding that a Florida appellate court's decision upholding a hear-
ing officer's denial of a motion to stay or dismiss a state action was not entitled to preclusive
effect on the issue of enforceability of an arbitration clause, because the ruling was based
solely on the hearing officer's lack of statutory authority to interpret or enforce the clause),
afgd, 101 F.3d 686 (2d Cir. 1996); McGuire, Cornwell & Blakey v. Grider, 765 F. Supp.
1048, 1051-52 (D. Colo. 1991) (concluding that a state court's denial of a motion to dismiss
or enforce an arbitration clause was not a final judgment entitled to preclusive effect in federal
court); Roodveldt v. Merrill Lynch, 585 F. Supp. 770, 783-84 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (ruling that
where a state court, presented with a motion to compel arbitration, instead issued an injunc-
tion preventing an employee from soliciting company clients, and where the employee subse-
quently filed a motion to compel arbitration in federal court, the state court's grant of a pre-
liminary injunction was not a final order entitled to preclusive effect).
In a number of other cases, federal courts have granted motions to compel arbitration or
even stayed state court actions, notwithstanding the existence of a prior state court order,
without expressly addressing the fill faith and credit issue. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541 F.2d 1263, 1263-64 (7th Cir. 1976) (affirming the district court
order compelling arbitration even though the state court had previously dismissed the com-
plaint and ordered the case to proceed to arbitration, and even though the state court's deter-
mination was on appeal to the state supreme court); Burger Chef Sys., Inc. v. Baldwin Inc.,
365 F. Supp. 1229, 1233-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (granting a motion to compel and to stay state
court action although the state court had already issued an ex parte restraining order enjoining
arbitration); Network Cinema Corp. v. Glassbum, 357 F. Supp. 169, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(granting a motion to compel arbitration and to stay state court action although the state court
had previously ruled that the arbitration clause was unenforceable).
F2 732 F.2d 345 (3d Cir. 1984).
193 See id. at 346-47, 350. The appeals court interpreted California law to preclude fur-
ther action by any court. See id. at 350. The Third Circuit rejected Towers Pernn's argument
that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, stating that "[t]he failure of the state
court to give effect to the federal right is an error of law, not an act beyond the jurisdiction of
the court." Id. at 348. The Third Circuit also rejected the argument that the federal and state
actions were not sufficiently similar to bring res judicata principles into play. See id.
194 664 F.2d 1176 (lth Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Baltin v. Alaron
Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466 (11th Cir. 1997).
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invalidate the arbitration clause but also to grant summary judgment on li-
ability to Meyer, those orders were entitled to preclusive effect in Alabama
state court and thus must be afforded full faith and credit by the federal
court.
19 5
Without delving deep into the details of each state's preclusion doc-
trines, it is not possible to critique each of these decisions. It is clear, how-
ever, that the extent to which the full faith and credit statute precludes arbi-
tral antisuit injunctions should turn on three factors: 1) the federal court's
interpretation of that statute,19 6 2) what constitutes "fundamental fair-
ness," 197 and 3) the state's own preclusion policies. At times, these deter-
minations will be straightforward, such as where a state court judgment on
the merits has been affirmed by the state's supreme court. Where they are
not, the federal courts should consider the policies discussed earlier in this
Article, as well as the specific circumstances of the case. For example, in
determining whether a particular state decision is sufficiently "final" or "on
the merits" to be entitled to have preclusive effect, the federal court should
take into account principles of federalism, efficiency, and deterrence of
vexatious conduct. The Ninth Circuit employed just such an analysis in a
decision holding that a state court's grant of an order compelling arbitration
was, given state law, entitled to preclusionary effect as a final order.
198
Somewhat curiously, these concerns have not been voiced as loudly in cases
in which federal courts have been called upon to reverse state court denials
of motions to compel arbitration.
199
195 See 664 F.2d at 1183-84 (summarizing and applying existing res judicata case law);
see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391, 398-99 (5th Cir.
Unit B 1981) (reversing and remanding the district court's grant of a petition to compel arbi-
tration in part because the district court failed to consider the preclusionary impact of the state
court's refusal to compel arbitration).
196 As noted earlier, the scope of the Full Faith and Credit statute must be interpreted in
light of the FAA and its own underlying policies. See supra text accompanying notes 164-75.
197 See supra text accompanying note 175 (discussing the constraint placed upon federal
court deference by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
198 See Southeast Resource Recovery Facility Auth. v. Montenay Int'l Corp., 973 F.2d
711, 714 (9th Cir. 1992). See infra text accompanying notes 447-51 (discussing Southeast
Resource in more detail).
199 See infra text accompanying notes 447-55 (observing that federal courts have more
frequently deferred to state court decisions ordering arbitration to proceed than to those re-
fusing to compel arbitration).
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B. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
1. Background on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal courts lack juris-
diction to review or sit as an appellate court over state court decisions. Not
coincidentally, the doctrine originated in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 200 in
which the Supreme Court reviewed a decision by a federal district court re-
fusing to annul ajudgment reached by the Indiana circuit court and affirmed
by the Indiana Supreme Court.201 The Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the suit, concluding that the suit was "plainly not within
the District Court's jurisdiction as defined by Congress." 20 2 Without laying
out any particular policy justifications for the decision, the Court simply ex-
plained that Congress authorized only the Supreme Court, and not district
courts, to hear challenges to state court decisions.20 3 Fifty-nine years later,
in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,20 4 the Supreme Court
reviewed a case in which the federal court plaintiffs challenged the local
D.C. Court of Appeals' failure to grant their requests for waivers of a bar
admission rule. 20 The Supreme Court concluded that to the extent that
plaintiffs' actions constituted a request that the district court review final
determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial pro-
ceedings, the district court was correct in its conclusion that it lacked sub-
206ject matter jurisdiction. However, while concluding that the D.C. Court
of Appeals' denial of the individuals' waiver petitions was judicial in na-
ture, and therefore not reviewable in district court,20 7 the Court found that
plaintiffs were nonetheless still jurisdictionally entitled to mount a general
200 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
201 See id. at 414. The federal court plaintiff challenged the Indiana judgment regarding a
corporation's duties and obligations as void in that it arguably violated the Contract, Equal
Protection, and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 414-15.
202 Id. at 415.
203 See id. at 416. The Court further rejected the federal court plaintiff's attempt to char-
acterize the federal court action as a challenge to the state court's jurisdiction, concluding in-
stead that "the bill at best is merely an attempt to get rid of the judgment for alleged errors of
law committed in the exercise ofthat jurisdiction." Id.
204 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
205 Although the District of Columbia is not a state, the Supreme Court found that final
judgments issued by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals are treated like decisions of
the highest court of a state. See id. at 463-64.
206 Referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the portion of the Judiciary Act granting the Supreme
Court power to review state court decisions under certain circumstances, the Court found that
"[r]eview of such determinations can be obtained only in this Court." See Feldman, 460 U.S.
at 476.
207 See id. at 479, 482-83.
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challenge to the constitutionality of the bar admission rule.208 Such a chal-
lenge, brought against the D.C. court in its non-judicial capacity, was not
"inextricably intertwined" with a review of a state court judicial decision
and thus was not barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1257.209 While the Supreme Court
did not explicitly outline the policy arguments it believed supported its con-
clusions in Feldman, it did on several occasions cite Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad v. Brotherhood ofLocomotive Engineers, 21 a case that spelled out
in some detail the federalism and comity concerns underlying the Court's
reversal under the AIA of a federal court's injunction against a state
court. 211 The Supreme Court has not issued any other significant decisions
applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 21  However, five justices in Penn-
zoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.,213 did conclude in dicta that a request that a federal
court enjoin a state court enforcement action was sufficiently distinct from
the state court's ruling on the merits such that Rooker-Feldman would not
apply.214
208 See id. at 484-86. The Supreme Court observed, however, that the doctrine of res ju-
dicata might foreclose plaintiffs' action, and explicitly refrained from ruling on this issue. See
id. at 487-88.
209 See id. at 485-87.
210 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
211 See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476, 482 n.16 ("Lower federal courts possess no power
whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions." (quoting Atlantic Coast Line, 398
U.S. at 296)). See infra text accompanying notes 288-92 for further discussion of Atlantic
Coast.
212 In Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994), the Court reached the
seemingly obvious conclusion that the doctrine did not bar a federal court action by a party
that did not participate in a prior state court suit.
213 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
214 Texaco, having been found liable for twelve billion dollars in a state court tortious
breach of contract action, filed a federal court suit arguing that the Texas judgment lien and
appeal bond provisions were unconstitutional in that they required Texaco to post a twelve
billion dollar bond in order to secure review of the jury award issued against it. The district
court ruled that Rooker-Feldman was inapplicable in that the federal court was not "attempt-
ing to sit as a final or intermediate appellate state court as to the merits of the Texas action."
Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250,254 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), afftd, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d
Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 1 (1987). Rather, it stated that, "Our only intention is to assure
Texaco its constitutional right to raise claims that we view as having a good chance of suc-
cess.' Id. The Second Circuit affirmed on somewhat different grounds, concluding that while
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did in fact bar the district court from evaluating the merits of the
state court judgment, the district court was entitled to review the due process and equal pro-
tection claims because they were not presented to the state court and were not "'inextricably
intertwined' with the state court action. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133,
1144 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482-83 n.16, rev'd, 481 U.S. 1 (1987)).
The Supreme Court plurality opinion chose not to address the Rooker-Feldman issue, instead
reversing the injunction on the ground that the federal court was mandated to abstain under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See infra text accompanying notes 408-22 (discussing
Younger's requirement that federal courts consider state interests before enjoining state court
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Although the doctrine has been criticized by some as an unnecessary
redundancy in that it substantially overlaps with the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and res judicata doctrine,215 Rooker-Feldman arguably has a broader
scope than do those doctrines. In particular, numerous courts have found
that Rooker-Feldman may prevent a federal court from hearing a case in
which an order has already been issued by the state court, even though that
order is not a final order entitled to preclusive effect under the Full Faith
216and Credit Clause. Moreover, because the doctrine deprives courts of
subject matter jurisdiction, challenges based on Rooker-Feldman can be
raised at any time and even on appeal, although a party may initially have
failed to raise the challenge.
217
civil and criminal proceedings). However, in dicta, five of the Justices concluded that
Rooker-Feldman was inapplicable because the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief was suf-
ficiently distinct from the merits of the state court action that it was not akin to an attempted
appeal. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 18 (Scalia & O'Connor, JJ., concurring); id. at 18, 21
(Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring); id. at 27-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 29, 31
n.3 (Stevens & Marshall, JJ., concurring). Only Justice Marshall found that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine barred federal court jurisdiction in the case. See id. at 23, 24-25 (Marshall,
J., concurring) (finding that the constitutional challenge is inextricably intertwined with the
state court judgment because federal relief is "predicated upon a conviction that the state court
was wrong").
215 See, e.g., Gary Thompson, Note, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and the Subject
Matter Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts, 42 RuTGERS L. REv. 859 (1990) (advocating
abolition of the doctrine and explaining why it is unnecessary and harmful); 18 CHARLEs
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4469 (1981) ("This jurisdic-
tional transmutation of res judicata doctrine seems entirely unnecessary."); see also Narey v.
Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1526-28 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding it unnecessary to apply the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine in a case that fails on the merits). But see GASH Assocs. v. Village of
Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728-29 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
has nothing to do with the Full Faith and Credit statute, resting instead on the principle that
federal courts have only original jurisdiction).
216 See, e.g., Distajo Second Circuit II, 107 F.3d 126, 137-38 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from reviewing interlocutory as well as final
state court decisions), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 365 (1997); Campbell v. Greisberger, 80 F.3d
703, 707 (2d Cir. 1996) ("It cannot be the meaning of Rooker-Feldman that, while the inferior
federal courts are barred from reviewingfinal decisions of state courts, they are free to review
interlocutory orders."); Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995)
("Rooker-Feldman is broader than claim and issue preclusion because it does not depend on a
final judgment on the merits."); Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Port Auth. of N.Y. &
N.J. Police Dep't, 973 F.2d 169, 177-79 (3d Cir. 1992) (observing that where a state court
issued a preliminary injunction, and where the subject of a preliminary injunction subse-
quently brought suit in federal court to enjoin an opposing party from enforcing a rule sup-
porting an injunction, a federal court could properly rely on Rooker-Feldman as well as
Younger abstention to dismiss the case, in that the interlocutory nature of the injunction "does
not preclude the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine").
27 Distajo Second Circuit II, 107 F.3d at 137 ("A challenge to a federal court's subject
matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 'may be raised at any time by either
party or sua sponte by the court."' (quoting Moccio v. New York State Office of Court
Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1996))); see also In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up
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2. Application of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine to Federal Courts' Issuance
of Pro-Arbitration Antisuit Injunctions
Very few courts have ruled on whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
precludes a federal court from compelling arbitration or enjoining a state
218court from considering the arbitrability of a particular dispute. Moreover,
Rooker-Feldman jurisprudence is, in general, rather undefined. 219  Thus,
courts will need to resolve at least three important ambiguities in applying
the doctrine to the arbitration context: first, if the ruling was not made by
the state's highest court, whether it blocks federal action; second, whether
the state court's ruling was sufficiently "final" to bar federal action; and
third, whether, given its content, the requested federal action is appropri-
ately considered to be an "appeal" of the state ruling and thus prohibited by
the doctrine. Courts will find it easier to resolve these ambiguities if they
consider the four policies discussed in this Article,220 in light of the specific
factual context of the case.
Although it could be argued that Rooker-Feldman only bars federal
court action as to decisions that have been ruled upon by a state's highest
court,221 courts and commentators have generally applied Rooker-Feldman
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 143 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine to block a federal court challenge to state approval of a settlement even
though the state did not approve the settlement until after the district court refused to enjoin
the state action). By contrast, at least in federal court, the defenses ofresjudicata and collat-
eral estoppel are affirmative defenses that must be stated in the answer or else lost. See FED.
R CIV. P. 8(c). It should be noted, however, that many pre-Feldman cases cited Rooker as a
principle ofresjudicata, and not of federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d
414, 425 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing Rooker to support the court's refusal to nullify a determination
of the New York Court of Appeals); Hanley v. Four Comers Vacation Props., Inc., 480 F.2d
536, 538 (10th Cir. 1973) (citing Rooker to support the determination that a when final judg-
ment on the issue of due process has been entered, it is res judicata).
218 This author located only one case that considered whether the Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine precluded a federal court from enjoining a state court order to send a dispute to arbitra-
tion. See Distajo Second Circuit 11, 107 F.3d at 138 (determining that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine was inapplicable because the federal action, having been filed prior to the state court
ruling, could not properly be characterized as an "appeal" from the state court ruling). A sec-
ond case, Integrated Pet Foods, Inc. v. Commonwealth, No. CIV. A. 95-7847, 1996 WL
153216 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 1996), involved the reverse situation: a party's attempt to secure a
federal court order enjoining a state court's decision sending a matter to arbitration. Inte-
grated Pet Foods stated, in dicta, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would appear to preclude
the federal court from reconsidering the state court's decision that certain defenses were not
available to the party. See id. at * 1.
219 See generally Thompson, supra note 215, at 860-61 (discussing various ambiguities
in the interpretation of the doctrine).
220 See supra text accompanying notes 77-163 for a discussion of the four policies.
221 Both the Rooker and Feldman cases themselves involved decisions that reached the
end of the state appellate process. Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the jurisdictional foundation
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to decisions by lower state courts as well.222 Analyzing the issue in terms of
federalism and comity concerns, the Second Circuit explained that
"[a]llowing lower federal courts to review the judgments of state lower
courts is as intrusive and as likely to breed antagonism between state and
federal systems as allowing federal court review of the judgments of the
states' highest courts. 223 This analysis seems correct, in terms of serving
the interests of not only federalism and comity but also efficiency. Thus,
where a state court has made a final ruling on the merits in a case that the
losing party now argues should have been arbitrated, Rooker-Feldman
would seem to bar a federal court from reconsidering the issue.
As to "finality," all would agree that unless the state court has at least
made a ruling of some sort, Rooker-Feldman does not apply. Thus, where a
state court action was filed but no ruling on arbitrability was made, the doc-
trine certainly does not restrict the federal court from making its own ruling
on arbitrability or even from enjoining the state court proceeding. Beyond
that, the road is foggy. For example, it is not entirely clear whether the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only to final judgments, or also to inter-
locutory rulings. Calling the question "interesting," the Seventh Circuit
hinted that it may find the doctrine applicable only to final determina-
22tions. 24 If this were so, a state court ruling that the dispute was not arbitra-
of these cases, refers only to the Supreme Court's right to review decisions by the "highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had." 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994).
222 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 215, at 894 (noting that although the Supreme Court
has never taken the step of giving Rooker-Feldman recognition to lower state court decisions,
other federal courts and commentators consistently have); Michael Finch & Jerome Kasriel,
Federal Court Correction of State Court Error: The Singular Case on Interstate Custody
Disputes, 48 O11o ST. L.J. 927, 976 (1987) ("The absence of state appellate finality does not
alter the practical reality that lower federal court review will constitute the functional equiva-
lent of an appeal .... Thus, Rooker-Feldman is relevant at the time that the state trial court's
judgment is final, regardless of whether section 1257 review is ... timely."); see also In re
General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 143 (3d
Cir. 1998) (holding that Rooker-Feldman barred a federal court from hearing a challenge to a
class action settlement approved by a Louisiana trial court); Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287,
291-92 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that Rooker-Feldman barred federal courts from hearing
claims that were affirmed by state appellate courts, but not the state supreme court); United
States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 925 (5th Cir. 1994) (concluding that Rooker-Feldman pro-
hibited federal courts from reviewing state trial court decisions on liens). But see News-
Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499, 1510-11 n.13 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that Rooker-
Feldman would have been applicable once the state decision had been reviewed and affirmed
by the state supreme court).
23 Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'don other
grounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
224 See Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. Moran, 959 F.2d 634, 635 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a plaintiff may not circumvent a state court decision by bringing a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action against the state court judge in federal court); see also United States v. Owens, 54
F.3d 271,274 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating, in dicta, that Rooker applies only where final judgment
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ble would not bring Rooker-Feldman into play until the state court decided
the case on the merits. Several other circuits have found, however, that the
doctrine bars reconsideration of interlocutory as well as final rulings.225 As
the Second Circuit put it: "It cannot be the meaning of Rooker-Feldman
that, while the inferior federal courts are barred from reviewing final deci-
sions of state courts, they are free to review interlocutory orders."226 Ap-
plying the federalism principles upon which the doctrine seems to be based,
this reading would seem to be correct, at least as applied to arbitration deci-
sions. Federal courts should no more be allowed to sit as appellate review-
ers over interlocutory state court orders than over final state court orders.
Efficiency principles also oppose federal court review of interim state court
orders. Federal policy sometimes points the other way, perhaps dictating
that federal courts should be allowed to make their own determinations,
notwithstanding a mere interlocutory state court ruling. In determining the
finality of the state court's order in the arbitration context, the federal court
should look, specifically, at the context of the order. Where, for example, a
state court has only issued an emergency temporary restraining order, pre-
cluding arbitration, it is less appropriate to prohibit a federal court to act
than when the state court has determined, after a full evidentiary hearing,
that arbitration is not required.
Even where a sufficiently high-level state court has issued a sufficiently
final judgment, Rooker-Feldman bars only those federal court actions that
can be characterized as an "appeal" of the state court action. Several factors
are relevant to the federal court's determination of whether it is, effectively,
being asked to hear an "appeal" from a state court ruling.227 First, as dis-
has been issued but that it "'is not a requirement that a plaintiff exhaust all conceivable state
remedies.' (quoting Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1548 (1 1th Cir. 1983))).
=2 See Richardson v. District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1515-16 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (rejecting a request to review an interlocutory decision by the D.C. Court of Ap-
peals to suspend an attorney); Campbell v. Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703, 707 (2d Cir. 1996) (re-
fusing to distinguish between an interlocutory decision and a final judgment for the purposes
of determining subject matter jurisdiction using the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Port Authority
Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J. Police Dep't, 973 F.2d 169, 177-79
(3d Cir. 1992) (holding that the interlocutory nature of a state court order does not preclude
the use of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and upholding the dismissal of an appeal against a
preliminary injunction issued by a state court); Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 296-97,
297 n.2 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting agreement with other circuits that the Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine applies to state court decisions that are not final).
22 Campbell, 80 F.3d at 707 (emphasis added); see also Gentner v. Shulman, 55 F.3d 87,
89 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that Rooker-Feldman applies whether an order is "final or in-
terlocutory in nature").
227 As the authors of an authoritative treatise observe, parties would only rarely charac-
terize their federal court action as an "appeal" from a state court decision. See 18 WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 215, § 4469. Thus, the difficult task is to determine which purportedly inde-
pendent federal suits are in fact appeals from a state court decision.
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cussed earlier, the doctrine bars only those actions which are "inextricably
linked" to the state court decision.228 However, where a federal court is
being asked in a motion to compel arbitration to reverse a state court's deci-
sion that a case pending in the state court is nonarbitrable, it seems clear that
the federal court action is "inextricably intertwined" with the state court de-
cision. This is not a situation, such as that described by five Justices in
Pennzoil, where the federal court is being asked to rule on an issue that was
not litigated in the state court.229 Second, the Second Circuit has found that
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable where the federal court action
was filed prior to the state court's ruling that the dispute was nonarbitrable,
reasoning that where the federal action was filed first, "[w]e cannot say that
DAI is attempting to appeal from any of the state court decisions." 
230
228 See supra text accompanying notes 209-10. This concept is not always easy to apply.
Compare Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that
Rooker-Feldman barred a federal court from hearing a legal malpractice claim based on al-
leged malpractice in state court), Gentner, 55 F.3d at 89 (holding that Rooker-Feldman de-
feated federal jurisdiction where a state court disqualified three attorneys from representing
the defendants in a pending criminal prosecution, and while the state action was still pending,
the attorneys and clients brought suit in the federal court to enjoin a state court order, because
"[i]n essence, they sought an appeal in federal court from the state court decisions"), and
Chrissy F. ex rel. Medley v. Mississippi Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 995 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1993)
(finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to order a state referee to hold a new trial
where the grounds for relief could have been raised by appeal in the state courts), with Char-
chenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that Rooker-Feldman did
not bar a federal court from hearing a complaint dismissed by a state court for lack of juris-
diction), Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 885-86 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994) (concluding that Rooker-
Feldman did not bar a federal suit alleging absentee voter fraud in a state election where the
issues presented to the federal court were not determined by a state court and were not inter-
twined with those issues), and Rhoades v. Penfold, 694 F.2d 1043, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1983)
(permitting federal action under § 1983 to enjoin enforcement of a state judgment allegedly
tainted by the denial of the right to appointed counsel where a claim did not involve review of
the substantive issues decided in a state court).
229 See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
230 Distajo Second Circuit 11, 107 F.3d 126, 138 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Texaco Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1143 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1
(1987)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 365 (1997); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Doe, 868 F. Supp. 532, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that where a state court has not
issued a judgment and the federal action is brought before any state court order was issued,
"state courts are simply without power to enjoin the commencement of a federal court ac-
tion"). The Second Circuit so held while recognizing that several of the state courts had is-
sued final judgments prior to its ruling. As to one of the state court decisions, the Second Cir-
cuit also emphasized that the federal district court issued a temporary restraining order which
enjoined the state court action prior to when the state court made its damages determination,
but that the state court plaintiff failed to apprise the state court of the existence of the tempo-
rary restraining order. See Distajo Second Circuit 17, 107 F.3d at 137-38.
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The Second Circuit's reasoning here seems questionable from a policy
standpoint, at least when applied as a strict rule.231 Such a rule would en-
courage a party anticipating a possible adverse state ruling on arbitration to
file a federal court action immediately following the filing of the state suit.
Then, depending on how the state court action seemed to be going, the party
could either pursue the federal court action, without fear of Rooker-Feldman
preclusion, or else voluntarily dismiss the federal court action. A variant of
the Second Circuit's ruling would, however, be desirable. The federal court
should determine whether the federal court action is effectively an appeal of
the state court ruling, after taking into account both the timing of the filing
of the two actions and the timing of the ruling in the state case. Where the
federal action is filed prior to the filing of the state court action, the federal
court should be free to enjoin the state court action.232 That is, the priority
of filing should be a relevant, but not conclusive, factor in the federal
court's analysis.
In sum, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a federal court from
hearing what is in effect an "appeal" from a state court determination that a
dispute is nonarbitrable. The extent to which a particular federal court ac-
tion in a motion to compel arbitration should be considered to be an imper-
missible "appeal" ought to turn on the maturity of the state court action and
the relative priority of the federal and state court actions.233 Consideration
23 The Third Circuit implicitly rejected the Second Circuit's reasoning, holding that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine blocked a federal court from enjoining a state court where the state
court did not enter final judgment until after the district court refused to issue the injunction.
See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133,
143 (3d Cir. 1998).
232 A third unresolved Rooker-Feldman question is whether the doctrine bars a federal
court from considering issues not actually raised in the court below. If the issue was not
raised below, can the federal court's consideration of the issue properly be considered an "ap-
peal" and thus be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine? The question has generated inter-
esting analysis by commentators and courts. Compare Thompson, supra note 215, at 876-77
(arguing that Rooker-Feldman only covers those issues actually raised in the state court), and
Texaco, 784 F.2d at 1144-45 (same), with Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3d Cir.
1992) (holding that Rooker-Feldman bars issues that were not, but could have been, raised
previously in state court). It seems unlikely, however, that this issue would arise with any
frequency in the context of an arbitral antisuit injunction because one party or the other almost
surely would have raised the issue of arbitrability in state court prior to one party seeking an
order to compel arbitration and enjoin the state court proceeding.
233 An argument could be made that the applicability of Rooker-Feldman should also turn
on whether either party engaged in vexatious conduct. The Fifth Circuit considered such an
argument in Musslewhite v. State Bar, 32 F.3d 942, 947-48 (5th Cir. 1994) and, withdrawing
its own prior ruling in Musslewhite v. State Bar, 25 F.3d 1300 (5th Cir. 1994), concluded that
such conduct was irrelevant. The court explained that even if the federal court plaintiff could
establish that the state court action seeking to discipline him for various alleged ethical in-
fractions was spurred by improper motives, Rooker-Feldman still barred the federal suit. The
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of these factors will allow courts to take into account the federalism and ef-
ficiency concerns upon which the doctrine is founded.
IV. DOCTRINES DEFINING A FEDERAL COURT'S ABILITY To ENJOIN
ONGOING STATE COURT ACTIONS
Even if a federal court is not entirely barred from considering a motion
to compel arbitration, it may be precluded from enjoining an ongoing state
court action. This Part will discuss the doctrines that are relevant to this
question.
A. The All Writs Act Provides Authority for Arbitral Antisuit Injunctions
Federal courts' authority to issue injunctions is founded in the All Writs
Act.2 4 This statute, passed in 1948 as a consolidation of prior statutes,
2 35
states that: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Con-
gress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 6 Courts
have long held that, subject to the constraints set out by the other doctrines
that will be discussed in the following Subparts, this statute authorizes fed-
eral courts to issue various writs, including particularly antisuit injunctions
directed to other federal or state courts.237 Once the federal court directs
court contrasted other Fifth Circuit decisions which had concluded that the federal preemption
doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), would not apply where it could be shown
that the state court action was undertaken for improper purposes. See Musslewhite, 32 F.3d at
947-48 (citing Smith v. Hightower, 693 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1982) and Shaw v. Garrison, 467
F.2d 113, 119-21 (5th Cir. 1972)). Although the Fifth Circuit stated that different policy justi-
fications underlie Younger than underlie Rooker-Feldman, and concluded that the bad faith
exception was appropriate only under Younger, it did not spell out its reasoning. See Mussle-
white, 32 F.3d at 948.
234 Ch. 646, § 1651(a), 62 Stat. 944, 944 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994)).
235 See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (noting that the 1948 statute was intended to consolidate former
sections 342, 376, and 377 of Title 28 of the United States Code).
236 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
237 See Winder v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196, 1202-03 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that
the All Writs Act permits a federal court to issue such commands as an injunction in order to
"'effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of ju-
risdiction' (quoting United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 173 (1977)); In
re Johns-Manville Corp., 27 F.3d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming the district court's issuance
of an order under the All Writs Act staying all litigation and proceedings against the trust that
was party to settlement, and also staying all payments by the trust to its beneficiaries); Wesch
v. Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465, 1470-71 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that a federal court injunction
of state court proceedings is appropriate in aid ofjurisdiction); United States v. BNS Inc., 858
F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that it "seems clear that the issuance of a preliminary
injunction pursuant to the All Writs Act is appropriate in certain instances to preserve the
court's [Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act] jurisdiction") see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651. See
generally Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1964) ("While Congress has seen
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such an antisuit injunction to the state court, the Supremacy Clause requires
the state court to abide by the order.238
B. Equitable Constraints May Preclude Arbitral Antisuit Injunctions
1. Background on Equitable Constraints
Traditional equitable constraints prohibit federal courts from issuing
injunctions, including arbitral antisuit injunctions, absent a showing of pro-
spective "irreparable injury and lack of an adequate remedy at law."239 As
the D.C. Court of Appeals explained in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Bel-
gian WorldAirlines,240 equitable principles support the issuance of an anti-
suit injunction only where such an injunction "is required to prevent an ir-
reparable miscarriage ofjustice.
241
fit to authorize [federal] courts ... to restrain state-court proceedings in some special circum-
stances, it has in no way relaxed the old and well-established judicially declared rule that state
courts are completely without power to restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam ac-
tions ... ." (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651, 2283) (additional citations omitted)).
238 See U.S. CONST. art. VI. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has recently
stated in dicta that the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require one state to
abide by another state's antisuit injunction. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct.
657, 665 (1998) (stating that enforcement measures, unlike determinations on the merits, are
not controlling in a second state jurisdiction).
239 Sherman, supra note 77, at 927; see also William T. Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Un-
der the Anti-Injunction Statute, 78 CoLuM. L. REv. 330, 331 (1978) (explaining that courts
are generally restrained by principles of equity and comity, and considerations of federalism,
in issuing antisuit injunctions); Wood, supra note 34, at 292-93 (outlining the equitable prin-
ciples which generally preclude antisuit injunctions). See generally Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37,43 (1971) (noting that courts of equity should not act "when the moving party has an
adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief'); John
Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1978) (propos-
ing a standard governing interlocutory injunctions which balances interim injury against in-
terlocutory judicial error); Comment, Anti-suit Injunctions Between State and Federal Courts,
32 U. Cm. L. REV. 471 (1965) (discussing the circumstances in which a federal court could
enjoin proceedings before a state court).
240 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
241 Id. at 927. While observing that antisuit injunctions are permissible only in extreme
circumstances, either to protect the jurisdiction of the issuing court or to prevent evasion of
the forum's important policies, Sabena nonetheless upheld a district court's issuance of an
injunction that restrained defendants from taking part in a British action. See id. at 930-31. It
found that the British action, in contrast to a typical permissible parallel proceeding, was initi-
ated solely for the purpose of depriving the American courts of jurisdiction, see id. at 930, and
further found that the injunction was necessary to prevent the litigants from evading U.S. an-
titrust law. See id. at 931-32. For a brief but informative discussion of the use of antisuit in-
junctions in the international context, see GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LrrIGATION
IN UNITED STATES COURTs, 475-90 (3d ed. 1996).
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Typically, courts have applied this equitable test to conclude that anti-
suit injunctions are not proper merely to halt a parallel in personam claim.242
Rather, as discussed earlier, the principle of comity is typically interpreted
to allow in personam proceedings in two jurisdictions to proceed concur-
rently until one of the jurisdictions issues a judgment. 43 Thus, the possible
problem of inconsistent judgments is resolved most often through the use of
preclusion doctrines, rather than by allowing one jurisdiction to close down
another's operations.
2. Application of Equitable Constraints to Federal Courts' Issuance of Pro-
Arbitration Antisuit Injunctions
The vast majority of courts that have granted arbitral antisuit injunc-
tions have not even considered whether equity permits interference.
2 44
Once the question is raised, however, it is not at all clear that many such
245injunctions meet the equitable test. To obtain an arbitral antisuit injunc-
242 See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927 ("Injunctions are most often necessary to protect
the jurisdiction of the enjoining court, or to prevent the litigant's evasion of the important
public policies of the forum.").
243 See supra text accompanying notes 121-27; see also Colorado River Water Conser-
vation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (noting that between state and federal
courts, "the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the
same matter in the Federal court"); Princess Lida of Thum & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S.
456, 466 (1939) (explaining that both state and federal courts may proceed with litigation until
judgment is obtained in one of them, which may be set up as res judicata in the other). Courts
more frequently enjoin proceedings in other jurisdictions where jurisdiction is in rem rather
than in personam. See infra text accompanying notes 282-86. Courts have also generally
found that it is more permissible to enjoin a proceeding in the same forum in which the in-
junction is sought, than to enjoin a proceeding in a different forum. See Colorado River, 424
U.S. at 817; Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927 n.49.
244 See, e.g., In re Arbitration Between Nuclear Elec. Ins. Ltd. & Central Power & Light
Co., 926 F. Supp. 428, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (compelling an arbitration sought by an insurer in
a dispute over the enforceability of insured's policy); Ferrari N. Am., Inc. v. Crown Auto
Dealerships, No. 94 Civ. 8541 (KMW), 1995 WL 614558, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995) (re-
quiring respondent to submit to arbitration before the American Arbitration Association in
New York City, and staying a proceeding before the Florida Department of Highway Safety
and Motor Vehicles), affd, 101 F.3d 686 (2d Cir. 1996); Pervel Indus., Inc. v. TM Wallcov-
ering, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 867, 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (granting a motion to compel an arbitration
pursuant to a clause in a sales contract, and staying pending state court proceeding), aff'd, 871
F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1989). But see Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Vetter, 838 F. Supp. 468, 473-74 (D.
Mont. 1993) (explaining that Snap-On established a likelihood of success on the merits of its
claim that the dispute was arbitrable, and that it would suffer irreparable harm if it lost the
benefits of arbitration, whereas Vetter's claimed inability to pay for arbitration did not rise to
the level of irreparable harm).
245 The district court refused to find such a showing in TranSouth Financial Corp. v.
Bell, 975 F. Supp. 1305, 1311 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (finding that no irreparable harm was estab-
lished, particularly where the party seeking arbitration retained the right to appeal an adverse
state decision through the state appellate process, as well as to the Supreme Court), aff'd in
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tion, moving parties should have to establish that equitable factors weigh in
their favor and that absent such injunction they will suffer irreparable injury.
In determining whether or not a party seeking an arbitral antisuit in-
junction can establish irreparable injury or equitable entitlement to the in-
junction, the federal court should consider more than the federal policy re-
garding arbitration; principles of federalism and comity, efficiency
concerns, and unjustifiable harassing trial tactics should also figure in the
analysis.
Although a party might contend that being forced to litigate an arguably
arbitrable dispute constitutes irreparable harm, there are several problems
with this argument. First, such a party cannot blithely point to potential
substantive differences between the rulings of the arbitrators and a court be-
cause the Supreme Court has clearly stated it will not assume the existence
of any such differences. 246 Second, unless the state court has already ruled,
it is mere speculation, and also disrespectful to the state court, to assume
that it would find the dispute not to be arbitrable. Third, in terms of effi-
ciency, even assuming one could accurately predict the actions of the state
court, or even if the state court had already ruled, it is not clear that allowing
a case to be decided through litigation rather than through arbitration con-
stitutes irreparable harm. Particularly where substantial progress has al-
ready been made in the state suit, litigation might well prove cheaper than
arbitration. Moreover, even to the extent it could be shown that the litiga-
tion process would be more time consuming and expensive, it would seem
that monetary compensation could be awarded to make up for such a loss
and that such harm is, therefore, not irreparable. Finally, where a party is
attempting to establish that equitable factors favor granting of the injunc-
tion, the court should consider whether either party engaged in vexatious or
harassing conduct. 247 A party might in some instances be able to establish
part, vacated in part on other grounds and remanded, 149 F.3d 1292 (1 1th Cir. 1998); see
also Swofford v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1128, 1129 (E.D. Ark.
1985) (concluding that the plaintiff had not made the necessary showing to obtain a prelimi-
nary injunction given that the plaintiff had the opportunity for both a trial on the merits and an
appeal in the state court system); Roodveldt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
585 F. Supp. 770, 784 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (considering the "balance of the equities" and the lack
of a showing of irreparable injury, before concluding that a federal court stay of a state court
ruling is not necessary, given the state court's careful and thoughtful proceedings and given
the federal court's order compelling arbitration).
246 See supra note 112 (discussing the Supreme Court's statement, in cases including
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985), that en-
forcement of substantive rights is the same in arbitration as in litigation).
247 Courts should employ the same equitable analysis they would undoubtedly employ if
asked to interfere with a state court decision ordering a case to proceed to arbitration. Only if,
for example, due to arbitrator bias and expense, a party could show she would be irreparably
harmed by participation in the arbitration might an injunction be permitted. Cf Aviall, Inc. v.
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irreparable harm due to the loss of the private forum or expertise that would
have been afforded by arbitration, but claims of such harm must be carefully
scrutinized.
In sum, traditional equitable principles are likely to preclude a federal
court from issuing an arbitral antisuit injunction except in very unusual cir-
cumstances that might lead to irreparable harm. Such circumstances might
include a situation where the federal action is filed prior to the state suit and
has already progressed substantially, or where a party opposing arbitration
is engaging in inappropriate vexatious conduct.
C. The Anti-Injunction Act
The AIA, initially passed in 1793, 248 currently provides that "A court of
the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by AIA of Congress, or where neces-
sary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
249
This current version of the Act was passed in 1948 in part to counter a
highly controversial Supreme Court decision, Toucey v. New York Life In-
surance Co.,25° which interpreted the Act restrictively to prevent federal
courts from enjoining state court proceedings seeking to relitigate issues
previously resolved in federal court.
251
Ryder Sys., Inc., 110 F.3d 892, 895 (2d Cir. 1997) (refusing to remove an arbitrator for bias
prior to rendering an award).
248 The original version of the Act stated "nor shall a writ of injunction be granted [by a
federal court] to stay proceedings in any court of a state.... ." Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22,
§ 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335 (1793); see JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrrTUON OF
THE UNITED STATES § 914 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833) (stating that federal courts
have no authority to issue injunctions in state courts or otherwise interfere with their jurisdic-
tion). The Act was amended in 1874 to provide that "The writ of injunction shall not be
granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in
cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bank-
ruptcy." Ch. 12, § 720, 18 Stat. 137 (1874) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 379 (repealed)).
249 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994). The Act applies to injunctions that indirectly as well as di-
rectly seek to limit the scope of state courts' authority. See Atlantic Coast Line RR. v. Broth-
erhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970) ("It is settled that the prohibition of§
2283 cannot be evaded by addressing the order to the parties or prohibiting utilization of the
results of a completed state proceeding.").
250 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
251 Justice Reed and two others had dissented vigorously in Toucey, complaining that the
Court's ruling would allow state courts to ignore federal courts' rulings, even after a tremen-
dous investment of time and energy. See 314 U.S. at 144. See generally 17 WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 215, § 4221 (discussing the history of the AIA). The 1948 amendment explicitly
included a "relitigation exception" to the Act's general proscription against antisuit injunc-
tions. The Reviser's Historical and Revision Notes to § 2283 state in part: "The excep-
tions specifically include the words 'to protect or effectuate its judgments,' for lack of which
the Supreme Court held that the Federal courts are without power to enjoin
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In interpreting the AIA, the Supreme Court has explained that while
"[t]he precise origins of the legislation are shrouded in obscurity .... the
consistent understanding has been that its basic purpose is to prevent
'needless friction between state and federal courts."' 2 2 Thus, the AIA re-
flects the federalist premise that state courts can generally be trusted to ap-
relitigation of cases and controversies fully adjudicated by such courts." 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1994). See infra text accompanying notes 336-69 for firther discussion of this provision.
252 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1972) (quoting Oklahoma Packing Co. v.
Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4,9 (1940)).
The Act... is a necessary concomitant of the Framers' decision to authorize, and
Congress' decision to implement, a dual system of federal and state courts. It repre-
sents Congress' considered judgment as to how to balance the tensions inherent in
such a system. Prevention of frequent federal court intervention is important to
make the dual system work effectively. By generally barring such intervention, the
Act forestalls "the inevitable friction between the state and federal courts that ensues
from the injunction of state judicial proceedings by a federal court."
Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988) (quoting Vendo Co. v. Lektro-
Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630-31 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
[Such a] dual court system was bound to lead to conflicts and frictions. Litigants
who foresaw the possibility of more favorable treatment in one or the other system
would predictably hasten to invoke the powers of whichever court it was believed
would present the best chance of success. Obviously this dual system could not
function if state and federal courts were free to fight each other for control of a par-
ticular case. Thus, in order to make the dual system work and "to prevent needless
friction between state and federal courts". . it was necessary to work out lines of
demarcation between the two systems.... The 1793 anti-injunction Act was at least
in part a response to these pressures."
Atlantic Coast Line R.R v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970)
(quoting Oklahoma Packing Co., 309 U.S. at 9).
Commentators have expressed less certainty or agreement than the Supreme Court as to
the origin of the Act. Compare MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN
TnE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 310 (2d ed. 1990) (positing that the Act was part of a
compromise, designed to ensure the independence of state courts from the newly-created
lower federal courts), and Charles Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARv. L.
REV. 345, 347 (1930) (citing a report made by Attorney General Edmund Randolph to the
House of Representatives in 1790 stating as to the Judiciary Act: "This clause will debar the
district court from interfering with the judgments at law in the State courts .... "), with Currie,
supra note 34, at 322 (noting that "dense clouds of ambiguity envelopl this most obscure of
all jurisdictional statutes," and arguing for revision of the statute), Telford Taylor & Everett I.
Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YALE L.J.
1169, 1170 (1933) (observing that "[t]he historical explanation for the inclusion of the anti-
injunction provision in the Act of 1793 is a matter of some uncertainty"), Mayton, supra note
239, at 332 (explaining that the AIA did not preclude federal courts from enjoining state court
actions but rather only barred single Supreme Court justices, sitting as circuit judges, from
issuing such injunctions), and Comment, Federal Court Stays of State Court Proceedings: A
Re-examination of Original Congressional Intent, 38 U. CfI. L. REv. 612, 614 (1971) (argu-
ing that Congress intended to foreclose federal courts from using injunctions against state
courts, but that it specifically approved the use of other writs including the writ of certiorari to
stay state proceedings).
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ply federal statutory law and constitutional provisions.253 Concurrent juris-
diction has typically been the rule. Indeed, the prohibition against federal
court injunctions has a constitutional aspect, "[d]ue in no small part to the
fundamental constitutional independence of the States [and their courts]."
254
The powerful AIA is limited in two ways. First, it does not preclude
federal courts from enjoining parties from filing actions in state court, but
255only from interfering with pending state court actions. Second, the cur-
253 The Supreme Court has stated that the AIA "is but continuing evidence of confidence
in the state courts, reinforced by a desire to avoid direct conflicts between state and federal
courts." Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 518 (1955).
254 Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 146.
255 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965) ("This statute and its prede-
cessors do not preclude injunctions against the institution of state court proceedings, but only
bar stays of suits already instituted."); see also Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 226, 229-31 (1972) (re-
peatedly referring to 28 U.S.C. § 2283 as a bar against enjoining a "pending" state action); cf
Kerr v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Civ. A. No. 87-3223, 1987 WL 14515, at
* 1 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 1987) (purporting to rely on the protection of judgment exception to the
AIA to enjoin commencement of state action where the federal court had previously held the
dispute to be arbitrable). See generally Warren, supra note 252, at 366-78 (discussing the
history of judicial comity and the federal courts' reluctance to issue injunctions against state
court proceedings); Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HARV. L.
REv. 726, 728-29 (1961) (discussing situations where federal courts have issued injunctions
apparently interfering with state judicial proceedings).
This distinction has raised a question on which appellate courts are divided-whether or
not the AIA's prohibition applies in situations where, at the time the federal court is requested
to enjoin the filing of a state suit, the state suit has not been filed, but where a state suit is then
filed prior to the issuance of a federal injunction prohibiting such a suit. To date, the First,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have ruled that the Act does not apply (thereby permitting the
injunction) so long as no state suit has been filed at the time of the request. See National City
Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1127-28 (8th Cir. 1982) (stating that a litigant
should not have the power to render a future federal ruling nugatory "by taking the very act
the federal court was being urged to enjoin"); Barancik v. Investors Funding Corp., 489 F.2d
933, 937 (7th Cir. 1973) (same); see also Hyde Park Partners v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 842
n.6 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating, in dictum, that the Act "does not.., bar injunctive relief that
would run against a state court ... when the federal court's injunctive power is invoked ... by
the plaintiffbefore the state court action ig commenced"). The Sixth Circuit has rejected such
a rule, reasoning that the ban of the Act is absolute, and that the rule adopted by the Seventh
Circuit and others does not, in any event, prevent the unseemly race to the courthouse:
As long as the commencement of state proceedings in any way affects or triggers the
operation of the anti-injunction statute, a race is assured, unseemly or not. What at-
torney worth his salt, learning that federal proceedings were about to start, would fail
to race to the state courthouse beforehand if it suited his client's interests to do so?
Barancik does not eliminate the race; it merely moves the finish line.
Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527, 532-33 (6th Cir. 1978). The Second Cir-
cuit has also questioned the rule:
We have considerable doubt whether the Barancik rule should be adopted in this cir-
cuit .... [I]t is axiomatic that one is not disabled from acting merely because an ad-
verse litigant has applied for an order to bar such action .... However anomalous it
may seem that a party can moot an issue by acting more rapidly than the court, it is
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rent Act sets out three exceptions, apparently designed to be exclusive, pur-
suant to which federal courts are permitted to enjoin pending state court ac-
tions.256 Absent an exception, a federal injunction is not justified either by
state court error or delay,257 nor even where the state court acts entirely
without jurisdiction, such as where the dispute involves an area preempted
far more anomalous and dangerous that a mere application for injunctive relief be
deemed equivalent to a court's order issuing an injunction.
Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 916 F.2d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1990). This
important issue remains open, as the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari in a case
which likely would have decided the question. See Roth, 583 F.2d at 539, cert. granted, 440
U.S. 944 (1979), cert. dismissed, 442 U.S. 925 (1979).
256 As the Supreme Court stated, "[b]y that enactment, Congress made clear beyond cavil
that the prohibition is not to be whittled away by judicial improvisation." Richman Bros., 348
U.S. at 514; see also Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 228-29 (stating that the AIA "imposes an absolute
ban upon the issuance of a federal injunction against a pending state court proceeding, in the
absence of one of the recognized exceptions"); Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 286-88 (stat-
ing that the Act is not a mere principle of comity, but rather absolutely prohibits federal in-
junctions against state court proceedings unless they fall within one of the three specifically
defined exceptions and that such exceptions should not be enlarged by statutory construction).
One commentator has observed that the three stated exceptions are not, however, exclusive,
and has identified five additional situations in which federal courts may enjoin state court pro-
ceedings. See Wood, supra note 34, at 308. Wood specifies that injunctions may be permit-
ted in cases involving the United States as a plaintiff, U.S. agencies, private attorneys general,
different parties, or situations in which no state judicial proceeding is said to be involved. See
id. at 308-12. However, as cases involving motions to compel arbitration do not typically in-
volve these situations, this Article will not focus on these purported additional exceptions.
257 In Richman Bros., the Court announced:
The assumption upon which the argument proceeds is that federal rights will not be
adequately protected in the state courts, and the "gap" complained of is impatience
with the appellate process if state courts go wrong. But during more than half of our
history Congress, in establishing the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, in the
main relied on the adequacy of the state judicial systems to enforce federal rights,
subject to review by this Court. With limited exceptions, it was not until 1875 that
the lower federal courts were given general jurisdiction over federal questions.
During that entire period, the vindication of federal rights depended upon the proce-
dure which petitioner attacks as so grossly inadequate that it could not have been
contemplated by Congress.
348 U.S. at 518. Thus, federal and state actions may typically proceed simultaneously until
either forum arrives at a judgment. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502,
507-08 (1962) (allowing concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal court for disputes over
violations of collective bargaining contracts); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 142-43
(1876) (allowing concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal court for the assignee in a bank-
ruptcy action). See generally Martin H. Redish & John E. Muench, Adjudication of Federal
Causes ofAction in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 311 (1976) (discussing the power and ob-
ligation of state courts to hear cases involving federal causes of action). Where a state court
has erred, the appropriate recourse is to appeal within the state system and ultimately to the
United States Supreme Court. See Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 296 (holding that "lower
federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions" and
that appeal should be made to the state appellate court and "in certain emergenc[ies]" to the
United States Supreme Court).
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by the federal courts.258 The Supreme Court has also stated that these ex-
ceptions "are narrow and are 'not [to] be enlarged by loose statutory con-
struction. ' '259 Moreover, given the general prohibition of 28 U.S.C. § 2283
and the "fundamental principle of a dual system of courts," 260 "[a]ny doubts
as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court proceedings
should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed in an
orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy.
' 261
Finally, courts have made clear that even where an injunction falls
within one of the exceptions to the AIA, a federal court is by no means re-
quired to enjoin a state court proceeding. Rather, the federal court is still
bound by "the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain
a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding." 262 One of
the factors that most readily leads federal courts to enjoin state court ac-
tions, assuming one of the exceptions applies, is where a party is attempting
263to engage in bad faith or harassing activities.
In light of these general principles, the following Sections will describe
the three exceptions and their applicability to federal arbitral antisuit in-
junctions.
258 Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 149-50 (explaining that the federal court did not have
inherent power to ignore 28 U.S.C. § 2283 and enjoin a state court proceeding merely because
it invaded an area preempted by federal law, but, rather, the proper course was to seek resolu-
tion of that issue by the state court); see also Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 294 ("[A] fed-
eral court does not have inherent power to ignore the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 and to
enjoin state court proceedings merely because those proceedings interfere with a protected
federal right or invade an area preempted by federal law, even when the interference is un-
mistakably clear.").
259 Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 146 (quoting Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 287).
260 Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 297.
261 Id.; see also Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (reaffrming the Court's opinion in Atlantic Coast Line).
262 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972); see also Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at
151 ("Of course, the fact that an injunction may issue under the Anti-Injunction Act does not
mean that it must issue.").
263 See, e.g., Villar v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 990 F.2d 1489, 1499 (5th Cir. 1993) (af-
firming the issuance of an antisuit injunction where the plaintiff continued to bring frivolous
cases); Sassower v. Thompson, Hine & Flory, No. 92-3553, 1993 WL 57466, at * 1-2 (6th Cir.
Mar. 4, 1993) (affirming an injunction barring the plaintiff, who had already filed 28 appeals
and original actions based on the same facts, from filing further actions without permission);
Sassower v. Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, Nos. 90-1142, 90-1146, & 90-8122, 1991 WI,
136589, at *1 (4th Cir. July 1, 1991) (affirmning the issuance of an injunction barring the
plaintiff from filing any further actions without first obtaining leave of the court); Harrelson v.
United States, 613 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that although preclusion doctrines
are normally adequate to protect defendants against repetitious litigation, courts have the
power under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) to enjoin a litigant who is abusing the court system by har-
assing its opponent).
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1. Express Authorization Exception
a. Background on the Express Authorization Exception
The Supreme Court has held that a federal statute "expressly author-
ize[s] ' 264 a federal court to enjoin a state court action either where such
authorization is clearly contained in the words of the statute or where the
legislative history of the statute reveals that the "Act... created a specific
and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of eq-
uityf] that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to
enjoin a state court proceeding."265 Applying this analysis in Mitchum v.
Foster,266 the Court found that the AIA did not bar a federal court from en-
joining a state court in connection with an action brought under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.267 The Court explained that while
the Civil Rights Act contained no explicit language authorizing federal anti-
suit injunctions, the circumstances surrounding passage of that Act led to
the conclusion that the statute expressly authorized an exception to the AIA
268prohibition. Observing that "[p]roponents of the legislation noted that
state courts were being used to harass and injure individuals, either because
the state courts were powerless to stop deprivations or were in league with
those who were bent upon abrogation of federally protected rights, 2 69 the
Supreme Court concluded that "Congress clearly conceived that it was al-
tering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the
protection of federally created rights; it was concerned that state instrumen-
talities could not protect those rights.., and it believed that these failings
extended to the state courts."
270
264 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
265 Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 237 (stating that no prescribed formula is required, an authori-
zation need not expressly refer to 28 U.S.C. § 2283). This broadening of the exception has led
some commentators to note that "the words 'expressly authorized' actually mean 'implicitly
authorized."' Wood, supra note 34, at 297; see Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute, supra
note 142, at 726 (explaining that "express" authorization does not have to be express).
266 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
267 The bookstore owner alleged that the closing violated his rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 407 U.S. at 227. Commentators, while expressing sympathy with
the decision's bottom line, have often argued that the Court's reasoning is confused. See, e.g.,
Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute, supra note 142, at 733 (stating that Mitchum "may be as
pleasing in result as it is questionable in its legal reasoning").
268 The Mitchum Court also, however, seemingly adopted the reasoning of six pre-1948
Supreme Court decisions that relied on particular statutory language to conclude that an ex-
ception to the Act existed with respect to removal jurisdiction, legislation limiting the liability
of ship owners, statutory interpleader, legislation regarding farm mortgages, habeas corpus,
and the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 234-35 & nn.12-17.
269 Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 240.
270 Id. at 242.
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Nonetheless, the Court has also found that "express authorization" does
not exist merely because a federal question is involved, because it is as-
sumed that federal rights will not be adequately protected in state courts, or
even where the federal courts have preempted the entire field under consid-
eration. The Court has found, for example, that neither the Taft-Hartley
Act,271 governing labor relations, nor the Clayton Antitrust Act 72 expressly
authorizes exceptions to the AIA, even though federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over claims brought under both statutes.273
271 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1994). In Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Rich-
man Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1955), the Court found that Taft-Hartley did not expressly
authorize federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings, even though the statute preempts
state court regulation in the labor field. See id. at 514, 517-18. While "assuming" that the
state court lacked jurisdiction to hear the manufacturer's request for an injunction to preclude
union picketing, the Court nonetheless found that the federal court was barred from enjoining
the state court proceedings, observing that it is wrong to assume that "federal rights will not
be adequately protected in the state courts." See id. at 518. The Supreme Court was also in-
fluenced by the fact that the federal court itself lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute until it
was first heard by the National Labor Relations Board. See id. at 516.
272 In Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977), a plurality of the Court re-
versed the district court's grant of an antisuit injunction, concluding that the Clayton Antitrust
Act did not expressly authorize federal courts to enjoin state court actions, even though that
statute provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction. See id. at 632. The Court reasoned that
even though the statute was designed to protect an important policy, allowing federal courts to
issue injunctions wherever necessary to protect an important federal policy would "completely
eviscerate[]" 28 U.S.C. § 2283. See id. at 636.
Given the clear prohibition of § 2283, the courts will not sit to balance and weigh the
importance of various federal policies in seeking to determine which are sufficiently
important to override historical concepts of federalism underlying § 2283; by the
statutory scheme it has enacted, Congress has clearly reserved this judgment unto it-
self.
Id. at 639. The Vendo plurality opinion was signed by only three Justices. However, the con-
curring Chief Justice agreed that the Clayton Act generally did not authorize federal antisuit
injunctions, stating instead:
I would hold that no injunction may issue against currently pending state-court pro-
ceedings unless those proceedings are themselves part of a "pattern of baseless, re-
petitive claims" that are being used as an anticompetitive device, all the traditional
prerequisites for equitable relief are satisfied, and the only way to give the antitrust
laws their intended scope is by staying the state proceedings.
Id. at 644 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The four dissenters would have held that the injunction
was in fact expressly authorized by the Clayton Act. See id. at 647-54 (Stevens, Brennan,
White, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
273 Richman Bros., 348 U.S. at 514, 517-18; see also Vendo, 433 U.S. at 632 ("The pri-
vate action for damages conferred by the Clayton Act is a 'uniquely federal right or remedy,'
in that actions based upon it may be brought only in the federal courts.").
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b. Application of the Express Authorization Exception to Federal Courts'
Issuance of Pro-Arbitration Antisuit Injunctions
To date, all courts considering the question have held that a federal
court is not justified in enjoining a state court action in the arbitration con-
text based on the "expressly authorized" exception.2 74  This conclusion
seems correct. Turning first to the express language of the FAA, it is im-
mediately evident that the statute does not specifically authorize federal
courts to enjoin ongoing state proceedings. Rather, as many courts have
noted, sections 3 and 4 of the statute merely allow courts to stay litigation
pending before them and to compel arbitration.275
Nor does the legislative history or policy underlying the FAA reveal the
FAA to be "a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a
federal court of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not
empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding."2 76 In contrast to the history
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, relied upon by the Supreme Court in
Mitchum to justify an exception to the AIA, 77 the history of the FAA con-
tains no evidence that the FAA was intended to allow federal courts to con-
trol actions taken in state court. Rather, as discussed earlier, this history
shows that the FAA was passed to supplement an ongoing effort to mod-
274 See, e.g., TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 975 F. Supp. 1305, 1309-10 (M.D. Ala. 1997)
(concluding that the expressly authorized exception does not apply), affid in part, vacated in
part on other grounds, and remanded, 149 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998); Swofford v. Shearson
Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1128, 1129 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (holding that none of
the three exceptions to the AIA apply); Network Cinema Corp. v. Glassbum, 357 F. Supp.
169, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding that federal arbitration statutes do not explicitly grant
United States District Courts the authority to stay state court proceedings); In re Arbitration of
Controversies Between Necchi Sewing Machine Sales Corp. & Carl, 260 F. Supp. 665, 669
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("[A] stay in this case is most certainly not 'expressly authorized by Act of
Congress."'). Many other courts have found that either the second or third exception to the
AIA is met, while conspicuously failing to mention the first exception. See In re Arbitration
Between Nuclear Elec. Ins. Ltd. & Central Power & Light Co., 926 F. Supp. 428, 436
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that no abstention was warranted and granting a stay in a state court
contract dispute); see also Fen-ari N. Am., Inc. v. Crown Auto Dealerships, No. 94 Civ. 8541
(KMW), 1995 WL 614558, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995) ("m]he Anti-Injunction
Act... allows a federal court to stay state proceedings 'where necessary in aid of its jurisdic-
tion, or to protect and effectuate its judgments."'), aff'd, 101 F.3d 686 (2d Cir. 1996); Pervel
Indus., Inc. v. TM Wallcovering Inc., 675 F. Supp. 867, 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying the
"necessary in aid ofjurisdiction" exception), affd, 871 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1989).
275 See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting that the FAA does not expressly
authorize federal courts to enjoin ongoing state proceedings).
276 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 237 (1972).
277 See supra text accompanying notes 264-70 (detailing the policy reasons justifying the
exception).
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emize state arbitration laws.2 7 8 Moreover, the enforcement mechanisms set
up in the Act, including particularly the fact that the Act does not give rise
to federal question jurisdiction, sharply undercut any argument that the pur-
poses of the FAA would be frustrated if it could not be enforced in federal
court. Instead, as the Court stated in Moses H. Cone, "enforcement of the
Act is left in large part to the state courts."279 In sum, given the federal
policy underlying the FAA and given the federalism principles supporting
the AIA, neither the fact that the FAA, imposes important federal policy nor
the fact that it preempts state law appears sufficient to justify an injunction
under the "expressly authorized" exception.
2. The "In Aid of Jurisdiction" Exception
a. Background on the "In Aid ofJurisdiction" Exception
The "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the AIA is not susceptible to
entirely clear explication. Although the exception appears, by its wording,
to be the one most subject to expansionary interpretation by the courts, one
commentator has observed that it "has often been construed with the great-
est nineteenth century rigor the courts can muster.' 280 Another commenta-
tor has called the exception "the most enigmatic of the three exceptions to
the Anti-Injunction Statute."
281
At minimum, the exception allows federal courts to issue injunctions
both to protect their own removal jurisdiction and to prevent state courts
from interfering with in rem actions that were first filed in federal court.
282
278 See supra note 102, 103-06 and accompanying text (noting that steps were taken to
modernize state arbitration laws as the FAA was passed to revise the federal court's approach
to arbitration).
279 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).
The Court did go on to state that the Act represented federal policy and should be "vindicated
by the federal courts where otherwise appropriate." Id. As discussed earlier, however, this
decision does not justify the issuance of federal antisuit injunctions to support arbitration. See
supra text accompanying notes 91-96 (describing two reasons why Moses H. Cone does not
show that the FAA justifies federal courts' actions of injunction against state courts).
280 Wood, supra note 34, at 301.
281 REDIsH, supra note 252, at 324.
282 The language of the 1948 Reviser's Note might seem to allow the exception to be
used only to support removal jurisdiction. It states as to this exception only: "The
phrase... was added to conform to section 1651 of this title and to make clear the recognized
power of the Federal courts to stay proceedings in State cases removed to the district courts."
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948) (Reviser's Note). However, as discussed the in text, the Court has
explicitly applied the exception to in rem actions. As Professor Martin Redish has observed,
interpreting the exception to cover only removal cases would seemingly render the clause su-
perfluous and would also fly in the face of that portion of the Reviser's Note which states that
"the revised section restores the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior to the
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As to in rem actions that are first filed in federal court, the concept is that
because the "res" cannot be guarded simultaneously by two jurisdictions,
the federal court is entitled to enjoin the state action to ensure its own con-
tinued jurisdiction. While this crucial distinction between actions brought
"in rem" and those brought "in personam" was originally exposited at
length in Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 283 prior to the 1948 amendment
of the statute, that decision was cited favorably in two recent Supreme Court
decisions.
284
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly said that the "in aid of
jurisdiction" exception may only be used for removal or in rem cases, it has
in several decisions sharply limited the scope of the exception, distinguish-
ing specifically between actions brought in rem and those brought in perso-
nam.285  The Court has explained that typically, where the actions are in
personam and where the federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdic-
tion, neither court should be allowed to interfere with the other, but rather
Toucey decision.' 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948) (Reviser's Note) (emphasis added); see Redish,
The Anti-Injunction Statute, supra note 142, at 744-45. The "res" exception was well estab-
lished at the time of Toucey.See id.
283 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
284 See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 642 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(noting that the Court has never viewed parallel in personam actions as interfering with the
jurisdiction of either court); Atlantic Coast Line R.IL v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs,
398 U.S. 281, 295-96 (1970) ("ITihe state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in
this case, and neither court was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing
claims in both courts.").
285 One decision, Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954), does seem to sup-
port a somewhat broader interpretation of the exception. In that case, the Court affirmed the
district court's grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining the company from enforcing an
anti-picketing injunction it had obtained in state court. See id. at 505. The facts of the case
were that the employer had first sought an injunction against the union in state court and then
filed an unfair labor practice claim with the NLRB. See id. at 502. The NLRB concluded, in
part, that the union had acted unlawfully and went on to seek a federal court injunction to re-
strain the conduct of the union. See id. at 502. The Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's grant of the injunction, reasoning that in order to make the Board's power under fed-
eral labor law effective:
[Tihe Board must have authority to take all steps necessary to preserve its case. If
the state court decree were to stand, the Federal District Court would be limited in
the action it might take .... [For the district court] [t]o exercise its jurisdiction
freely and fully it must first remove the state decree.
Id. at 505-06. However, although Capital Service seems to support a broader interpretation of
the statute, it has been sharply undercut by the later decisions discussed in the text. In addi-
tion, the Court itself, just one year after issuing Capital Service, seemingly limited the
strength of the decision's holding by construing the decision as having been made under the
"expressly authorized" exception rather than the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the Act.
See Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 517 (1955) (describing
Capital Services as based on the "express authorization" exception); see also Redish, The
Anti-Injunction Statute, supra note 142, at 753 (noting the questionable implications of Capi-
tal Service in light of its characterization by the Court in Richman Bros.).
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parties should use appellate mechanisms and the doctrines of claim preclu-
sion and issue preclusion to protect against incorrect or inefficient results.
28 6
For example, in 1970, Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Engineers287 vacated the district court's grant of an antisuit injunction
against a state court's anti-picketing order, even though the union claimed
that the injunction was necessary to support both the district court's prior
refusal to bar the picketing and the Supreme Court's determination in a re-
lated case that picketing was a protected activity under federal law. 288 The
Court explained that antisuit injunctions are not justified merely because
state proceedings "interfere with a protected federal right or invade an area
preempted by federal law, even when the interference is unmistakably
clear."289 Rather, it must be shown that the injunctive relief is "necessary to
286 The Court in Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., while defending the use of antisuit injunc-
tions in the in rem context, stated:
But a controversy is not a thing, and a controversy over a mere question of personal
liability does not involve the possession or control of a thing, and an action brought
to enforce such a liability does not tend to impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the
court in which a prior action for the same cause is pending. Each court is free to
proceed in its own way and in its own time, without reference to the proceedings in
the other court. Whenever a judgment is rendered in one of the courts and pleaded
in the other, the effect of that judgment is to be determined by the application of the
principles ofres adjudicata by the court in which the action is still pending.
260 U.S. at 230. Similarly, in Mandeville v. Canterbury, the Court, reversing an injunction
issued against a state court by a federal court, stated that:
[W]here the judgment sought is strictly in personam for the recovery of money or for
an injunction compelling or restraining action by the defendant, both a state court
and a federal court having concurrent jurisdiction may proceed with the litigation at
least until judgment is obtained in one court, which may be set up as res judicata in
the other.
318 U.S. 47, 49 (1943) (per curiam).
287 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
288 Atlantic Coast Line involved picketing at the Moncrief switching yard near Jackson-
ville, Florida. As soon as the picketing began, the company, Atlantic Coast Lines ("ACL"),
sought an anti-picketing injunction in federal court. After the federal court denied this in-
junction, in 1967, ACL sought and obtained an anti-picketing injunction in state court. See id.
at 283. Two years later, the Supreme Court, in a factually related decision, determined that
unions had a federally protected right to picket under the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as
amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88, and that state courts could not permissibly enjoin such pick-
eting. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 393
(1969) ("[P]icketing-whether characterized as primary or secondary-must be deemed con-
duct protected against state proscription."). Armed with this Supreme Court precedent, the
union asked the federal court to dissolve the state court injunction prohibiting the Moncrief
Yard picketing, and the district court granted its request. See Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at
284. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the grant of the injunction. See id.
289 Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 294. Similarly, in Richman Bros., decided just one
year after Capital Service, the Court found the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception inapplicable,
where the federal court itself had no jurisdiction prior to action by the NLRB. See Richman
Bros., 348 U.S. at 519 ("[N]onexistent jurisdiction therefore cannot be aided."). Richman
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Rather, it must be shown that the injunctive relief is "necessary to prevent a
state court from so interfering with a federal court's consideration or dispo-
sition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and
authority to decide that case." 290 The Court concluded: "In short, the state
and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this case, and neither court
was free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both
courts." 291 It found that even though a prior Supreme Court decision had
made clear that the state court's decision was improper, the union's appro-
priate remedy was to seek review within the state system or ultimately to the
Supreme Court.
292
Notwithstanding such narrowing Supreme Court decisions, several
lower courts have recently used the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception more
broadly, particularly to assist in the management of complex litigation and
class actions. Some courts have, for example, relied on the exception to
justify the injunction of state proceedings to protect tentative settlements in
antitrust or mass tort class actions,293 or to protect the limited funds avail-
rather than the "in aid of jurisdiction exception." See id. at 517 (noting that Capital Services
recognized express authority).
See supra note 257 for further discussion of Richman Bros.'s reversal of the district
court's antisuit injunction. See also 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 215, § 4225, at 534-35
(noting that courts interpreting the "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" exception to the AIA
have concluded that it "does not allow a federal court to enjoin state proceedings merely be-
cause they involve issues presented in a federal in personam action" (citations omitted)).
290 Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 294.
291 Id. at 295.
The traditional notion is that in personam actions in federal and state court may pro-
ceed concurrently, without interference from either court, and there is no evidence
that the exception to § 2283 was intended to alter this balance. We have never
viewed parallel in personam actions as interfering with the jurisdiction of either
court.
Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend. Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 642 (1977) (plurality opinion).
292 See Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 296 ("[Llower federal courts possess no power
whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions.").
"[A] federal court does not have inherent power to ignore the limitations of § 2283
and to enjoin state court proceedings merely because those proceedings interfere
with a protected federal right or invade an area pre-empted by federal law, even
when the interference is unmistakably clear." Rather, when a state proceeding pres-
ents a federal issue, even a pre-emption issue, the proper course is to seek resolution
of that issue by the state court.
Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1988) (citations omitted).
293 See, e.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 201-04 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that a federal court could enjoin class members from filing a state court action when
the federal court had provisionally approved the settlement of a complex asbestos class action
and when the parties were attempting to use the state suit as a "preemptive strike" against the
federal settlement and to have the state court declare what the federal court should do); In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981)
(holding that because a state court action would be a challenge to the federal court's jurisdic-
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able to creditors in a bankruptcy action.294 Also, in one well known busing
case, in which the district court's jurisdiction was continuing, the federal
court enjoined certain parties from bringing a state court action.2 95 In sev-
eral cases, federal courts have even issued antisuit injunctions based on po-
296tential settlements of particularly complex matters, or based merely on
the federal court's continuing responsibility over a class action.297 Federal
courts have also sometimes felt free to enjoin state court proceedings in in-
surance cases, wherein the insurer brings a declaratory action in federal
court seeking a decision that the policy is invalid, while the insured files an
action under the policy in state court.
298
Liab. Litig., Civ. A. No. CV94-P-11558-S, 1994 WL 114580, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 1994)
(enjoining related state and federal actions where the court had approved a preliminary settle-
ment agreement); Ahem v. Fibreboard Corp., Civ. A. No. 6:93cv526, 1993 WL 767801, at *1
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 1993) (issuing an antisuit injunction to support a proposed settlement in a
mandatory class action).
294 See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.), 134
F.R.D. 32, 36-38 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that where a defendant would likely go bank-
rupt if the court allowed parallel proceedings, and where the court is at the "critical juncture"
of reviewing the stipulation of settlement of a proposed class action, the federal court is em-
powered to enjoin a state proceeding that may interfere with that purpose).
295 See Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 383, 384 (4th Cir. 1974)
(stating that it is proper to enjoin a state court when a state court proceeding would endanger
the federal court's desegregation orders); see also Wesch v. Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465, 1470-71
(11 th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the "aid ofjurisdiction" exception justified the federal court,
which had issued a congressional redistricting order, in enjoining a state court suit that sought
congressional redistricting); Garcia v. Bauza-Salas, 862 F.2d 905, 909 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating
that the "aid ofjurisdiction" exception applies "in cases where a state court proceeding would
interfere with ongoing federal oversight of a case").
296 See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 337 (2d Cir. 1985) (enjoining a state
court action that "threatened to frustrate" a federal proceeding of "substantial scope" which
had already required expenditure of substantial time and was nearing a possible settlement); In
re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5142, at *6-9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1991) (hold-
ing that where an ongoing class action suit had been in litigation for nine years and where
progress was finally being made in federal court, the potential for resolution justified enjoin-
ing state court proceedings under the "in aid ofjurisdiction" exception to the AIA).
297 See Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877, 881-82 (11th Cir. 1989) (stat-
ing that a federal court has the power to enjoin a state court action in order to support the fed-
eral court's continuing jurisdiction over a class action and reasoning that extremely complex
litigation is the equivalent of a "res"); see also McNeill v. New York City Hous. Auth., 719 F.
Supp. 233, 255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (enjoining landlords from proceeding against tenants in
state housing court to collect rent where the district court was in the process of deciding a
challenge brought by low-income tenants to city policies and procedures in federal court). But
see Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Quinn-L Capital Corp., 960 F.2d 1286, 1298-99 (5th Cir. 1992)
(refusing to interpret the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception so broadly as to allow injunctions
with respect to all federal court class actions); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco 1I Prods. Litig.,
MDL-991, 1995 WL 489480, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 1995) (same).
298 See generally Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute, supra note 142, at 748-50 (noting
that in these circumstances, "federal courts have generally felt free to enjoin the state pro-
ceeding"). There are many examples of insurance cases in which the federal court has en-
joined the state action. See Hesselberg v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 102 F.2d 23, 27 (8th Cir. 1939)
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Nonetheless, such broad interpretations have been disputed even in
complex cases,299 and they are not the norm. Not only the Supreme Court,
but also many appellate courts have reiterated that the mere fact that federal
issues are presented in a state case, even combined with the fact that those
federal issues are preemptive, does not justify a federal court in enjoining
the state court's consideration of those issues. 300 Rather, as one commen-
tator observed, these expansions are "the exception ... and not the rule."
30 '
(finding that the federal court had jurisdiction to stay the state proceeding); Jamerson v. Alli-
ance Ins. Co., 87 F.2d 253, 256 (7th Cir. 1937) (same). Cf Royal Ins. Co., 960 F.2d at 1293-
301 (affirming the district court's reliance on the "relitigation" exception to enjoin a state
court from considering coverage claims which a federal court had already ruled were not cov-
ered by the policy, but reversing the district court's use of the "in aid of jurisdiction" excep-
tion to prohibit litigation in state court of related tort, waiver, and estoppel claims that arose
after the issuance of a declaratory judgment).
299 See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
134 F.3d 133, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1998) (refusing to issue an injunction as necessary in aid of
jurisdiction even though the federal court had previously rejected class certification and a set-
tlement now being approved in state court); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175,
1181-83 (8th Cir. 1982) (reversing a grant of mandatory class certification on the ground that
it constituted an injunction that violated the AIA); In re Glenn W. Turner Enters. Litig., 521
F.2d 775, 780 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that the district court could not enjoin a state attorney
general from executing a state judgment even if executing the state judgment would render the
defendants unable to pay any future federal judgment); United States v. Ford Motor Co., 522
F.2d 962, 965-66 (6th Cir. 1975) (stating that when a state court proceeding is "not interfering
with a res in the possession of' a federal court, a federal court would violate the AIA by inter-
fering with the state action); Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 903 F.
Supp. 16, 18 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (finding that the AIA prohibits federal courts from enjoining
class members from continuing to pursue in personam state actions although the AIA would
allow a federal court to bar the commencement of new state actions); cf Standard Microsys-
tems Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 916 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1990) (vacating the district
court's injunction of a state court action as a violation of the AIA, even though the suit in-
volved the same claims as the federal court action, and distinguishing Baldwin because here
the federal court was not on the verge of settling a complex matter).
300 See Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1988) (noting that fed-
eral issues arising in state proceedings should be resolved in state courts); 1975 Salaried Re-
tirement Plan v. Nobers, 968 F.2d 401, 411 (3d Cir. 1992) (observing that although ERISA
preempted state law claims, benefit plans were not entitled to enjoin state suit since none of
three exceptions applied); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Florida, 929 F.2d 1532, 1535
(11th Cir. 1991) ("The law is clear that a claim of federal preemption does not constitute an
exception to this absolute prohibition [on injunctions] . . . regardless of both the merits of the
federal preemption claim and the validity of the federal or state courts' asserted jurisdiction
over the controversy."); Total Plan Servs., Inc. v. Texas Retailers Ass'n., 925 F.2d 142, 144-
46 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming the district court's refusal to enjoin a state court from consider-
ing claims, even assuming that such claims arise under ERISA which is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of federal court); Phillips v. Chas. Schreiner Bank, 894 F.2d 127, 131-32 (5th Cir.
1990) (reversing the district court's injunction prohibiting federal court defendants from pur-
suing foreclosure proceedings in state court during the pendency of a federal lender liability
action based on RICO).
301 Wood, supra note 34, at 303; see also Sherman, supra note 77, at 938-39 (noting a
modest expansion of antisuit injunctions in the past decade to prevent class action members
from litigating their suits individually).
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Even assuming, as is by no means clear, that the Supreme Court will
accept some lower courts' issuance of injunctions to aid jurisdiction in the
context of complex class actions, the rationale supporting such an exception
would not seem to apply in the context of a typical arbitration case. The
Subsection which follows will address the question of whether the party re-
questing a federal court injunction in an arbitration case can meet the Atlan-
tic Coast Line test of showing that the injunctive relief is "necessary to pre-
vent a state court from so interfering with a federal court's consideration or
disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and
authority to decide that case."
302
b. Application of the "In Aid of Jurisdiction" Exception to Federal Courts'
Issuance of Pro-Arbitration Antisuit Injunctions
Several federal courts have either held or stated that federal courts
which have determined that it is appropriate to issue an order compelling
arbitration under the FAA may also rely on the "in aid of jurisdiction" ex-
ception to the FAA to enjoin ongoing state proceedings. 30 3 However, only
302 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295
(1970).•
303 See TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 149 F.3d 1292, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 1998) (raising
the possibility that an exception might apply once the district court had issued an order com-
pelling arbitration, but remanding for consideration of these issues); Specialty Bakeries, Inc.
v. RobHal, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 822, 829-31 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (granting a preliminary injunction
barring the defendants from continuing to seek relief in a state court action in which the court
had earlier refused to stay the action pending arbitration, concluding that such an order was
justified "in aid of jurisdiction" because the federal court had previously granted a motion to
compel arbitration), affd as modified and remanded sub nom. Specialty Bakeries v. HalRob,
129 F.3d 726 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Arbitration Between Nuclear Elec. Ins. Ltd. & Central
Power & Light Co., 926 F. Supp. 428, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting a motion to compel ar-
bitration and also issuing an injunction against the state court proceeding on the grounds of
either aiding jurisdiction or protecting or effectuating judgments); Ferrari N. Am., Inc. v.
Crown Auto Dealerships, No. 94 Civ. 8541 (KMW), 1995 WL 614558, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
19, 1995) (issuing an order both compelling arbitration and also staying proceedings initiated
before the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles and concluding that a
stay was justified either in aid of jurisdiction or to protect and effectuate the court's judg-
ment), aff'd, 101 F.3d 686 (2d Cir. 1996); McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 709 F.
Supp. 369, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (granting a permanent injunction precluding the plaintiffs
from pursuing, and the state court from granting, relief in the state court where the federal
courts had previously ruled the dispute was arbitrable and where the current ruling resolved
the issue of the venue of arbitration, concluding that an injunction was necessary in aid ofju-
risdiction); Pervel Indus., Inc. v. TM Wallcovering, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 867, 869 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (granting a motion to compel arbitration and staying a pending state court action in or-
der to preserve the federal court's jurisdiction), af'd, 871 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1989).
[Vol. 147:91
ARBITRAL ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS
two of the courts offer any substantial reasoning in support of this posi-
tion.3" 4
In Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. RobHal, Inc.,30 5 where the federal court
had, in a previous decision, ordered that the contractual dispute between two
sets of bagel companies proceed to arbitration, the court declared that it was
justified in enjoining one of the parties from seeking broad injunctive relief
in a state court action that had been filed prior to the federal action. The
court explained:
In our Order dated March 26, 1997, we "ORDERED that this court will retain
jurisdiction until further order of court, pending completion of the arbitration
proceeding." As such, we retained jurisdiction "to supervise implementation
of [our] order." To allow HalRob to proceed to a preliminary injunction hear-
ing in the state court seeking relief far beyond what the parties contemplated in
that forum would eviscerate the arbitration process and make it a "hollow for-
mality," with needless expense to all concerned.
306
The federal court further cited the federal policy favoring arbitration
307and opposing prolonged litigation. It stated that although it was sensitive
to federalism and comity concerns, the injunction was necessary "to pre-
serve the integrity of this arbitration process. Otherwise, HalRob can obtain
full and complete injunctive relief and money damages in the state court, as
it requests in its complaint there. Little or nothing would be left for the ar-
bitrator."
308
In TranSouth Financial Corp., 309 the Eleventh Circuit considered an
appeal from a district court decision abstaining from granting a motion to
compel arbitration and held that it was barred under the AIA from granting
an arbitral antisuit injunction. 310 After reversing the abstention decision,
311
the appellate court offered some dicta regarding whether the district court
might grant a motion to enjoin the ongoing state court action if, on remand,
304 The rest of the decisions, all from the Southern District of New York, simply cite
prior precedent which supposedly justifies the injunction as falling under an exception to the
AIA. However, none of the prior precedent sets out a justification for relying on the "in aid of
jurisdiction" exception. See supra note 303 (citing cases holding that injunctions were appro-
priate as exceptions to the AIA but, with the exception of TranSouth and Specialty Bakeries,
failing to provide a clear rationale for the exceptions).
3 5 961 F. Supp. 822 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd as modified and remanded sub nom. Specialty Bak-
eries v. HalRob, 129 F.3d 726 (3d Cir. 1997).
306 Id. at 830 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
307 See id.
308 Id.
309 149 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998).
310 975 F. Supp. 1305 (M.D. Ala. 1997), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds,
and remanded, 149 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998).
311 See TranSouth, 149 F.3d at 1294-96.
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it chose to issue an order compelling arbitration. Noting that the exception
could, at least in some circumstances, be used to enjoin state courts' consid-
eration of in personam as well as in rem cases, 31 the Eleventh Circuit rec-
ognized that the question remained whether such an injunction would be
"necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court's
consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal
court's flexibility and authority to decide that case. ' 313 It stated that "[i]f
the district court orders arbitration, a stay of the state court proceedings
might be appropriate at that point because continued state proceedings could
jeopardize the federal court's ability to pass on the validity of the arbitration
proceeding it has ordered. 3 14 The court reasoned that "when a federal dis-
trict court grants a motion to compel arbitration it retains jurisdiction to con-
firm or vacate the resulting arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-10.' 3
Ultimately, however, the court refused to reach out to decide this ques-
tion.
3 16
Two other federal courts have interpreted the "in aid of jurisdiction"
clause quite differently, though neither explicated the exception in any de-
tail. In TranSouth Financial Corp. v. Bell,317 the district court ruled that it
was not authorized, by the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception, to enjoin a
state court action. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Atlantic Coast
Line, the district court found that traditionally the exception applied to in
rem proceedings and that "[b]eyond that, it is very difficult to distinguish
situations in which this exception solely applies."318 In Swofford v. Shear-
son Lehman/American Express, Inc.,3 19 the district court refused to stay the
state court action pending the federal court's ruling on the petition to com-
pel arbitration. It stated simply:
The Court does not believe that any of the exceptions to the Act are applicable
here .... Plaintiff has the opportunity for a trial on the merits of the action
against him in the state court. There is no reason to believe that justice will not
be served thereby. If the Plaintiff is correct in his assertions made here, then
312 See id. at 1296-97 (citing Peterson v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1395 (11th
Cir. 1997) (holding that "aid of jurisdiction" exception could be used to stay state court action
where the suit had been removed to federal court).
313 Id. at 1297 (quoting Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs,
398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970)).
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 See id.
317 975 F. Supp. 1305 (M.D. Ala. 1997), affid in part, vacated in part on other grounds,
and remanded, 149 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998).
318 Id. at 1311.
319 604 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
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he has recourse in the appellate courts of Arkansas ifhe loses in state court and
chooses to file an appeal.
3 2 0
Only the Eleventh Circuit's TranSouth decision squarely addresses the
question of whether an arbitral antisuit injunction meets the Atlantic Coast
Line test of being "necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering
with a federal court's consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously
impair the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide that case, 32 1 or
whether, instead, the federal and state cases should be allowed to coexist as
two in personam actions. In examining this question, it should be pointed
out that certain factors some might think pertinent are not in fact relevant to
the analysis. GivenAtlantic CoastLine and ChickKam Choo, it is clear that
neither the fact that relief is sought under a federal law, nor the fact that the
FAA preempts inconsistent state laws, nor the fact that there is a strong fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration, justify a federal court in enjoining a previ-
ously filed state court action. 322 Rather, the Court has repeatedly enunciated
that state courts can and must be trusted to make their own determina-
tions.323 This seems especially salient given the policy underlying the FAA,
and given that the Court has explicitly held that the FAA applies in state as
well as in federal court.324 Nor, in the typical arbitration case, has the fed-
eral court made the extreme commitment of resources that some courts have
found justify an injunction, such as where the court has all but signed off on
a final settlement. Thus, a strong argument can be made that the ongoing
state court action does not interfere with the federal court's arbitration rul-
ing any more than the typical state suit interferes with any other ongoing
federal action; therefore, the two lawsuits should be permitted to coexist.
325
320 Id. at 1129.
321 Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 295.
322 See supra notes 96-113 and accompanying text (arguing that "it is by no means clear
that federal arbitration policy favors federal courts' issuance of arbitral antisuit injunctions").
But see Wood, supra note 34, at 316 (arguing that "[i]f the state law is hostile to arbitration,
and the state court rejects a request for a stay pending arbitration, the case for a federal in-
junction is strong").
323 See supra text accompanying notes 248-63, 282-302 (arguing that concurrent juris-
diction is the norm, and that even federal preemption does not justify antisuit injunctions).
324 See supra text accompanying notes 93-96 ("Since 1983 the Supreme Court has on
multiple occasions made it clear that the FAA requires state courts as well as federal courts to
enforce parties' arbitration agreements."). Even where a state court has actually ruled that
arbitration is not required, it is wrong to assume that the state court incorrectly interpreted
either the FAA or the parties' agreement to arbitrate. This is the flaw in Diane Wood's argu-
ment. See Wood, supra note 34, at 316 (arguing that "[if] the state law is hostile to arbitra-
tion, and the state court rejects a request for a stay pending arbitration, the case for a federal
injunction is strong").
325 In Specialty Bakeries v. RobHal, Inc., for example, the federal determination that the
dispute was arbitrable was placed in no more jeopardy than any other federal ruling in a con-
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The Eleventh Circuit's contrary reasoning in TranSouth has some initial
appeal, but ultimately is not compelling. Whereas the Eleventh Circuit sug-
gests that courts that grant motions to compel arbitration necessarily retain
jurisdiction to consider a future motion to confirm or vacate the arbitral
award, this is not always the case. Rather, in some disputes no motion to
confirm or vacate is ever filed.326 In other disputes, a motion to confirm or
vacate may be filed in a court other than that which granted the motion to
compel arbitration.327 Some courts have even held that no motion to con-
firm may be filed in any court unless the parties in their arbitration agree-
ment included "magic words" allowing for court confirmation of the arbitral
award in a particular jurisdiction.328 Thus, it is not true that a federal court
which grants a motion to compel will inevitably be faced with a motion to
confirm or vacate the arbitral award. Moreover, it is hard to see why it
current jurisdiction situation. See 961 F. Supp. 822 (E.D. Pa.), a ffd as modified and re-
manded sub nom. Specialty Bakeries v. HalRob, 129 F.3d 726 (3d Cir. 1997). The state court
could decide whether or not it was compelled to or desired to follow the federal court ruling.
But see supra text accompanying notes 305-08 (discussing the court's view in Specialty Bak-
eries that to allow the state action to proceed would "eviscerate the arbitration process").
It might be argued that arbitration decisions are unique in that pro-arbitration orders are,
by their nature, preliminary rulings, and that federal courts must be authorized to issue in-
junctions to protect their jurisdiction over these matters. As discussed supra, in a typical con-
current jurisdiction situation, the two courts effectively participate in a race to judgment, such
that once one court has issued a final judgment, the judgment will presumably be entitled to
preclusive effect in the other jurisdiction. In the arbitration context, however, a federal court's
determination that a dispute must be resolved through arbitration will not necessarily be held
to be a final judgment and, therefore, entitled to preclusive effect by the state court. As will
be discussed, infra at text accompanying notes 367-70, a number of courts have held that an
order compelling arbitration is final only when the motion to compel arbitration was inde-
pendent and not embedded in an action on the merits. The federal court's ruling may become
final only after the arbitrators have ruled and their ruling has been confirmed by the federal
court. Thus, the federal court may itself be incapable of issuing a speedy decision that will
terminate the state court proceeding. However, it is not clear that the model of competing
concurrent courts turns on each court's right to issue a final decision. Moreover, it is not clear
that this situation is really unique. In many cases a court is not in the position to issue a final
judgment until a great deal of discovery has been done, motions have been presented, and,
perhaps, trial has occurred.
3z6 See MACNEIL ET. AL., supra note 96, § 38.1.1 (observing that confirmation is used
where awards are "not complied with voluntarily").
327 See City of Naples v. Prepakt Concrete Co., 490 F.2d 182, 183-84 (5th Cir. 1974)
(holding that although Florida federal district court had issued a motion to compel arbitration
and technically retained jurisdiction, the motion to confirm arbitration should be heard in the
Northern District of Ohio, where the arbitration had been held)
328 See, e.g., Oklahoma City Assocs. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 923 F.2d 791, 795 (10th
Cir. 1991) (refusing to confirm an arbitral award where the arbitration agreement did not call
for court confirmation); Varley v. Tarrytown Assocs., 477 F.2d 208, 210 (2d Cir. 1973)
(same). See generally MACNEIL ET. AL., supra note 96, § 38.2 (discussing and critiquing
some courts' insistence on the presence of an "entry of judgment" clause in order to allow
confirmation of arbitral award).
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would be necessary to enjoin state court proceedings to protect the federal
court's future jurisdiction to grant a motion to confirm the arbitration. Until
an arbitral award is issued, the federal court would seem to have no need for
jurisdiction to confirm or vacate that award. While perhaps an antisuit in-
junction might be in order if, following issuance of an arbitral award, a state
court sought to block confirmation in federal court, granting an antisuit in-
junction prior to such action seems quite premature.
Thus, I conclude that it will take a truly exceptional case to justify a
federal court involved in an arbitration determination in enjoining an ongo-
ing state court action in order to protect its jurisdiction. In the vast majority
of situations the federal court should simply issue the order to compel arbi-
tration and then allow the parties to deal with any consequences of the state
court action.329 A federal court might, however, be justified in enjoining an
ongoing state action on efficiency grounds where, although the state court
330suit had already been filed, the parties devoted substantially more time
and energy to a federal court action which was now nearing termination
through issuance of an order to compel arbitration.331 Such a case would
fairly closely resemble cases in which, to protect a federal court's settlement
or managerial efforts, various courts have held that an injunction is neces-
sary to protect the federal court's jurisdiction.332 I also believe that a federal
329 If one of the parties were to ignore the federal court's order to compel arbitration, the
court could, of course, issue appropriate sanctions, such as for civil or criminal contempt. See,
e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 292-94 (1947) (explaining that a
court may use both civil and criminal contempt to enforce its orders, and observing that a de-
fendant may be punished for criminal contempt of a court order even after the underlying or-
der is found to have exceeded the court's subject matter jurisdiction); see also United States
Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1988) (con-
firming that a court may use criminal or civil contempt powers to enforce its orders, but ob-
serving that a civil contempt order may depend on the court's underlying jurisdiction).
If the state court suit had not already been filed, the federal court would not be barred
by the AIA from enjoining the filing of such a suit. See supra text accompanying note 255
(interpreting the AIA as "not preclud[ing] federal courts from enjoining parties from filing
actions in state court, but only from interfering with pending state court actions").
331 See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 557 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (involving a
lawsuit commenced in 1975), affd, 742 F.2d 1438 (2d Cir. 1983). In Hunt, following an
eight week trial in 1978, the district court dismissed some of the plaintiffs' claims on the mer-
its and ruled that others were subject to arbitration. See id. at 370. The remainder of the case
then went to arbitration, but in 1982 the plaintiffs commenced a state court action seeking to
vacate the arbitral award. The federal district court ruled that it retained jurisdiction over the
claim it sent to arbitration and further ruled that it was justified in enjoining the state court's
consideration of the claim by either the second or third exception to the AIA. The district
court emphasized the "considerable familiarity of this Court with the complex issues involved
in the case throughout its history ... ." Id. at 373. Here, given the vast expenditure of time
and resources in the federal court, and given the state court's total lack of familiarity with the
case, the injunction does seem justified to protect the federal court's jurisdiction.
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court may, in rare circumstances, find it necessary to enjoin a state pro-
ceeding to protect its own jurisdiction where a party is engaged in harassing
and abusive litigation tactics that threaten the viability of the federal ac-
tion.333 Similarly, where the party requesting the antisuit injunction has it-
self engaged in harassing conduct, I believe the federal court should not is-
sue the injunction to preserve its jurisdiction.
3. "Protection or Effectuation of Judgment" Exception
(Relitigation Exception)
a. Background on the "Protection or Effectuation of Judgment" Exception
The "protection or effectuation of judgment" exception, also known as
the "relitigation exception," is in some ways the most logical of the excep-
tions.334 As Professor Redish has observed, it would seem to be based on a
policy that "[l]itigants should not be allowed to relitigate in state court is-
sues between them that have already been determined by a federal court,
lest the parties prevailing in federal court be subjected to harassment, and
the finality and legitimacy of the federal court's findings be undermined."
335
Yet, as Redish also observes, the policy makes less sense as one gives it
closer scrutiny.3 36 Why can't state courts be expected to use their own pre-
clusion doctrines to prevent relitigation of issues that have already been de-
cided?337 The explanation that jumps to mind is that we can't trust state
courts, perhaps seeking to aggrandize their own jurisdiction, not to ignore
federal precedent.338 Yet, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that we
can, as a general matter, trust state courts to properly apply federal law.
339
332 See supra text accompanying notes 293-98 (discussing cases in which "several lower
courts have recently used the 'in aid of jurisdiction' exception more broadly, particularly to
assist in the management of complex litigation and class actions").
333 It is somewhat difficult even to imagine this scenario. If, however, one of the parties
to the federal suit kept repeatedly filing actions in various state courts, and if that party kept
asking these various state courts to issue temporary restraining orders against its federal oppo-
nent, I would be sympathetic to the federal court's grant of an antisuit injunction.
334 See supra notes 248-51 and accompanying text (discussing the 1948 revision of the
AIA to add a relitigation exception).
335 Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute, supra note 142, at 723.
336 See id. at 723-24 (arguing that the doctrine of res judicata should be sufficient to pre-
vent the relitigation of cases in the state courts).
337 See id.
338 See id. at 724 ("One explanation... is that the relitigation exception reflects perva-
sive mistrust of the state courts' ability and willingness to comprehend federal judgments and
to accord them proper respect.").
339 See supra text accompanying notes 248-53 ("Thus, the A[IA] reflects the federalist
premise that state courts can generally be trusted to apply federal statutory law and Constitu-
tional provisions."); see also Henry J. Bourguignon, The Federal Key to the Judiciary Act of
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Without resolving this basic concern as to the policy underlying the
relitigation exception, the Supreme Court has set out a framework for when
the exception does and does not apply. In essence, the Court has interpreted
the exception narrowly, thus far precluding relitigation only of those spe-
cific issues that have actually been presented to, and resolved by, the federal
court.3a0 Thus, in Chick Kam Choo,341 the Court found that where a federal
court had granted summary judgment as to the plaintiffs federal law claims
and dismissed the plaintiff's Texas law claim for forum non conveniens,
342
1789, 46 S.C. L. REV. 647, 701-02 (1995) ("The grant to state courts of maximum concurrent
jurisdiction with the federal courts and of exclusive jurisdiction over most cases arising under
federal law, treaties and the Constitution reflected a trust, perhaps reluctant for some, of the
state courts in dealing with important federal suits of their own citizens."); Henry M. Hart, Jr.,
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,
66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953) (concluding that state courts have been considered pri-
mary and in many cases ultimate guarantors of constitutional rights). But see Richard H. Fal-
lon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1218 (1988) (noting that
"the Constitution does not presume the parity of state and lower federal courts" but rather
trusts the lower federal courts to guarantee the "supremacy of federal law and federal rights");
Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdic-
tion, 85 NwV. U. L. REV. 1, 46-47 n.237 (1990) (arguing that the Framers did not trust state
courts to "faithfully enforce federal law"); Neubome, supra note 117, at 1105 (arguing that it
is an "illusion that state courts will vindicate federally secured constitutional rights as force-
fully as would the lower federal courts"); Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congres-
sional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a
New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 69-70, 100 (1975) (arguing that lower federal courts
are "the enforcers of Supreme Court decisions" and that "[s]tate judges who are either unfa-
miliar with or antagonistic to federal programs ... may do much to disrupt and injure federal
schemes of national scope").
340 See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood ofLocomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 297
(1970) (vacating the district court's injunction prohibiting enforcement of a state court in-
junction barring picketing, even though the district court had previously ruled that the picket-
ing could not be enjoined under federal law). The Court reasoned that because it was not clear
in the federal court's initial ruling that federal law precluded an injunction based on state law,
the federal court was not justified in enjoining the subsequent state court action to protect its
own order. See id. at 287-93. The Court explained that the state court should be allowed to
make the determination whether federal law preempted the state court injunction, even though
the federal court "was certain" that the state court action "was improper" under the Supreme
Court's intervening decision in Brotherhood of R.R Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,
394 U.S. 369 (1969). See Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 296; see also supra text accompa-
nying notes 285-92 (arguing that the Supreme Court "has in several decisions sharply limited
the scope of the exception, distinguishing specifically between actions brought in rem and
those brought in personam").
341 Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
342 The case involved a Singapore resident who was killed in an accident in Singapore
while performing repair work on a ship owned by Esso Tankers Inc., a subsidiary of Exxon.
See id. at 142. The federal claims had been brought under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, the
Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761, and the "general maritime law of the United
States." Id. These claims were rejected by the district court, respectively, on the grounds that
plaintiff was not a "seaman," that he had not died on the "high seas," and that Singapore law
rather than U.S. general maritime law applied. See id. at 142-43.
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and where the plaintiff brought a subsequent claim based on the same inci-
dent in state court alleging claims under both Texas and Singapore law, the
federal court was justified in enjoining only that portion of the state court
case that was based on Texas law, because only that claim involved "an is-
sue that previously was presented to and decided by the federal court."
343
The Court explained that the relitigation exception "is founded in the well-
recognized concepts of resjudicata and collateral estoppel, ' 344 and that "an
essential prerequisite for applying the relitigation exception is that the
claims or issues which the federal injunction insulates from litigation in
state proceedings actually have been decided by the federal court." '345 While
commentators have expressed some dismay at the Court's narrow interpre-
tation of the relitigation exception, observing that principles of res judicata
normally preclude claims that could have been raised as well as those that
were actually raised in a prior proceeding, 346 all but one appellate court that
has ruled on the issue after Chick Kam Choo has concluded that only actu-
ally litigated claims may be protected.347
The Court has further limited the scope of the relitigation exception by
ruling that even where a state court has explicitly determined that a prior
federal court judgment is not entitled to res judicata effect in the state court,
343 Id. at 147. The district court had initially granted the defendant's motion to perma-
nently enjoin the plaintiff and her attorneys 'from prosecuting or commencing any causes of
action or claims against [respondents] in the courts of the State of Texas or any other
state... arising out of or related to the alleged wrongful death of Leong Chong."' Id. at 144.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. See id. at 144-45.
344 Id. at 147.
345 Id. at 148. The Supreme Court also found that it would be up to the state court to de-
termine whether, as the defendant argued, the state's forum non conveniens determination was
preempted by federal maritime law. See id. at 149-50. It stated: "[W]hen a state proceeding
presents a federal issue, even a pre-emption issue, the proper course is to seek resolution of
that issue by the state court." Id.
346 See, e.g., 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 215, § 4226 & nn.7-9 (Supp. 1997) ("[C]laim
preclusion bars state litigation on a part of the claim that could have been, but was not, heard
in the federal action ... ."); George A. Martinez, The Anti-Injunction Act: Fending Off the
New Attack on the Relitigation Exception, 72 NEB. L. REv. 643, 659 (1993) (arguing that
Chick Kam Choo should not be read to mean that a federal court may enjoin a state court from
considering only those issues actually decided by the federal court and asserting that the
Court's language to this effect is "unconsidered dicta," in that defendants did not argue for
preclusion of claims that could have been but were not raised in the federal court).
347 See In re SDDS, Inc., 97 F.3d 1030, 1037 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that only issues
which have actually been decided by a federal court permit enjoining a state court from reliti-
gating the issue); Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506, 524 (5th Cir. 1994) (same); LCS
Servs., Inc. v. Hamrick, 925 F.2d 745, 749 (4th Cir. 1991) (same); American Town Ctr. v.
Hall 83 Assocs., 912 F.2d 104, 112 (6th Cir. 1990) (same); Staffer v. Bouchard Transp. Co.,
878 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1989) (same). But see Western Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864,
870-72 (9th Cir. 1992) ("We disagree with those Circuits which have concluded that the reli-
tigation exception is limited to issues 'actually litigated' in a prior court proceeding.").
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the federal court may not necessarily enjoin the state court action in order to
protect its own decree.3 48 Rather, if the state court's ruling that the federal
court action was non-preclusive would itself be entitled to res judicata or
collateral estoppel effect in the state court, then the federal court is required
to defer to that ruling.349 The Court reasoned that the possibility that "inef-
ficient simultaneous litigation in state and federal courts on the same issue"
would result from this decision "is one of the costs of our dual court system
,,350
Case law has not entirely resolved the question of how final a federal
court ruling must be to support an injunction against a state court under the
relitigation exception. At the extremes, it is clear that a final judgment is
sufficient351 and that an injunction protecting ajudgment that a federal court
may make in the future, but has not yet made, is insufficient. 352 Beyond
this, as a leading treatise notes, "there is some uncertainty."353  While the
Second Circuit did affirm issuance of an injunction based on a discovery or-
348 See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 524 (1986) (limiting the reli-
tigation exception of the AIA to those situations in which the state court has not yet ruled on
the merits of the res judicata issue). Plaintiffs had initially sued defendants in state court in
February, 1979. A few months later, plaintiffs brought an action against some of the same
defendants on related grounds in federal court. The federal action was tried first, and although
plaintiffs won a favorable jury verdict, the district court granted a j.n.o.v. in favor of the de-
fendant. When the defendant sought to have the pending state court action dismissed on res
judicata grounds, the state court denied the motion. Plaintiffs went on to secure a verdict of
$4,000,001 in the state court action, and defendants then asked the federal district court to
enjoin the plaintiffs from further prosecuting the state court action. The injunction granted by
the district court was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. See id. at 520-21.
349 The Parsons court stated:
Ve believe that the Anti-Injunction Act and the Full Faith and Credit Act can be
construed consistently, simply by limiting the relitigation exception of the Anti-
Injunction Act to those situations in which the state court has not yet ruled on the
merits of the res judicata issue. Once the state court has finally rejected a claim of
resjudicata, then the Full Faith and Credit Act becomes applicable and federal courts
must turn to state law to determine the preclusive effect of the state court's decision.
Id. at 524. See generally Wood, supra note 34, at 305-06 (critiquing Parsons on the ground
that it discourages parties from exhausting state court remedies and instead encourages theni
to file actions in federal court as quickly as possible).
350 Parsons Steel, 474 U.S. at 525 (calling a federal court injunction against the enforce-
ment of a state court judgment "highly intrusive").
351 See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 150-51 (1988) (holding that
the district court was justified in enjoining the state court from considering claims which the
federal court had already rejected in resolving a motion for summary judgment).
352 See 17 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, Er AL., supra note 215, § 4226 n.16 (citing, inter
alia, Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 929 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that
protecting possible future federal court judgments is an insufficient reason to enjoin state pro-
ceedings) and Mooney Aircraft Corp. v. Foster, 730 F.2d 367, 374 (5th Cir. 1984) (same)).
353 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 215, § 4226.
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der,354 other circuits have not adopted such a lax test.355 Some have sug-
gested that the test for whether a federal court ruling is sufficiently final to
support an order for injunctive relief ought to be whether the federal court's
order would be subject to interlocutory appeal, if not appeal as a final judg-
ment.
356
b. Application of the Protection or Effectuation of Judgment Exception to
Federal Courts' Issuance of Pro-Arbitration Antisuit Injunctions
Although quite a few federal district courts have based their issuance of
antisuit injunctions on the "relitigation" exception to the AIA, none of these
courts has provided a substantial analysis justifying its reliance on the ex-
ception.357 Rather, such courts have typically made a simple statement such
354 See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 288 F.2d 245, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1961) (enjoining a
party from using information obtained in federal court discovery in a state court proceeding).
355See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
134 F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that neither the denial of class certification nor the
rejection of a provisional class settlement were sufficient to support an injunction under the
relitigation exception to the AIA); J.R. Clearwater Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176,
179 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the denial of class certification in a federal action was
not a judgment that could form the basis for enjoining state court action); Coastal Petroleum
Co. v. U.S.S. Agri-Chems., 695 F.2d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that a pretrial order
determining that certain defenses would not be available at trial was not a final order suffi-
cient to support an injunction under the relitigation exception).
356 See 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 215, § 4226 (suggesting that interlocutory rulings
that are appealable as of right or under the collateral order doctrine could be the basis for an
injunction, but arguing that the statute should not be interpreted to include an order "merely
because it might have been certified for discretionary interlocutory appeal" in that doing so
"would make this exception wholly open-ended and would go far beyond the purposes it was
intended to serve").
357 See, e.g., In re Arbitration Between Nuclear Elec. Ins. Ltd. & Central Power & Light
Co., 926 F. Supp. 428, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that an order staying a pending Texas
state court action is justified, "when issued subsequent to or in conjunction with an order
compelling arbitration concerning the same subject matter as the state court proceeding," un-
der one or both of the second two exceptions to the AIA); Ferrari N. Am., Inc. v. Crown Auto
Dealerships, No. 94 Civ. 8541 (KMW), 1995 WL 614558, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995)
(allowing an injunction under either the second or third exception because "[a]llowing the
Florida proceeding to continue would be inconsistent with this court's order that the parties
proceed to arbitration of their dispute in New Yor-k"), affid, 101 F.3d 686 (2d Cir. 1996);
Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Vetter, 838 F. Supp. 468, 472-73 (D. Mont. 1993) (granting a petition
to compel arbitration and also staying any further state court proceedings as inconsistent with
such federal order); McGuire, Comwell & Blakey v. Grider, 765 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (D.
Colo. 1991) (stating that as the court had decided in its opinion to order the parties to submit
their claims to arbitration, any further proceedings in state court on the arbitrable claims and
disputes would be inconsistent with that order); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 557 F. Supp. 368,
372 (S.D.N.Y.) ("From what has already been set forth, it is abundantly clear that this case
comes within the exception and that the Court is empowered to enjoin the Hunts' state court
proceeding as necessary to effectuate the judgment entered in this action."), affid, 742 F.2d
1438 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Network Cinema Corp. v. Glassburn, 357 F. Supp. 169, 172
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as that issued by a Montana district court in Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Vet-
ter:35S  "Because the petition to compel arbitration should be granted, any
further proceedings in state court between [the parties] should be stayed as
inconsistent with this order. This stay thus falls within the third exception
contained in the Anti-Injunction Act. .... 7359
Two district courts employed somewhat more detailed analyses and
concluded that they were not permitted to issue an antisuit injunction by the
third exception to the AIA. In TranSouth Financial Corp. v. Bell,360 Judge
Thompson stated:
An injunction staying the state-court suit by Bell could not be properly issued
as a means to protect or effectuate a judgment of this court, as none has been
entered. The court is not tempted to put the cart before the horse by first de-
cidinthe arbitrability question, and then strapping an injunction on that deci-
sion.
The court explained that the AIA permits federal courts to enjoin state
actions only where the court "has issued an immediately appealable ruling
containing directives with preclusive effects on state as well as federal
courts .... ,362 Examining the policy implications of its ruling, the Tran-
South court found no unfairness or other problems, because the party now
seeking the injunction could have moved more quickly to file suit in federal
court, and state courts can apply federal arbitration law as well as the federal
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (stating that because the court held that the dispute should be referred to ar-
bitration, a stay of state proceedings was authorized to protect and effectuate that determina-
tion); In re Arbitration of Controversies Between Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp. & Carl,
260 F. Supp. 665, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (concluding that a stay was necessary to protect or
enforce the judgment because, having ruled that the disputes should be sent to arbitration, any
further proceedings in state court would be inconsistent with the decision and decree of the
federal court); see also Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 916 F.2d 58,
60 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating in dictum that although a district court has conclusively ruled that a
dispute is arbitrable, and where the effect of that ruling may be undermined by relitigation in
state courts, an injunction may be permitted); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
541 F.2d 1263, 1274 (7th Cir. 1976) (stating that while the district court might have con-
cluded that an injunction was necessary to protect or effectuate judgment, it had discretion not
to do so and did not abuse its discretion in denying the injunction).
358 838 F. Supp. 468 (D. Mont. 1993).
359 Id. at 473.
360 975 F. Supp. 1305 (M.D. Ala. 1997), affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds,
and remanded, 149 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998). See supra notes 309-16 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that an injunction may be warranted
under the "in aid ofjurisdiction" exception.
361 975 F. Supp. at 1310.
362 Id. The court explained, however, that had the state court suit been filed afier the is-
suance of a federal court order compelling arbitration, then the federal court would have been
justified in enjoining such a suit. See id. at 1310-11.
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36336
courts. In Roodveldt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,364
the court employed a somewhat different analysis, concluding that even as-
suming the injunction might be permissible under the relitigation exception,
the district court would exercise its discretion not to grant the injunction be-
cause "there is little danger that the Pennsylvania state court litigation will
unduly affect an arbitration order entered by this court."365 Rather the fed-
eral court concluded that its own ruling would continue to require arbitra-
tion despite the course of action taken by the state courts.
3 66
In determining whether the relitigation exception permits issuance of an
antisuit injunction to support a federal court's grant of a motion to compel
arbitration, courts should first consider whether the granting of the motion
to compel is sufficiently final to be treated as a "judgment" under the AIA.
Although most courts have failed even to address this question in interpret-
ing the AIA, the answer is not clear. Interpreting two somewhat ambiguous
367provisions of the FAA, most appellate courts have dealt with this lan-
guage by denying immediate appeals from orders granting motions to com-
pel arbitration where the arbitration issue is "embedded" in a broader dis-
pute on the merits, and allowing such appeals only where the motion to
compel arbitration is an independent action.368 Thus, the relitigation excep-
363 See id. at 1311 ("Although the foreign corporations here may not have been able to
anticipate being sued for fraud ... before being served with papers in state court action, there
is no unfairness in this fate.").
364 585 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
365 Id. at 783 (stating that the federal court's order would be unaffected by the state
court's action).
366 The state court granted an injunction precluding Roodveldt, a former Merrill Lynch
employee, from continuing to solicit Merrill Lynch accounts, clients, and customers. See id.
at 774. The state court neither explicitly ordered arbitration nor denied Roodveldt's petition
for a stay pending arbitration, but rather granted Merrill Lynch the requested injunctive relief,
concluding that it was "the only means available.. . to maintain the status quo pending an
opportunity to arbitrate the dispute upon the merits." Id. at 781; see also Swofford v. Shear-
son Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1128, 1129 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (concluding, with-
out analysis, that none of the exceptions to the AIA applied).
367 The FAA allows appeal from "a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is
subject to this title," 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) (1994), but it also explicitly provides that a court's
interlocutory grant of a motion either to stay litigation pending arbitration or to compel arbi-
tration is not subject to appeal. See id. § 16(b). The issue is thus whether some orders com-
pelling arbitration can properly be considered "final" and thus covered by 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3)
and not 9 U.S.C. § 16(b). Interlocutory appeal would also be allowed where the district court
and circuit court both exercise their discretion, as set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994), to
certify the matter as requiring interlocutory review.
368 See, e.g., Napleton v. General Motors Corp., 138 F.3d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a grant of arbitration that was
embedded in the larger case), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 341 (1998); McCarthy v. Providential
Corp., 122 F.3d 1242, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1997) (same), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 275 (1998);
Altman Nursing, Inc. v. Clay Capital Corp., 84 F.3d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1996) (dismissing an
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tion would not seem to apply where an entire case on the merits was filed in
federal court, but rather only in those cases where solely a motion to compel
was filed and then granted by the federal court.
Second, as a matter of policy and fairness, as the district court con-
cluded in TranSouth, there seems to be little reason to permit the issuance of
such an injunction against state courts. The Supreme Court has required
that state courts apply the FAA and has stated that it must generally be as-
sumed that state courts properly apply federal law. Moreover, a party that is
particularly concerned about the attitude of the state court toward arbitration
need only make sure to file an action as quickly as possible in federal court,
once a dispute arises, to ensure that the federal court will be authorized to
enjoin a subsequently filed state court action.
Third, it is not at all clear that such an injunction is necessary as a mat-
ter of practicality. Once the federal court has issued an order compelling
arbitration, parties would risk sanctions such as contempt of court by refus-
ing to follow the order. Although some might protest that a subsequent state
court order refusing to order arbitration or voiding the arbitration clause
might put parties in a difficult situation, there is no reason to believe that
such orders would be common.369 Even assuming (as I have argued) that
state courts are currently less favorably inclined toward arbitration than fed-
eral courts, it is unlikely that many state courts would directly counter a
prior federal court order compelling arbitration. In short, while it seems that
federal district courts are justified in issuing antisuit injunctions to support
the grant of a motion to compel arbitration in non-embedded proceedings,
policy factors weigh against the federal courts' use of the injunction even in
this situation.
appeal where the parties had sought relief on the underlying claims); Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v.
Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[Ain order can only be final within the
meaning of § 16(a)(3) and therefore immediately appealable if arbitrability is the sole issue
before the district court."); Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co., 15 F.3d 93, 95 (8th
Cir. 1994) (concluding that appellate courts lack jurisdiction to hear appeals from embedded
proceedings); Filanto, S.P.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 984 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1993) ("If the
suit is 'embedded,' . . . orders directing arbitration are not immediately appealable."); cf
Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80, 84-86 (2d Cir. 1961)
(Friendly, J.) (concluding that the district court's decision to order a trial on arbitrability was
not sufficiently final to be appealable, but also concluding that the First Circuit's ruling on
arbitrability was sufficiently final to bind the district court). But see Arnold v. Arnold Corp.,
920 F.2d 1269, 1276 (6th Cir. 1990) (concluding that even an embedded arbitration order is
an appealable final judgment). See generally Carla Kemp, Note, Appeals of Orders Compel-
ling Arbitration in Embedded Proceedings Must Wait, 1997 J. Disp. RESOL. 143.
369 This author has identified no decisions in which a state court insisted on resolving a
dispute through litigation after the federal court issued an order compelling arbitration. Still,
state courts should have the power to proceed concurrently in exceptional situations.
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4. Conclusions About the Applicability of AIA
Looking at the AIA as a whole, once again, it appears that both the fed-
eralism principles underlying the AIA, and the federal policy underlying the
FAA, generally oppose arbitral antisuit injunctions. Nonetheless, such in-
junctions may occasionally be permitted depending on the relative priority
of the federal and state actions, the status of each of the two actions, and
perhaps a showing of vexatious conduct by either party. In terms of prior-
ity, where the party seeks federal injunctive relief prior to the filing of the
state court action, the AIA poses no bar whatsoever. Further, although the
"expressly authorized" exception seems not to apply at all, under certain
circumstances the federal court may be authorized in issuing an antisuit in-
junction either to protect its jurisdiction or to prevent relitigation of its
resolution of the arbitration issue. The more the federal court has invested
in the dispute relative to the state court, the more likely it is that an injunc-
tion would be warranted either to protect the federal court's jurisdiction or
to prevent relitigation. Also, where the party against whom the injunction is
sought appears to have engaged in harassing or vexatious conduct, and
where the party seeking the injunction has not engaged in such conduct, ei-
ther of the exceptions is more likely to apply.
D. Abstention Doctrines
The doctrines previously discussed in this Article determine whether
federal courts have the authority to enjoin state court actions.370 The ab-
stention doctrines discussed in this Subpart, by contrast, govern the question
of whether a federal court that has the authority to enjoin a state court may,
ought, or ought not exercise its discretion to do so. The Supreme Court has
often observed that not only the AIA, but also "principles of equity, comity,
and federalism," might preclude issuance of an antisuit injunction.37'
Abstention, described by one commentator as "a hydra-like beast,"372 is
based on a series of Supreme Court decisions rather than on any statute.
Typically, both courts and commentators identify the various categories of
abstention by the name of the court decision which originated each type of
370 See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 US.
281, 286-87 (1970) (rejecting the contention that the AIA establishes a mere principle of
comity rather than a binding rule regarding the power of the federal courts); cf Wood, supra
note 34, at 294 (stating that "[w]hether the Act is 'jurisdictional' or merely an expression of
equitable restraint has remained unclear through the many years of its existence," but then
basing the remainder of her article on the assumption that the AIA is jurisdictional).
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 244 (1972) (Burger, C.J., White & Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring).
372 Rehnquist, supra note 114, at 1050.
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abstention.373 The Court has expressed some ambiguity as to whether the
various types of abstention should be viewed together, as part of a-whole, or
separately.374 Commentators have battled over the propriety of abstention
given various circumstances, focusing particularly on whether and how ab-
stention should take account of federal and state interests.
375
Rather than attempt to devise a comprehensive abstention theory, a task
which has challenged (and perhaps daunted) many commentators, this Arti-
cle will focus on the two separate strands of abstention doctrine which ap-
pear most relevant to the question of whether a federal court should enjoin a
state court action regarding a motion to compel arbitration. Specifically, it
373 See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976) (requiring abstention, in limited circumstances, to prevent duplication of ongoing state
court litigation); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971) (requiring abstention as to ongo-
ing state criminal prosecution not shown to be brought in bad faith); Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1959) (permitting abstention as to an unsettled
and politically sensitive state law issue); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943)
(requiring federal abstention where federal court action would disrupt a complex state regula-
tory scheme); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941) (requiring federal
courts to abstain where they can avoid deciding a federal constitutional issue by deferring to a
state court's determination on an unsettled issue of state law).
374 Compare Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 US. 1, 11 n.9 (1987) ("The various types
of abstention are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases. Rather,
they reflect a complex of considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system
that contemplates parallel judicial processes."), with New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1989) ("While we acknowledge that '[t]he various types of
abstention are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases,' the policy
considerations supporting Burford and Younger are sufficiently distinct to justify independent
analyses.") (citation omitted) (quoting Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 11 n.9), and Colorado River, 424
U.S. at 813-15 (analyzing various types of abstention independently).
375 Professor Richard Fallon has categorized two major strands of such commentary as
either nationalist (favoring federal courts) or federalist (favoring state courts). See Fallon,
supra note 339, at 1151. Compare Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1037-38 (1982) ("federalist"), and Hart, supra
note 339, at 1401 (same), with Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE
L.J. 1425, 1426-29 (1987) ("nationalist"), John Minor Wisdom, Foreword: The Ever-
Whirling Wheels of American Federalism, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1063, 1072 (1984)
(same), and Fiss, supra note 117, at 1103 (same). Another commentator has urged that ab-
stention doctrine be drastically revised and largely eliminated to reflect the Constitution's
fundamental forum neutrality. See Rehnquist, supra note 114, at 1052. Commentators have
also battled over the empirical question of whether, in fact, there is "parity" between the de-
terminations of federal and state courts. Compare Neubome, supra note 117, at 105-06 (as-
serting that federal courts are more sympathetic to federal rights than are state courts), with
Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State
Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 214-15
(1983) (arguing that federal and state courts are equally likely to uphold federal claims). See
generally Amar, supra note 117, at 646 (arguing that the Constitution mandates that state
courts be considered competent to decide federal issues, but that Article III also mandates that
federal courts "be the last word" in federal question and admiralty cases).
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will first examine Colorado River abstention,376 which focuses on whether
exceptional considerations of wise judicial administration and efficiency
dictate abstention by the federal court. It will then turn to so-called Younger
abstention, which looks to whether it is permissible for a federal court to
enjoin a previously filed state action.
1. Colorado River/Moses H. Cone Abstention
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.,377 the Supreme Court directly addressed the question of whether a
federal district court may abstain from hearing a motion to compel arbitra-
tion based on the existence of a previously filed state court action. Apply-
ing the "considerations of wise judicial administration" standard set out in
Colorado River,378 the Court found that the district court had erred in re-
fusing to consider the motion to compel arbitration. The case arose out of a
construction contract between Mercury Construction and Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital that included an arbitration provision. When a dispute
arose regarding payment of certain costs, the Hospital brought suit in state
court.379 Mercury then filed an action seventeen days later in federal court
seeking an order to compel arbitration under the FAA,380 but the district
376 The Court, in Colorado River, took great pains to state that the case was not laying
out a new "abstention" doctrine, but rather a doctrine based on considerations of"[w]ise judi-
cial administration." See 424 U.S. at 817. Nonetheless, the Court, in subsequent opinions,
has referred to Colorado River as an abstention doctrine. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (describing Colorado River as "an example where absten-
tion is warranted by considerations of 'proper constitutional adjudication,' 'regard for federal-
state relations,' or 'wise judicial administration' (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817)).
This Article will follow the same course.
377 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
378 Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (1976). The Colorado River decision involved a
water rights action brought by the United States in federal court under the McCarran Amend-
ment, 43 U.S.C. § 666. See id. at 802-03. The Supreme Court upheld dismissal of the federal
court action in light of a pending state court action involving the same issues. See id. at 820.
In doing so, it cited federal policy opposing piecemeal litigation of water rights issues, the
relative lack of progress in the federal court action, and the relative inconvenience of the fed-
eral forum. See id. at 818-19. While noting that a federal court may abdicate its duty to de-
cide cases only in "exceptional circumstances," the Court found in that case that "considera-
tions of 'wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and
comprehensive disposition of litigation"' justified the federal court's refusal to hear the case.
Id. at 817.
379 See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 7. The Hospital argued, inter alia, that Mercury had
relinquished any right to arbitration under the principles of waiver, laches, estoppel, and fail-
ure to make a timely demand. See id. at 7.
380 Mercury had to wait to file the federal action until the expiration of an ex parte in-
junction obtained by the Hospital in state court which prohibited Mercury from taking any
steps to pursue arbitration. See id.
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court granted the Hospital's motion to stay the federal court action pending
resolution of the identical issues in state court.381 Following an appeal to
the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the stay, con-
cluding that abstention was inappropriate on Colorado River grounds in that
"[t]here was no assumption by either court of jurisdiction over any res or
property,' 382 there was no "contention that the federal forum was any less
convenient to the parties than the state forum," 383 there was no legitimate
concern with "piecemeal litigation, '384 and "[t]he order in which the concur-
rent tribunals obtained and exercised jurisdiction cuts against, not for, the
District Court's stay. 385 The Court explained that although the state court
action had been filed prior to the federal court action, the contractor filed the
federal court action as soon as it could, following expiration of the state
court injunction that had precluded it from taking steps to secure arbitra-
386tion. Moreover, the Court observed that the federal court action had pro-
gressed further toward resolution of the arbitration issue than had the state
court action at the time of the issuance of the stay.387 In concluding that the
district court had erred in staying its resolution of the motion to compel ar-
bitration, the Supreme Court further emphasized the federal policy favoring
speedy resolution of arbitration issues and "the fact that federal law pro-
vides the rule of decision on the merits. 3 88 Finally, the Court took note of
the "probable inadequacy of the state court proceeding to protect Mercury's
381 See id. The Fourth Circuit, in an en banc decision, reversed the district court's stay
order and "remanded the case to the District Court with instructions for entering an order to
arbitrate." Id. at 8.
382 Id. at 19. Colorado River implied that a stay may sometimes be appropriate to allow a
singleprisdiction to maintain its authority over a res. See 424 U.S. at 818.
38M oses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 19. The choice was between the North Carolina Superior
Court of Guilford County and the District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.
See id. at 4, 7. The Hospital conceded that the federal court forum was not inconvenient. See
id. at 19.
384 Id. The Court found that any inconvenience due to the fact that the Hospital might
have to arbitrate claims against certain parties but not others was due to the Hospital's con-
tracts, and not to the federal court action. It further observed that the actual litigation of the
federal court action was "easily severable from the merits of the underlying disputes," id. at
21, and thus gave rise to no significant concern with piecemeal litigation.
385 Id. at21.
386 See id. ("Mercury filed its § 4 petition the same day that the injunction was dis-
solved.").
387 See id. ("[P]riority should not be measured exclusively by which complaint was filed
first, but rather in terms of how much progress has been made in the two actions.").
388 Id. at 23. The "federal law" referred to by the Court was the FAA itself, which the
Court explained gave rise to a body of federal substantive law governing arbitrability. See id.
at 24.
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rights," '389 explaining that it was not clear that state courts were obliged to
grant motions to compel arbitration under section 4 of the FAA.
390
In analyzing Moses H. Cone, it is extremely important to take note of
several issues the Court did not reach. As to the central focus of this Arti-
cle, the Court expressly refrained from ruling on the question of whether a
federal court may stay a state court action pending arbitration. 3 1 Also, the
Supreme Court reserved ruling in Moses H. Cone on the question of
whether a party's engagement in "vexatious" or "reactive" litigation tactics
should be relevant to a federal court's decision of whether or not to abstain
from interfering with an action pending in state court.392  It did, however,
state: "The reasoning of the Courts of Appeals in this case and in Calvert-
that the vexatious or reactive nature of either the federal or the state litiga-
tion may influence the decision whether to defer to a parallel state litigation
under Colorado River-has considerable merit.,
393
389 Id. at 26.
390 See id. at 26. The Court observed that while state courts are required to grant stays of
litigation under section 3 of the Act, it was not clear whether section 4 of the FAA, regarding
motions to compel arbitration, applied to state courts. See id. The Court also noted, as an
"historical matter," that the then current North Carolina precedent did not necessarily favor
even the grant of a stay of litigation. See id. at 27 n.36.
391 See id. at 25 n.32 ("We need not address whether a federal court might stay a state-
court suit pending arbitration under 28 U.S.C. § 2283.").
392 See id. at 17 n.20, 18 (stating "that even if the Hospital acted in complete good faith
there were no exceptional circumstances warranting the District Court's stay").
393 Id. Specifically, the Court noted that the Fourth Circuit had reversed the district
court's stay in part because it concluded that "the Hospital's state-court suit was a contrived,
defensive reaction to Mercury's expected claim for relief and for arbitration." Id. (citing Mer-
cury Constr. Corp. v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 656 F.2d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1981) (en
banc), affd, 460 U.S. 1 (1983)). The Fourth Circuit also stated, by contrast, that "[i]t is mani-
fest that [the federal court plaintiff's] action was not a 'contrived' federal claim asserted only
in order to delay the resolution of the controversy nor was it a 'reactive' or 'tactical maneuver'
for such purpose." Id. at 944. The earlier case mentioned by the Court, Will v. Calvert Fire
Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978), had reversed and remanded a district court's issuance of a stay
for reconsideration in light of Colorado River. See id. at 655, 657. On remand, both the dis-
trict court and the court of appeals concluded that the stay should be continued as "a means to
deter vexatious use of the federal courts." Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reinsurance
Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1236 (7th Cir. 1979) (stating that the prevention of a vexatious federal
suit is supported by strong policy and would justify federal deferral to a parallel state pro-
ceeding absent strong countervailing reasons for the federal court to decide a federal suit
without further delay); see also Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reinsurance Co., 459
F. Supp. 859, 866 (N.D. II1. 1978) (staying a federal securities action that was virtually identi-
cal to a counterclaim filed by the same party in a state court action, where the only difference
between the suits was a "questionable" Rule lob-5 claim included only in the federal suit, and
where the state court defendant had filed a separate federal action rather than attempting to
remove the state court action, presumably in an attempt to delay the proceedings), affd, 600
F.2d at 1236. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit in Calvert affirmed the district court's conclu-
sion that the filing of the federal suit was a "defensive maneuver' based on a contrived federal
claim. See Calvert, 600 F.2d at 1234. The court observed:
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Finally, although the Supreme Court concluded that the district court in
Moses H. Cone erred in staying its resolution of the motion to compel arbi-
tration,39a the Court did not foreclose the possibility that abstention might be
appropriate given different facts. One district court distinguished Moses H.
Cone,395 but was reversed on appeal.
396
Moses H. Cone might be distinguished as follows. First, where a party
seeking arbitration files its federal court action in a distant and inconvenient
location, a federal court would have a stronger reason for abstaining on the
Judge Will's characterization of the suit as vexatious is essentially a factual finding
which we should accept on appeal unless contrary to the weight of the evidence.
Such is not the case here. There was ample evidence to support his finding that Cal-
vert sought to delay a final decision on its liability under the participation agreement,
and also that it sought to employ the federal suit as part of its delaying strategy.
While delay is a legitimate trial tactic, it is not one which the federal courts are re-
quired to go along with.
Id. at 1234 n.14.
394 See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 27-28 (holding that the Colorado River test is appli-
cable to stays as well as to dismissals of federal court actions).
395 In TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 975 F. Supp. 1305 (M.D. Ala. 1997), afrd in part,
vacated in part on other grounds, and remanded, 149 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998), the court
found that it must abstain from issuing an order to compel arbitration. In distinguishing
Moses H. Cone, the district court emphasized the following: (1) that allowing the federal ac-
tion to proceed would necessarily lead to piecemeal litigation in that not all the parties could
be joined in federal court due to lack of diversity, see id. at 1308-09, and because pursuant to
the AIA, the district court lacked authority to stay the state court action, see id. at 1308-09,
1313-14; (2) that due to subsequent developments in the law, it is now clear that state courts
have the responsibility and authority to enforce the FAA, see id. at 1314; and (3) that the state
court was a "slightly more convenient forim" than the federal court, see id. at 1308.
See TranSouth, 149 F.3d at 1294-96. In reversing the district court's abstention as an
abuse of discretion, the Eleventh Circuit concluded: (1) any piecemeal litigation was the re-
sult of voluntary party actions and the federal pro-arbitration policy, see id. at 1295; (2) prior-
ity of jurisdiction and timing weighed against abstention, see id; (3) the applicability of fed-
eral law favored the exercise of federal jurisdiction, see id; and (4) that the availability of
complete relief in the state foram only "slightly" favored abstention, see id. Several other
courts have also applied the test set out in Moses H. Cone and concluded that they should not
abstain from considering a motion to compel arbitration. See First Franklin Fin. Corp. v.
McCollum, 144 F.3d 1362, 1363-65 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (reversing the district court's abstention
from a motion to compel arbitration where the federal suit was filed just 18 days after the state
suit); Distajo Second Circuit 11, 107 F.3d 126, 138 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to abstain where it concluded that the state court
had not engaged in "substantial proceedings" in the course of issuing a default judgment),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 365 (1997); Whiteside v. Teltech Corp., 940 F.2d 99, 102-03 (4th Cir.
1991) (holding that district court erred in refusing to consider a motion to compel where no
exceptional circumstances existed that would support such abstention); A.L. Williams & As-
socs., Inc. v. McMahon, 697 F. Supp. 488, 492-93 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (holding that abstention is
not appropriate where, among other factors, the state action was filed less than two months
prior to the filing of the federal suit, and where the state action had not progressed beyond the
filing of initial discovery requests); Roodveldt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
585 F. Supp. 770, 776-79 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that no exceptional circumstances existed
to justify abstention).
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basis of inconvenience than it did in Moses H. Cone.397 Second, whereas
Mercury filed its federal court action as soon as it could, just seventeen days
after the filing of the state court action, some parties have waited much
longer before filing a federal court action and seeking to enjoin the state
court action. In the event of a longer delay, a federal court might conclude
that policies of efficiency and good judicial management would call for def-
erence to the state court, particularly if the state court had already made sub-
stantial progress in the case.398 Third, whereas the Supreme Court justified
its decision, in part, on the ground that the state court might not have the
authority to grant motions to compel pursuant to the FAA, this no longer
appears to be good law. The Supreme Court's post-Moses H. Cone deci-
sions in Southland399 and Terminix400 have made it clear that state courts
must apply at least section 2 of the FAA (requiring enforcement of an arbi-
tration clause) if the contract governs interstate commerce, interpreted in its
broadest possible sense.40 Further, although the Supreme Court has still
not addressed the issue, it nonetheless seems clear that state courts must
grant both motions to compel arbitration and stays of litigation when neces-
sary to support an arbitration agreement.402 Thus, it is no longer true, if it
ever was, that state courts lack the power to grant their own motions to
compel.403  Fourth, whereas the Supreme Court emphasized in Moses H.
Cone that arbitrability is a question of federal law, subsequent Supreme
Court decisions have clarified that arbitrability involves many issues of state
law as well. Where the party challenging arbitration is raising a contractual
397 See TranSouth, 975 F. Supp. at 1308 (holding that "the state court may be a slightly
more convenient forum" in deciding to abstain).
398 Cf First Franklin, 144 F.3d at 1364-65 (emphasizing, in reversing district court ab-
stention, that the federal suit was filed only about three weeks after the state action); Distajo
Second Circuit 11, 107 F.3d at 138 (affirming the district court's refusal to abstain where the
state court had not engaged in "'substantial proceedings' in entering [a] default judgment").
399 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1984) (finding that Congress intended
section 2 of the FAA to apply in federal and state courts).
400 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271-81 (1995) (holding that
state courts must apply section 2 of the FAA rather than conflicting state anti-arbitration stat-
utes, and construing broadly the FAA's requirement that the relevant contract involve com-
merce).
401 See supra text accompanying note 95 (noting that the Supreme Court has stated that
section 2 of the FAA must be enforced by federal and state courts).
402 See supra notes 95-96 (describing sources which support a state court's ability to
grant motions to compel arbitration and stays of litigation as part of their requirement to en-
force section 2 of the FAA).
403 The TranSouth district court relied on these legal developments in concluding that
abstention was appropriate. See TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 975 F. Supp. 1305, 1314-15
(M.D. Ala. 1997), affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, and remanded, 149 F.3d
1292 (11 th Cir. 1998). The Eleventh Circuit, while vacating in part and remanding, accepted
this conclusion. See TranSouth, 149 F.3d at 1295-96.
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defense such as waiver, unconscionability, or fraud, the Court has now
specified that state law shall guide the decision,40 4 and the Court has also
explained that state law shall generally be used to determine whether the
parties decided to arbitrate a particular dispute.40 5 Federal common law is
relevant only to provide the background principle that ambiguities are gen-
erally to be interpreted to favor arbitration,406 and that parties may not be
deemed to have submitted the question of arbitrability to the arbitrators ab-
sent a showing of clear and convincing evidence to that effect. 407 Thus, to
the extent that a party is challenging an arbitration clause or its scope on
state law grounds, the abstention might well be justified.
As will be discussed below, a strong argument can also be made that a
federal court, which might not be justified in abstaining from ruling on a
motion to compel, might nonetheless be justified in abstaining from enjoin-
ing a state court from considering a motion to compel or from enjoining en-
forcement of a judgment already obtained in state court.
2. Younger and Pennzoil Abstention
In Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.,40 the Supreme Court greatly expanded
its earlier decision in Younger v. Harris,40 9 ruling that principles of federal-
ism require a federal court to abstain from enjoining a state court's civil as
404 See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) ("[G]enerally appli-
cable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invali-
date arbitration agreements without contravening § 2.").
405 See First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) ("When deciding whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), courts generally.., should
apply ordinary state-law principles that govem the formation of contracts.").
06 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman/Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 n.8 (1995) (not-
ing that the FAA 'establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a
like defense to arbitrability' (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983))).
407 See First Options, 514 U.S. at 944 ("Courts should not assume that the parties agreed
to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is 'clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]' evidence that they did so."
(citations omitted) (alteration in original)).
408 481 U.S. 1, 10 (1987) (holding that the lower courts "should have abstained under the
principles of federalism enunciated in Younger v. Harris" instead of enjoining a plaintiff from
executing ajudgment in its favor, pending appeal).
409 401 U.S. 37, 41, 44 (1971) (reversing a district court's injunction which barred the
state prosecutor from pursuing ongoing litigation under the California Criminal Syndicalism
Act in state court, despite the fact that the federal plaintiff claimed its First Amendment rights
were in jeopardy, and explaining that such injunction was inconsistent with "Our Federal-
ism").
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well as criminal proceedings if sufficient state interests are at stake.410 Tex-
aco, the federal court plaintiff, had been the defendant in an action brought
in Texas state court by Pennzoil in which the jury awarded $10.53 billion
plus prejudgment interest against Texaco. 411 Texaco sought to file a bond in
state court to suspend execution on the judgment pending appeal. However,
Texas law appeared to require Texaco to post a bond in at least the amount
of the judgment, interest, and costs.412  Texaco's federal court action con-
tended that the requirement of such a large bond violated the Constitution
and various federal statutes.413 Although Pennzoil argued that the requested
injunction was improper as a matter of abstention doctrine, as well as pursu-
ant to the AIA and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the federal district court
granted the injunction and it was affirmed by the Second Circuit.
414
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that: "[t]he courts below should
have abstained under the principles of federalism enunciated in Younger v.
Harris."415 Such principles, explained the Court, meant that, notwithstand-
ing the important interests in protecting federal rights and interests, federal
courts should not unduly interfere with state courts.416 Rejecting a widely
410 See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 11 (stating that Younger abstention should apply to pending
state criminal and civil proceedings "if the State's interests in the proceeding are so important
that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the comity between the States and
the National Government" (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 364(b))).
411 See id. at 4 (describing the jury's award of $7.53 billion in actual damages, $3 billion
in punitive damages, and prejudgment interest).
412 See id. at 5 (stating that with regard to a money judgment, Texas law requires that
"'the amount of the bond... shall be at least the amount of the judgment, interest, and costs'
(quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 364(b))).
413 See id. at 6 (noting Texaco's claim that "the Texas proceedings violated rights secured
to Texaco by the Constitution and various federal statutes"). The specific laws and statutes
cited were the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Williams Act, and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See id. at 6 n.6.
414 See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding
Younger abstention inapplicable because issuance of an injunction would not "interfere with a
state official's pursuit of a fundamental state interest"); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d
1133, 1149 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting Younger abstention on the ground that "[tihe state inter-
ests at stake in this proceeding differ in both kind and degree from those present in the six
cases in which the Supreme Court held that Younger applied," in that those six cases directly
involved a state actor whereas this suit involved two private parties).
415 481 U.S. at 10.
416 The Court stated that the basic doctrine of equitable restraint
is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of "comity," that is, a
proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief
that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left
free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways .... The concept does
not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more than it means centralization
of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts.
The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a sys-
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held view that Younger applied only to criminal proceedings or situations in
which the state itself was a party to the litigation, the Court stated:
This concern [with federalism] mandates application of Younger abstention not
only when the pending state proceedings are criminal, but also when certain
civil proceedings are pending, if the State's interests in the proceeding are so
important that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the com-
ity between the States and the National Government.
417
The Court then went on to conclude that the State of Texas did have an
important interest in enforcing its judgment pursuant to the process selected
by the state. It explained:
Not only would federal injunctions in such cases interfere with the execution
of state judgments, but they would do so on grounds that challenge the very
process by which those judgments were obtained. So long as those challenges
relate to pending state proceedings, proper respect for the ability of state courts
to resolve federal questions oresented in state-court litigation mandates that the
federal court stay its hand.
41
tem in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to
vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so
in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 10 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
417 Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 11. The Second Circuit had distinguished Younger on the basis
of this widely held view, observing that the Supreme Court's previous applications of
Younger had all involved the state government or a state official as a party. See Texaco, 784
F.2d at 1149-50 (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden St. Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423, 437 (1982)) (holding that a federal court is required to abstain from enjoining a state su-
preme court agency from bringing an attorney disciplinary action); see also Moore v. Sims,
442 U.S. 415, 434-35 (1979) (holding that a federal court is required to abstain from enjoining
an action by the state department of human resources); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434,
446-47 (1977) (holding that a federal court should abstain from enjoining an action by the
state department of public assistance); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338-39 (1977) (holding
that a federal court should abstain from enjoining state court judges from enforcing a criminal
contempt citation); Huffinan v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975) (holding that a federal
court should abstain from enjoining state officials from enforcing a state civil nuisance stat-
ute).l
418 Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 14. To support this proposition, the Court cited its prior deci-
sion in Juidice, in which it had required a federal court to abstain from adjudicating a chal-
lenge to a State's contempt process. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 13. The Court found: "There
is little difference between the State's interest in forcing persons to transfer property in re-
sponse to a court's judgment and in forcing persons to respond to the court's process on pain
of contempt." Id. The Court thus rejected Justice Stevens's argument, concurring in the
judgment, that the state here had no interest beyond "its interest as adjudicator of wholly pri-
vate disputes." Id. at 30 n.2 (concurring on the ground that Texaco failed to present a viable
Constitutional claim). The Court stated: "Our opinion does not hold that Younger abstention
is always appropriate whenever a civil proceeding is pending in a state court. Rather, as in
Juidice, we rely on the State's interest in protecting 'the authority of the judicial system, so
that its orders and judgments are not rendered nugatory."' Id. at 14 n.12 (quoting Juidice, 430
U.S. at 336 n.12).
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The nature and purpose of the state court action are relevant in deter-
mining whether a federal court should abstain from enjoining such a suit.
When the Court issued its decision in Younger, it carefully distinguished a
decision it had issued just six years before in Dombrowski v. Pfister,419 ex-
plaining that a federal court would still be justified in enjoining a state court
action that was brought to harass defendants rather than with the expectation
of securing valid convictions.420 The Younger Court similarly cited Cam-
eron v. Johnson,421 stating that it, too, required a showing of "bad faith and
harassment" in order to obtain injunctive relief.
422
3. Application of Colorado River and Younger Abstention Principles to
Federal Courts' Issuance of Pro-Arbitration Antisuit Injunctions
A federal court acts far more intrusively when it directly enjoins a state
court action, particularly following issuance of a state court judgment, than
when it merely proceeds to consider a matter also being considered by a
state court. Thus, even if a federal court is found technically to have juris-
diction to issue such an injunction, it would seem appropriate for a federal
court to be able to abstain from enjoining a state court action under certain
circumstances.
In light of this distinction, it is surprising how few courts have sepa-
rately considered whether they should abstain from enjoining an ongoing
state court action, even if they need not abstain from issuing a motion to
compel arbitration. In fact, this author could not locate a single decision
specifically applying abstention concepts to this determination. However,
419 380 U.S. 479, 489 (1965) (holding that the district court erred in failing to enjoin the
criminal prosecution in state court).
420 In Dombrowski, the federal court plaintiffs sought to enjoin their criminal prosecution
in state court, alleging that:
[T]he threats to enforce the statutes against appellants are not made with any expec-
tation of securing valid convictions, but rather are part of a plan to employ arrests,
seizures, and threats of prosecution under color of the statutes to harass appellants
and discourage them and their supporters from asserting and attempting to vindicate
the constitutional rights of Negro citizens of Louisiana.
Id. at 482. The Court found that the injunction was permissible because the plaintiffs showed
irreparable injury when they alleged that "defense of the State's criminal prosecution will not
assure adequate vindication of [their] constitutional rights," and "a substantial loss or impair-
ment of freedoms of expression will occur if appellants must await the state court's disposi-
tion and ultimate review in this Court of any adverse determination." Id. at 485-86.
421 390 U.S. 611, 618-22 (1968) (upholding a federal court's refusal to enjoin a state's
enforcement on an anti-picketing law where there was no showing of harassment, intimida-
tion, or oppression of the accused).
422 Younger, 401 U.S. at 49 (denying the appellee equitable relief given his failure to es-
tablish that because the prosecution was brought in bad faith or was one of a series of prose-
cutions, an injunction was required to prevent irreparable harm).
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several courts have implicitly applied abstention concepts to the question by
stating that they must consider policies supporting federalism and comity in
determining whether to exercise their discretion to issue an injunction they
found to be permitted under the AIA. Of the six courts that considered such
policies, four decided that it would be inappropriate to enjoin an ongoing
423state court action, and two determined that such an injunction was per-
missible.424
423 In Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1180-82 (1lth Cir. 1981),
overruled on other grounds by Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466 (1Ith Cir.
1997), the court stated that "[w]here a federal court is asked to interfere with pending state
court proceedings it must proceed with caution, taking into account general considerations of
federalism and, in particular, the likelihood of seriously disrupting the legitimate functioning
of the judicial system of the state." It went on to affirm the district court's exercise of its dis-
cretion to deny the requested stay of the state court proceedings, emphasizing that the party
requesting the injunction "allowed the state court proceedings to continue for many months,
turning to the federal court only after most issues had been resolved against it in the state liti-
gation," and pointing out that the state court did not disregard or refuse to apply federal law.
See also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541 F.2d 1263, 1274 (7th Cir. 1976)
(observing that the district court was justified in exercising its discretion not to enjoin an on-
going state court proceeding in light of "the historical reluctance of federal courts to interfere
with state judicial proceedings" (quoting Southern Cal. Petro. Corp. v. Harper, 273 F.2d 715,
718 (5th Cir. 1960))); Swofford v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1128,
1129 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (refusing to exercise its discretion to stay state court proceedings and
to thereby "interrupt the normal flow of judicial business in chancery court"); Roodveldt v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 770, 782-84 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (ob-
serving that although the strict abstention doctrines of Younger may not apply, federal courts
should nonetheless exercise their discretion to enjoin state proceedings "in light of the histori-
cal reluctance of federal courts to interfere with state judicial proceedings," and concluding
that as it is unlikely that further litigation in the state court would endanger the federal court's
arbitration order, a stay would be inappropriate); cf Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Vetter, 838 F.
Supp. 468, 474 (D. Mont. 1993) (holding that although a stay of state action was warranted, it
was not necessary in that the court assumed that the state system would not now proceed fur-
ther, and choosing to refrain from issuing a formal stay or injunction "[o]ut of deference to
and respect for the state court"); Nuclear Installation Servs. Co. v. Nuclear Servs. Corp., 468
F. Supp. 1187, 1188-89 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (granting a petition to compel arbitration, but refusing
to enjoin a state proceeding, without prejudice to renewal of such motion, where a state court
has already stayed litigation).
424 See Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. RobHal, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 822, 830 (E.D. Pa.) (stating
that although "[w]e are sensitive to notions of federalism and comity... [a] preliminary in-
junction restraining the RobHal [company] from proceeding in state court is necessary in aid
of our jurisdiction so as to preserve the integrity of this arbitration process"), a ffdas modified
and remanded sub nom. Specialty Bakeries v. HalRob, 129 F.3d 726 (3d Cir. 1997); A.L.
Williams & Assocs., Inc. v. McMahon, 697 F. Supp. 488, 495 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (holding that
although the court must take into account considerations of federalism, a stay of state pro-
ceedings was justified because "in the particular circumstances of this case, the legitimate
functioning of the California judicial system would not be disrupted, since the California ac-
tion proceeded no further than the initial stages of discovery and had been pending less than
two months when this court issued its initial stay order").
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To properly address the question of whether a federal court ought to ab-
stain from enjoining an ongoing state court proceeding, the federal court
should take into account considerations of wise judicial administration and
also federalism and comity concerns. Once again, these issues can be prop-
erly analyzed only after examining the complete context of the federal and
state actions.
The Colorado River doctrine, for example, requires the federal court to
consider principles of "wise judicial administration," including the strength
of the federal policy, the relative priority and progress of the two actions,
the relative convenience of the two fora, and the possibility of obtaining
complete rather than "piecemeal" relief in either forum.4 25 With respect to
arbitral antisuit injunctions, these factors would often seem to dictate ab-
stention. Although federal policy under the FAA looks favorably upon ar-
bitration, both state and federal courts are bound by this same policy,426 and
thus it would not seem to support a federal injunction under most circum-
stances. Nor would injunctive relief seem appropriate where a substantial
amount of progress has been made in the state court prior to one party's fil-
ing of the federal suit. The district court should also resist enjoining a state
court action where the federal forum seems more inconvenient, or where all
of the parties to the state suit could not be brought into the federal action for
want of subject matter or personal jurisdiction. An injunction may be war-
ranted, however, where a dispute was filed first or very shortly after the
state suit in federal court, and where a substantial amount of progress was
made in the federal court before one of the parties sought to file a parallel
state action.
427
425 See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976) (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952))
("Although this case falls within none of the abstention categories, there are principles unre-
lated to considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and regard for federal-state rela-
tions which govern in situations involving the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent juris-
dictions, either by federal courts or by state and federal courts.").
426 As noted earlier, even where a state court has made a finding in a particular case that
the dispute need not be arbitrated, this by no means illustrates that the state court has ignored
the FAA or that an injunction is appropriate. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99 (not-
ing that a state court will sometimes be justified in ruling that a dispute is not arbitrable).
427 The facts considered by the district and circuit courts in TranSouth present a close
question on abstention. As the district court emphasized, piecemeal litigation of the sort dis-
favored in Colorado River seems inevitable given that not all of the state court parties are
subject to the federal court's jurisdiction. Moreover, the state court would be quite capable of
enforcing federal arbitration policy. See TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 975 F. Supp. 1305,
1313-14 (M.D. Ala. 1997), affid in part, vacated in part on other grounds, and remanded, 149
F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998). At the same time, the appellate court was correct to emphasize
that abstention is generally disfavored, that the federal action was brought only about six
weeks after the state action, and that no substantial progress had been made in the state action.
See TranSouth, 149 F.3d 1292, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 1998). In this author's view, given these
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Pursuant to the doctrines enunciated in Younger and Pennzoil, a federal
court must also abstain from enjoining a state court proceeding "if the
State's interests in the proceeding are so important that exercise of the fed-
eral judicial power would disregard the comity between the States and the
National Government. 'A28 The question of whether the state has such an
interest turns on the relative maturity of the two actions. Where a state
court action has been filed only very recently, where little or nothing has
been resolved, and particularly where the federal court suit was filed prior to
the state court action, a federal court injunction will intrude only slightly
into the state's sphere of interest. By contrast, the further the state court ac-
tion has progressed in terms of the amount of discovery exchanged, and in
terms of the rulings the court has issued, the more the federal court will in-
trude by enjoining that state court action. In the extreme situation, where
the state court action has already proceeded through a trial and to judgment,
stopping that state court action in its tracks blatantly disempowers the state
sovereign. The Supreme Court has already found that a state has a substan-
tial interest in both using its contempt powers to assist a party to collect the
judgment it is due,429 and in allowing a prevailing party to execute its judg-
ment,430 such that federal courts err in enjoining such state court actions.
431
While the Court has not yet ruled on whether Younger abstention is permit-
ted or required in cases where the state court has not yet entered ajudgment,
close facts, a district court could legitimately have exercised its discretion either to abstain or
not to abstain from granting the motion to compel arbitration. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
should not have reversed its decision as an abuse of discretion. At minimum, the district court
was justified in abstaining from granting the antisuit injunction, even if it was not justified in
abstaining entirely from the matter.
428 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (holding that Younger abstention
is warranted when federal injunctions would interfere with the execution of state judgments
on the grounds that they challenge the very process by which those judgments were obtained).
429 See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338-39 (1977) (holding that the district court erred
in enjoining the enforcement of state court contempt proceedings due to principles of comity
and federalism as enunciated in Younger).
430 See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 13-14. The Court explained:
There is little difference between the State's interest in forcing persons to transfer
property in response to a court's judgment and in forcing persons to respond to the
court's process on pain of contempt. Both Juidice and this case involve challenges
to the processes by which the State compels compliance with the judgments of its
courts. Not only would federal injunctions in such cases interfere with the execution
of state judgments, but they would do so on grounds that challenge the very process
by which those judgments were obtained. So long as those challenges relate to
pending state proceedings, proper respect for the ability of state courts to resolve
federal questions presented in state-court litigation mandates that the federal court
stay its hand.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
431 See id. at 17 (concluding that the district court should have abstained); Juidice, 430
U.S. at 338 (same).
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the logic of the Court's approach places greater and greater restraints on the
federal court as the state action progresses further and further.4a
In determining whether a federal court is required to abstain from inter-
fering with an ongoing state court action, the courts should also consider
whether either party has engaged in "harassing" or "bad faith" tactics. The
Court has explicitly held that injunctions which might otherwise be barred
by Younger abstention are permitted where the state court action was
brought in bad faith or to harass. 43 3 In Moses H. Cone, the Court reserved
the question whether a court might consider the harassing nature of either
the federal or state suit in determining whether Colorado River abstention
was required.434  This Article suggests that the Court ought to examine
whether either the federal or state action was brought in bad faith as one
factor in its discretionary abstention analysis. Although it often may be dif-
ficult for a court to make a finding of bad faith, certain scenarios seem to
call for such a finding.435 For example, imagine a scenario in which a party
files an action in state court and then, several years later, having now suf-
fered adverse rulings, files a motion to compel arbitration in federal court
and also requests that the federal court enjoin the ongoing state action.
Certainly these facts would seem to weigh against the grant of the injunc-
436tion. On the other hand, where it could be shown that a party was repeat-
432 Cf TranSouth, 149 F.3d at 1296 n.1 (concluding that Younger did not support absten-
tion by a federal court that was requested to compel arbitration and to issue an arbitral antisuit
injunction because, in light of the applicability of the FAA, "no compelling state interest ex-
ists in having the state courts, instead of the federal courts, decide this case").
433 See supra text accompanying notes 419-22 (discussing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965), and noting that Younger abstention requires an examination of the nature and
purpose of the state court action).
434 See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 17 n.20
(1983) (stating that even though "the vexatious or reactive nature of either the federal or the
state litigation may influence the decision whether to defer to a parallel state litigation under
Colorado River,... [w]e need not rely on such reasoning here").
435 See supra text accompanying notes 160-62 (noting that false forum shopping, ille-
gitimate delay, and repetitive litigation may point to an inappropriate, vexatious, or harassing
action).
436 In Lorentzen v. Levolor Corp., 754 F. Supp. 987, 992-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), the court
abstained, emphasizing that the plaintiff had initially filed in state court, which held the dis-
pute arbitrable, before filing a federal action 20 months later. Some courts have used the con-
cept of "waiver" to apply a similar analysis. See PPG Indus. v. Webster Auto Parts Inc., 128
F.3d 103, 107-10 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirning the district court's finding of waiver where a party
seeking arbitration initially filed two actions in court and obtained substantial discovery be-
fore seeking to compel arbitration of counterclaims); S & H Contractors, Inc., v. A.J. Taft
Coal Co., 906 F.2d 1507, 1514 (11 th Cir. 1990) (holding that a foreign corporation waived its
right to arbitrate by waiting eight months from the time the opposing party filed the complaint
to demand arbitration, during which time parties filed several motions and took several depo-
sitions); cf Distajo Second Circuit 11, 107 F.3d 126, 130-34 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating "the gen-
eral rule that waiver of the right to arbitrate occurs when a party 'engages in protracted litiga-
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edly filing litigation in state court, notwithstanding numerous rulings that
the dispute must be arbitrated, such facts would seem to weigh in favor of a
federal court injunction. In sum, in considering whether or not to abstain
from enjoining a state court action, the federal court should, once again, ex-
amine the four policies discussed in this Article in light of the factual con-
text of the situation.
V. FEDERAL COURTS' OVERZEALOUS ISSUANCE OF PRO-ARBITRATION
ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS AGAINST STATE COURTS REFLECTS THEIR
EXCESSIVE ENTHUSIASM FOR CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION
Federal courts have, at least since 1983,'437 evinced tremendous faith in
and favoritism toward arbitration. In a series of decisions that I have dis-
cussed elsewhere, the Supreme Court and other federal courts have relied on
this preference to interpret the FAA and its scope very broadly,438 to read
arbitration clauses themselves very expansively, 439 and to reject various po-
tential common law defenses to arbitration agreements. 44  In one commen-
tator's words, judges "have chosen to deal with their lack of resources by
tion that results in prejudice to the opposing party,"' but affirming the district court's refiusal
to find waiver where, although the party now seeking arbitration had pursued eviction actions
in state court, the federal court concluded that the issues were sufficiently unrelated so as not
to constitute waiver (quoting Cotton v. Sloane, 4 F.3d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1993))). See gener-
ally MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 96, at 21.2-21.4.3 (discussing the time limits, pursuant to the
FAA, in which parties must agree to arbitrate, and examining the law involving waiver of a
party's right to arbitrate).
37 Moses H. Cone, discussed earlier in this Article at some length, is also the decision in
which the Court first enunciated the view that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed
with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration." Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at
24; see also Sternlight, supra note 54, at 660-61 (arguing that the Court's statement of a pol-
icy favoring arbitration is a "myth" for which the Court has not provided a sufficient rationale
orsuport).
The federal courts have typically found that the FAA applies to employment disputes
despite statutory language that would seem to preclude such coverage. The courts have also
found that the statute applies broadly to cover disputes brought in state court, and that it pre-
empts almost all state arbitration legislation. Also, the courts have rejected virtually all public
policy exclusions to the FAA. See Stemlight, supra note 55, at 19-22 (discussing how the
Court "took additional steps to ensure that the FAA would be applied very broadly" (citation
omitted)).
439 Courts have often found disputes to be arbitrable although they do not clearly fall
within the scope of the arbitration agreement. See id. at 29-30 ("[C]ourts have frequently held
that a securities industry employee who signed a U-4 registration statement... was required
to arbitrate all claims against the employer, even though the U-4 does not specify which dis-
putes are arbitrable.").
440 Courts have tended not to void arbitration clauses on such grounds as fraud or uncon-
scionability. See id. at 25-39 ("Purporting to apply state law, courts seem committed to a be-
lief that all binding arbitration agreements are conveyed with sufficient clarity as to be com-
prehensible to the parties, are agreed to absent fraud or duress, and are fair, although perhaps
lacking formal protection.").
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creating a fictitious new public policy that trumps all others-'the policy in
favor of clearing my docket."'' 41 Many have argued that federal courts'
great enthusiasm for arbitration has caused them to ignore the rights and in-
terests of consumers, workers, franchisees, or other "little guys.
' 42
This Article has shown that federal courts' great enthusiasm for arbitra-
tion has caused them to pay insufficient attention to federalism and comity
concerns, instead proving overly willing to enjoin ongoing state court pro-
ceedings in order to ensure that disputes are arbitrated rather than litigated.
The preceding discussion demonstrates that federal courts have frequently
ignored relevant doctrines or interpreted exceptions quite broadly in issuing
injunctions against state courts in order to support federal court pro-
arbitration rulings.443
Federal courts' excessive enthusiasm for arbitral antisuit injunctions
also tends to benefit larger employers, manufacturers, franchisors, and bro-
kerages over employees, small distributors, franchisees, and customers. As
discussed earlier, it is usually the "little guy" who files in state court.44 4 It
then tends to be the "big guy" who files in federal court, often in a location
441 Cliff Palefsky, Arbitrary Arbitration: The Founders Would Frown on Mandatory
ADR, S.F. DAILY, Mar. 1, 1995, at 4; see also Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract
and Jurisdiction, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 331 (critiquing the Court's expansion of binding arbi-
tration); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of CompelledArbitration, 1997 WIs. L. REv. 33, 36 ("Our
legal sensibilities tell us that where waiver of so important a right as access to the courts is
imposed through a contractual form infamous for the absence of real consent, courts should
draw a protective line by holding the form term at least presumptively unenforceable." (cita-
tion omitted)).
442 See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in
American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1955-67 (1996) (arguing that the institution of arbitra-
tion "is being exploited as a tool by which to achieve a surreptitious reduction of justice serv-
ices in our society"); Carrington & Haagen, supra note 441, at 401 (stating that the Court's
decisions will allow "birds of prey" to "sup on workers, consumers, shippers, passengers and
franchisees"); Sternlight, supra note 54, at 712 ("Congress must act quickly to prevent com-
panies from using arbitration as a tool of oppression.").
443 In some instances, the courts that have issued arbitral antisuit injunctions have failed
to set out the factual context in detail, thereby making it difficult or impossible to say whether
the federal court acted improperly in enjoining the state court action. See, e.g., McGuire,
Cornwell & Blakey v. Grider, 765 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Colo. 1991) (enjoining a state proceed-
ing filed a year and a half prior to a federal ruling without noting the date that the federal ac-
tion was filed or discussing in any depth the progress made in the state action); Pervel Indus.,
Inc. v. TM Wallcovering, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (staying a state court action
without specifying the date of filing of the state or federal action or discussing the status of the
state action), aff'd, 871 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1989); Novik & Co. v. Jerry Mann, Inc., 497 F. Supp.
447 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (enjoining multiple state proceedings without providing any information
as to when they were filed or how far they had proceeded).
444 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (citing cases in which "little guys" filed
state actions).
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distant from where the "little guy" filed suit and where the dispute is cen-
tered. The "big guy" requests not only an order compelling arbitration but
also an injunction to shut down the state court proceeding.445  Thus, to the
extent that federal courts are too willing to shut down state court proceed-
ings they also provide a strategic benefit of forum choice to the "big guy"
over the "little guy." I do not contend that the federal courts intend to pro-
vide such a benefit, nor even that they are necessarily conscious or aware of
the effect of their actions. Nonetheless, based on my analysis of the re-
ported decisions, it does seem clear that federal courts' decisions have such
an effect.446 Interestingly, federal courts have proved much more deferen-
tial to state court judgments ordering arbitration to proceed. In Southeast
Resource Recovery Facility Authority v. Montenay International Corp.,
447
for example, the state court had refused to stay arbitration.448 The party op-
posing arbitration then filed an action in federal court and successfully
moved to stay arbitration.449 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding
that the state court's refusal to enjoin arbitration was equivalent to an order
to compel arbitration and that this decision must be afforded full faith and
credit by the federal court. In reversing the district court's interference
with the state court's pro-arbitration order, the Ninth Circuit went on at
some length about the "values underlying the full faith and credit statute,"
including the promotion of comity and the conservation of judicial
resources.4 51  Similarly, in Integrated Pet Foods, Inc. v. Common-
445 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (citing cases in which "big guys" filed a
motion to compel arbitration in federal court and asked the federal court to enjoin the state
courtproceeding).
It would be fascinating to further explore this point, and to investigate whether federal
courts appear less willing to enjoin state court proceedings when it is the "little guy" who
seeks relief. See supra note 58 (discussing two federal courts' denials of motions to enjoin
state court refusals to order arbitration where the "big guy" filed the state suit). It would also
be interesting to compare the backgrounds of the judges (both state and federal) who are more
and less enthusiastic about arbitration. These projects, however, are for another research
leave.
447 973 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1992).
448 See id. at 712 (referring to an earlier state court decision rejecting the application of a
California statutory provision, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.2(c), allowing "a court to stay ar-
bitration if a party to the arbitration agreement is involved in related litigation with a third
party"k.
44' See id. (noting that the district court held that section 1281.2(c) applied).
450 See id. at 714 (holding that because of "the full faith and credit statute, the promotion
of comity and the conservation of judicial resources," parties with a state court decision can-
not relitigate the same issues in federal court).
451 See id. (stating that "[a] federal court cannot reexamine arguments that already have
been considered and rejected by a state court because such review of a state court decision
creates needless friction between the state and federal forums," and that "[t]he district court
also wasted judicial resources by reexamining the state court order").
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452wealth, the federal district court refused to enjoin a state court proceeding
in which the state court had ordered a dispute to proceed to arbitration.
453
The district court explained that it denied the motion for a temporary re-
straining order and also dismissed plaintiff's complaint on the ground that
the relief sought was barred by the AIA.454 The court noted, as well, that
the motion "appeared to be inconsistent with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine"
in that "it sought, indirectly, to challenge the correctness of a decision of the
Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County."
455
It seems that federal courts have also proven more deferential to state
court rulings in the nonarbitration context. For example, in In re Gen
eral Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litiga-
tion,456 the Third Circuit recently upheld a district court's decision to
deny a motion for injunctive relief against a state court's approval of an
allegedly collusive class action settlement, even though
the Third Circuit had previously refused to certify the plaintiff class or to
accept a virtually identical settlement.457 The court explained that while
the parties' alleged "end run" around the prior federal court order
"gives us pause, 'ASs the court was blocked from interfering with
the state court procedures by the Full Faith and Credit Act,
459
452 No. CIV.A. 95-7847, 1996 WL 153216 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 1996). For a similar case,
see Lorentzen v. Levolor Corp., 754 F. Supp. 987, 987, 991-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), citing princi-
ples of federalism and policies opposing forum shopping, and relying on Colorado River ab-
stention in refusing to consider the plaintiff's claims where a state court had previously ruled
that the dispute was arbitrable.
453 See Integrated Pet Foods, 1996 WL 153216, at *1 (discussing the district court's pre-
vious judgment and noting that it had rejected the moving party's argument that "the state
court had erroneously barred it from asserting a number of defenses").
454 See id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2283, stating that "[a] court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act
of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judg-
ments").
455 Id.
456 134 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 1998).
457 The original Third Circuit decision, In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995), held that the district court erred in certi-
fying a nationwide settlement class of GM truck owners seeking relief as the result of alleged
defects in GM truck fuel systems. See 134 F.3d at 136-37. The 1995 decision both vacated
the class certification order and set aside the settlement, but allowed the parties the option of
curing the defects in the district court. See id. at 137; General Motors, 55 F. 3d at 819.
Rather than seeking to cure such defects, the plaintiffs simply filed a new action in Louisiana
state court. See General Motors, 134 F.3d at 137.
458 General Motors, 134 F.3d at 137.
459 The Third Circuit found that the Full Faith and Credit statute blocked the federal court
from issuing an injunction because, after the district court refused to enjoin the state court ac-
tion, the Louisiana court entered final judgment approving the settlement. See id. at 141-43.
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the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 46 and the AIA. 46 1 Similarly, in Kamilewicz
v. Bank of Boston Corp.,462 the Seventh Circuit found that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine precluded the federal district court from hearing a legal
malpractice action, where the action was based on a claim that attorneys had
committed malpractice in securing a class action settlement in state court
that required plaintiffs to pay more in attorney fees than they received on
the merits.4 63 In so ruling, the Seventh Circuit found that the federal court
lacked jurisdiction to act, even though plaintiffs alleged that the state court
judgment was itself void for lack of personal jurisdiction and lack of due
process,464 and even though the question of whether the settlement was void
for fraud or other reasons was not resolved by the state court until after the
federal suit was filed.465 Finally, in News-Journal Corp. v. Foxman,466 the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court's dismissal of a federal suit on the
grounds of Younger abstention although the federal court plaintiff claimed
The Third Circuit found that judgment would be considered final in Louisiana and must there-
fore be afforded full faith and credit by the federal courts. See id. at 142.
460 The Third Circuit found Rooker-Feldman applicable because, prior to the Third Cir-
cuit's consideration of the appeal (although subsequent to the district court's denial of the
motion to enjoin), the Louisiana court entered a final judgment approving the settlement. See
id. at 143.
461 The Third Circuit found that the injunction was not necessary in aid of the federal
court's jurisdiction because the state court's action did not threaten to cause havoc in any way
with proceedings taking place in the federal court. See id. at 143-46. It contrasted the situa-
tion with the court's prior decision in Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir.
1993), in which the court had ruled that the AIA permitted federal courts to use an injunction
in a multi-district litigation case where settlement was imminent. See General Motors, 134
F.3d at 145 (citing Carlough, 10 F.3d at 203-04). The Third Circuit similarly found that no
injunction was needed to protect or effectuate a federal judgment since neither denial of class
certification nor rejection of a settlement were properly considered a judgment. See Id. at
145-46. Finally, the Third Circuit also found that the federal courts lacked personal jurisdic-
tion to consider the challenge to the Louisiana action. See id. at 140-41.
462 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996).
463 See id. at 511-12. The Seventh Circuit found that, although characterized as a mal-
practice action, the federal suit was effectively an appeal of the state court judgment in that
plaintiffs' injuries resulted from the state courtjudgment. See id. at 510.
464 See id. at 510-11. Judges Easterbrook, Posner, Manion, Rovner, and Wood vigor-
ously dissented from the en banc Seventh Circuit's refusal to grant plaintiff's petition for a
rehearing on a variety of grounds, including the ground that the malpractice action was not
really an appeal of the state judgment, and that the state judgment was alleged to be void for
lack of personal jurisdiction or lack of due process. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp.,
100 F.3d 1348, 1349-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
465 92 F.3d at 510-11. After the federal action was filed, the federal defendants filed a
motion with the Alabama court requesting an order directing them to show cause why they
should not be bound by the prior settlement. See id. at 509. The Alabama court did not reaf-
firm its order of settlement until January 30, 1996, several weeks after the district court dis-
missed that suit for lack ofjurisdiction. See id.
466 939 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1991).
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its First Amendment rights were in jeopardy.4 67  In affirming the district
court's abstention, the appellate court emphasized that "a federal court
[should] 'tread lightly' when a state proceeding is already underway,
'A6s
and that the federal court plaintiff could raise its concerns in the adequate
state forum.4 69 It explained that "[w]hile the News-Journal was entitled to
review of its federal claims in state court, it was not guaranteed its desired
result.'
, 47 °
If federal courts applied similar considerations in determining whether
or not to grant arbitral antisuit injunctions, they would issue far fewer such
injunctions. While this Article does not contend that all arbitral antisuit in-
junctions are improper, it does assert that federal courts have been far too
willing to grant such injunctions. Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Distajo471 is
an example of a case in which the federal courts seemed overly willing to
472interfere with state court proceedings. In one aspect of that factually
complex case,4 7 3 the franchisor, DAI, had its leasing company file an action
in state court to evict franchisee Emily Distajo.474 Distajo then responded
by filing a state court action claiming, inter alia, fraud and breach of con-
tract by DAI and its leasing company.475 Only after Distajo had filed this
dispute did DAI assert the arbitration clause in its contract and file an action
in federal court seeking to compel arbitration. 476 Before the federal court
ruled on the motion to compel, the state court, on October 24, 1994, issued
partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, concluding after sub-
467 The case involved a criminal action, pending in state court, in which the court had
placed a gag order on trial participants. See id. at 1504-05.
468 Id. at 1508 (quoting Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1549 (11th Cir. 1988)
(per curiam)).
469 See id. at 1508-11 (discussing the plaintiff's requests for rehearing and review).
470 Id. at 1511.
471 870 F. Supp. 34 (D. Conn. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, 66 F.3d 438 (2d Cir.
1995), on remand, 944 F. Supp. 1010 (D. Conn. 1996), affd, 107 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 365 (1997).
472 See Distajo Second Circuit 1, 66 F.3d at 458 (affirming the district court's decision
not to accord full faith and credit to judgments of Illinois and North Carolina state courts).
473 The suit involved consolidated litigation from several states. In the interests of brev-
ity and clarity, this Article will only discuss one set of the claims. It should however be noted
that the Second Circuit did conclude that the judgment of an Alabama court was entitled to
full faith and credit and thus reversed the district court's injunction issued as to that proceed-
ing. See id. at 446-49.
474 See id. at 443. DAI conceded that the leasing company was wholly owned by DAI,
that it had no assets or net income, that no rent was paid to the leasing company, and that DAI
made the decision that the leasing company should file an eviction action. Nonetheless, DAI
argued that the leasing company was a separate entity that was not bound by the arbitration
agreement between franchisor and franchisee.
475 See id.
476 See id.
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stantial analysis that the arbitration clauses were void and unenforceable.
4 77
Nonetheless, two and a half weeks following the issuance of the state order,
the federal court granted DAI's motion to compel arbitration. 47  A few
weeks later, the district court granted first a temporary restraining order and
then a preliminary injunction barring Distajo from seeking enforcement of
her Illinois judgment.479 The district court found that the injunction was not
barred by the AIA because continued state litigation "would impair the in-
tegrity of the order of arbitration. ' 4SO On appeal the Second Circuit upheld
the district court's ruling. It concluded that the Illinois court's grant of
summary judgment was not final under Illinois law and that the district
court need not afford it full faith and credit.4 81 The Second Circuit further
concluded that because the federal court motion to compel arbitration had
been filed (though not ruled on) prior to the state court's issuance of its rul-
ing, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not preclude the federal court from
ruling in the case.
482
The outcome in the Distajo litigation seems wrong, given the analysis
in this Article.483 As the state court was fully capable of applying the FAA,
the district court's ruling was not justified by requirements of federal pol-
icy.484 Moreover, interests pertaining to federalism and efficiency opposed
477 Distajo v. Doctor's Associates Inc., No. 94-L-155 (3d Jud. Cir., Ill., Oct. 24, 1994)
(finding the arbitration clause void and unenforceable on grounds of waiver, lack of mutuality,
unconscionability, and fraud).
478 See Distajo Second Circuit 1, 66 F.3d at 443 (noting the grant of motion to compel on
Nov. 10, 1994).
479 See 1d. (noting the grant of a Temporary Restraining Order on Nov. 22, 1994 and a
grant of a preliminary injunction on Dec. 14, 1994); see also 870 F. Supp. 34, 36 (D. Conn.
1994) (granting a preliminary injunction).
480 Doctor'sAssocs., 870 F. Supp. at 36. The Second Circuit apparently was not asked to
review this ruling as it is not discussed in either of the two Distajo appeals. See Distajo Sec-
ond Circuit 1, 66 F.3d at 438; Distajo Second Circuit 11, 107 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 365 (1997).
481 See Distajo Second Circuit 1, 66 F.3d at 449-50 (noting that "[tihe Illinois Supreme
Court has held that an Illinois judgment is not final, and thus not entitled to preclusive effect,
until the time for appeal has expired" (citations omitted)).
482 See Distajo Second Circuit H1, 107 F.3d at 136-38. While the Second Circuit did not
rule on the abstention question with respect to the Distajo set of facts, it did conclude in a re-
lated piece of litigation that abstention was not required because the state court had not en-
gaged in a substantial proceeding. See id. at 138.
483 Although the ultimate outcome does seem wrong, in a technical sense the Second Cir-
cuit's analysis was not eroneous to the extent appellants failed to present certain of these ar-
guments in their appellate briefs. Moreover, it should be recognized that the Distajo courts, at
least, made a serious effort to consider many of the doctrines governing the issuance of anti-
suit injunctions by federal courts against their state counterparts.
484 See supra text accompanying notes 77-113 (arguing that federal policy does not sup-
port issuance of arbitral antisuit injunctions by federal courts against state courts, but rather
supports the assumption that the state courts will adequately enforce the FAA). The state
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the federal override of the state decision. The state court had already in-
vested substantial resources in the case. Discovery had been conducted and
the state court had considered and ruled on a motion for partial summary
judgment, which resolved multiple factual and legal issues. When the fed-
eral district court effectively ignored the state court decision, it not only dis-
respected the state court but also required the federal court and the parties to
expend additional resources to present the same issues a second time. In
addition, the vexatious litigation factor dictated in favor of allowing the
state court judgment to stand. DAI was the party that originally initiated
litigation in state court, albeit acting through its wholly owned leasing com-
pany. Furthermore, DAI waited at least several months before filing the
motion to compel arbitration in federal court. Thus, this is not a case where
a party, from the outset, sought federal court interpretation of the arbitration
clause, but rather one in which a party seemingly tried to shop between two
forums in order to gain a strategic advantage.
The doctrines discussed in this Article could easily have been inter-
preted to allow or even require the federal district court in Distajo to defer
to the state court. Even assuming the district court's analysis of Illinois res
judicata law was correct, and that the Full Faith and Credit statute therefore
did not require preclusion, 485 the district court might nonetheless have inter-
preted the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar an effective appeal of the state
486court decision. Alternatively, even if the district court had found that it
was justified in granting the motion to compel, it could have drawn the line
at enjoining the state court proceeding by concluding that the injunction was
not permitted either by traditional equitable principles 487 or by any excep-
tion to the AIA.4" Finally, the federal court should, at a minimum, have
exercised its discretion to abstain from interfering with a state court pro-
ceeding in which the state court had already invested substantial time and
energy by permitting discovery and making a substantial ruling on the mer-
its.
489
Two rare federal court decisions show how the sort of analysis set out
in this Article might be used to deny an arbitral antisuit injunction. In
found that the defenses it relied on to void the arbitration clause were applicable under the
FAA. See Distajo v. Doctor's Associates Inc., No 94-L-155 (Cir. Ct., 3d Jud. Cir., Ill., Oct.
24, 1994).
485 Without broadening the scope of this Article to examine Illinois law on resjudicata, it
is not possible to consider whether or not Illinois law would have allowed for a contrary deci-
sion on this point.
486 See supra text accompanying notes 200-33 (discussing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
487 See supra text accompanying notes 239-47 (discussing the equitable constraints on
the issuance of injunctions by federal courts).
488 See supra text accompanying notes 248-369 (discussing the AIA).
489 See supra text accompanying notes 370-438 (discussing abstention doctrines).
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TranSouth Financial Corp. v. Bell,490 the district court concluded that where
a borrower filed a state court action on October 4, 1996, and where the
lenders did not file a federal court action until November 25, 1996, the dis-
trict court should abstain from hearing the petition to compel arbitration,
49 1
and that the AIA did not permit the federal court to enjoin the ongoing state
proceedings 92  As well, in Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer,493 the
Eleventh Circuit relied on equitable and full faith and credit principles to
affirm a district court's refusal to enjoin a state court's determination that an
arbitration clause was void, where the federal court plaintiff waited until
"four days before the state court trial and almost nine months after initiation
of the state court proceedings" to seek a federal stay.
494
The analysis set out in this Article may, however, also be used to sup-
port the grant of an arbitral antisuit injunction. Such injunctions may be
appropriate where, for example, the motion to compel arbitration was first
filed in federal court and was ruled upon by that court before an action was
brought in state court. In such a situation the federalism interests are weak,
the efficiency interests favor grant of an injunction, and the principles op-
posing vexatious litigation may also come into play. Hunt v. Mobil Oil
Corp.495 illustrates the point. In that case, plaintiffs filed a federal court ac-
tion in 1975. After three years of discovery and an eight week trial, the
court dismissed several of the plaintiffs' claims on the merits and ruled that
others should be arbitrated.496 The dispute then went to arbitration, but in
1982, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in state court in New York seeking to vacate
an alleged final award by the arbitrators. 497 Defendants requested the fed-
490 975 F. Supp. 1305 (M.D. Ala. 1997), a.fid in part, vacated in part on other grounds,
and remanded, 149 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998).
491 The district court found it appropriate to abstain in large part because the impossibil-
ity of adding certain of the state court parties to the federal court action would necessitate
piecemeal dispute resolution. See TranSouth, 975 F. Supp. at 1308. The Eleventh Circuit
reversed on this issue. See TranSouth, 149 F.3d at 1294-96. See supra note 427 for a discus-
sion of both courts' analyses.
492 See TranSouth, 975 F. Supp. at 1309-11 (finding that exceptions to the AIA did not
apply). The Eleventh Circuit did not reverse but hinted that an antisuit injunction might be
justified if the district court were to compel arbitration. See TranSouth, 149 F.3d at 1296-97.
See supra note 427 for discussion of both courts' analyses.
493664 F.2d 1176 (lth Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Baltin v. Alaron
Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 105 (1998).
494 Id. at 1179; see also id. at 1179-84.
495 557 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affid, 742 F.2d 1438 (2d Cir. 1983).
496 See id. at 370.
497 See id. at 370-71 (noting the plaintiffs' allegation of misconduct by the arbitrators).
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eral court to enjoin plaintiffs from pursuing their state action. 498 The federal
court granted the request,499 and this author agrees that it was justified. The
state court had not issued any decision that would bring into play either the
Full Faith and Credit statute or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Moreover,
the injunction would seem to have been warranted as a matter of equity and
under the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the AIA, given the extensive
time invested by all of the parties in the federal proceeding, the substantial
priority of the federal action over the state court action, the fact that the
plaintiffs had chosen first the federal but then the state forum, and the exis-
tence of at least the possibility that the plaintiffs were engaging in vexatious
or harassing conduct. Finally, abstention was not appropriate in light of the
state court's minimal investment in time compared to the proceedings that
had already taken place in federal court.
CONCLUSION
This Article suggests that many federal courts have been overly willing
to issue arbitral antisuit injunctions. However, it by no means contends that
"big guys" are more likely to engage in forum shopping than "little guys,"
that arbitral antisuit injunctions are always inappropriate, or that federal
courts should refrain from issuing arbitral antisuit injunctions in order to
benefit the "little guys." Consumers, franchisees, and distributors seek an
advantage by filing in state court just as manufacturers, franchisors, and
dealers seek an advantage by filing their motions to compel arbitration in
federal court. The Second Circuit was right when, in Distajo Second Circuit
I, it stated "[t]his case is about forum-shopping, by one and all." 500
Thus, this Article does not contend that federal courts should attempt to
favor "little guys" over "big guys," but only that they should treat "little
guys" fairly by using the same principles in considering arbitral antisuit in-
junctions as they do in considering other antisuit injunctions. That is, fed-
eral courts should base their determinations of whether to issue arbitral anti-
suit injunctions on considerations of federal arbitration policy, comity and
federalism, efficiency, and the desirability of deterring vexatious litigation.
To fully consider these policies, federal courts must examine the spe-
cific factual context of both the state and federal actions. They should rec-
498 See id. at 371 (noting the defendants' extension of the scope of their pending motion
to enjoin the plaintiffs from commencing an action that would interfere with the arbitration
and to order the plaintiffs to continue with the arbitration).
499 See id. at 377.
500 Distajo Second Circuit 1, 66 F.3d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1995), on remand, 944 F. Supp.
1007 (D. Conn. 1996), aftd, 107 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Distajo Second Circuit IP'), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 365 (1997).
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ognize that because federal arbitration policy applies equally to state and
federal courts, federal policy does not typically justify federal antisuit in-
junctions. If the state court suit has progressed far in terms of the issuance
of judgments or the conducting of discovery, both federalism and efficiency
concerns will typically weigh against the issuance of a federal antisuit in-
junction. The federal courts should also be wary of granting arbitral antisuit
injunctions that support a party's use of harassing or vexatious litigation
tactics.
Where federal courts fail to consider the full array of policies and doc-
trines that are relevant to the issuance of arbitral antisuit injunctions, they
ironically use the force of federal supremacy to subordinate state interests in
favor of a third forum, non-judicial private dispute resolution. In sum, when
federal courts allow their great enthusiasm for arbitration to overwhelm
their proper analysis of arbitral antisuit injunctions, they will inevitably is-
sue decisions that are not only damaging to the relationship between federal
and state courts, but also unjust.
* * * * * *
